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ABSTRACT
THE GREAT PESTILENCE
YELLOW FEVER IN PORTSMOUTH, VIRGINIA 1855
Burden Susan Lundgren
Old Dominion University. 2005
Director: Dr. Clare A. Houseman
In 1855, the town of Portsmouth, Virginia was devastated by an epidemic of
yellow fever. Most citizens fled. Of those who remained, most became infected and a
thousand died. The municipal government collapsed. In their place, a small organization
known as the Portsmouth Relief Association assumed responsibility for ensuring the
survival of the town. This organization managed the care of the sick, the burial of the
dead, and the care of orphans. It was the sole agent receiving and allocating the funds and
resources that poured into the community. Scarce food, drugs and other supplies were
available only through the Association. Once the epidemic was over, the Association
handed control back to the returning Common Council.
This dissertation examines the work of the Association using systems theory as
described by Carter and Anderson. This theory describes individuals as being the center of
ever-larger human populations (e.g., families, groups, organizations). Each population
interacts with the individual, with each other and with the external environment. The
context and the events o f the epidemic are described. The analysis concentrates on the
organizational element of the theory and uses additional sources concerning the nature of
organizations to augment the theory.
Advisory Committee: Dr. Clare A. Houseman (chair)
Dr. Joyce Hoffman
Dr. George Maihafer
©2005 Burden S. Lundgren. All rights reserved.
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This dissertation is dedicated to those who stayed and those who came to tend the
sick, bury the dead, and care for the orphans.

Some months after the above dedication was written, a catastrophe struck my
hometown of New York City-this time from the skies. This dissertation is also dedicated
to those who stayed and those who came to rescue the trapped, tend the wounded, bury
the dead, and care for the orphans.
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9

INTRODUCTION
It was a small epidemic. A thousand people in Portsmouth, Virginia died of yellow
fever. It was just a blip o f mortality compared to the 100,000-150,000 yellow fever
deaths that occurred in the United States from the 17th to the 20th centuries (Patterson
Yellow Fever Epidemics and Mortality in the United States, 1693-1905 cited by Trask,
1996)—small even compared to the 2000 souls who perished across the water in Norfolk.
Over four months in 1855, yellow fever desolated the two port cities.1 Today, as then, the
cities face each other across the Elizabeth River at the tip of southeastern Virginia.
Located hard by the largest natural harbor in the world, the businesses of both largely
revolve around shipping and the military. There are few reminders of the catastrophe that
the municipalities shared less than 150 years ago. A “Quarantine Road” runs through the
campus o f Old Dominion University in Norfolk. Two miles away, a still-empty field is
said to contain the bodies of yellow fever victims. In Portsmouth, the orphanage built to
house orphans from the epidemic today enjoys a life as a private residence (B. Baker,
personal communication, March 20,1999). Today, visitors to both cities can stroll in
gentrified waterfront downtowns and enjoy a pleasant ferry ride between strolls. In these
circumstances, it is difficult to imagine the waste that the Aedes aegypti mosquito brought
to the very same areas not that long ago.
Yellow fever is a viral disease with an insect vector. It is transmitted by female
mosquitoes (most often the Aedes aegypti). After a bite from an infected mosquito, there
is a short incubation period (3-6 days) followed by the onset of flu-like symptoms and
fever. The disease runs its course in about a week. The characteristic yellow color o f the
patient is caused by hepatic involvement. Death results from liver, kidney or heart failure.
If the mosquito bites a yellow fever victim in the first 3 or 4 days of the disease, the virus
passes from blood into the insect’s stomach. For the next 12 days, the virus migrates to
the salivary glands from which they are introduced into the next victim. Once infected, the
1This was not the first visit of the disease to either city, but it was by far the most severe.
Yellow fever made an appearance in Virginia no less than 13 times during the 19th century. Nine
of these outbreaks which ranged from mild to serious occurred in Norfolk. There was a brief
eruption of the disease in Portsmouth in 1852 resulting in four deaths.

1
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mosquito can inject the disease into a new victim every 3 days. This continues as long as
the insect lives, often until the next frost (Powell, 1949, vii-viii). Mosquito control offers
the best means of preventing or reducing spread of the disease. Since the possibility of
disease transmission by mosquitoes was entirely unknown until 1878, (Christophers, 1960)
in 1855, the citizens of the two cities were at the mercy of the tiny insect that conveyed
the virus.
The purpose of this dissertation is to examine the experience of the yellow fever
epidemic in Portsmouth with special attention to the process by which the systems
constituting the social fabric of the town disintegrated (e.g., the government ceased
functioning), re-formed into new systems to meet the emergency, then changed again as
the epidemic dissipated.2 In recent past years, we have witnessed a number of world cities
dealing with catastrophic situations. In some (the destruction of the World Trade Center,
the SARS epidemic in Toronto), governments played dominant roles. However, when
AIDS struck New York and San Francisco, volunteer groups sprang up to provide
leadership where government had failed. In fact, epidemics in the early centuries of
American development were often addressed by a mix of municipal and voluntary
agencies. This work presents a case study of how one town survived disaster by
harnessing private resources when government failed. Its central focus is the formation
and transformation of a community group (the Portsmouth Relief Association), which
served as the de facto government until the epidemic burned itself out.
Rosenberg (1992. p. 279) has remarked that epidemics can serve as natural
experiments illuminating fundamental patterns of social value and institutional practice.
Epidemics, in fact, focus social values and practices in a microcosm driven by a singular
desire to survive. In some ways, epidemics serve as blast furnaces that bum away the
dross of custom and reveal what is most fundamental to a particular society. Many 19th

2 The word “epidemic” can be problematic. According to Hays (2000, p. 5), the term
refers to a phenomenon that is “temporary, affecting a particular place, and resulting in mortality
and/or morbidity in excess of normal expectancy.” Epidemic episodes are superimposed over
endemic diseases (those that are normally prevalent in a community). Hays’ commonsense
definition aptly describes the Portsmouth (and Norfolk) experience with yellow fever.

2
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century historical issues were played out in the Portsmouth experience. The themes of the
urban character of yellow fever, of fear and flight, of a disproportionate burden of illness
among the poor, o f caritas versus municipal responsibility, of nativism, of race, of
southern distinctiveness, of sanitarianism, of religious enthusiasm were all part of the
intellectual tapestry of the pestilence. O f special note was the differing treatment accorded
to people along perceived class lines. It should be remarked at the outset that one of the
factors that most complicates this study of disease and society in the antebellum American
South is the presence of three groups which were regarded differently, counted differently,
and met the epidemic with different resources and expectations. These are the free and
enslaved African-American and the white populations. This dissertation attempts, insofar
as possible, to describe the experience of the epidemic for all of these groups.
An epidemic is often regarded as some sort of aberration of nature’s plan or,
alternatively, as a punishment from God. Rosenberg (1992, pp. 110-11) has argued that
medical historians have framed epidemics in varying manners. In conventional
descriptions, epidemics seem to come from without. They are imaged as attacking aliens.
More recently, historians have tended to concentrate on the social causes of
epidemics-epidemics as consequences of societal changes and inequities. However, both
these explanations miss the broader context of the fundamental ecological disarrangements
occasioned by human depredations of the environment that result in such devastating
states of pathogen/vector/human maladaptation. This is not to suggest that proximate
causes-shipboard mosquitoes, urban overcrowding-are unimportant, but that a less
anthropomorphic view allows us to appreciate a more complex representation of epidemic
diseases. Thus, although it is true to state that the yellow fever virus causes yellow fever,
it may be just as true to state that human yellow fever infections are caused by human
depredations o f the environment and human insistence on becoming traders and citydwellers.

Theoretical Framework
Cities exist as both parts of larger systems and as collections of systems within

3

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

themselves. This dissertation aims to examine a catastrophic urban event from a systems
perspective, but first it is necessary to examine what constitutes such a perspective and
how systems theory might illuminate the events described. Ralph E. Anderson and Irl
Carter have written extensively describing general systems theory. Unless otherwise
indicated, the concepts of systems theory discussed in this paper have been drawn from
their work (with Gary R. Lowe) Human Behavior in the Social Environment (fifth edition,
1999).
Social systems theory offers several advantages for the examination of a range of
human events. First, it is comprehensive. It offers an opportunity to describe and
integrate a number of disparate theories into a larger framework. Second, although it may
not explain all human behavior, it does provide suggestions for explanation for many
behaviors. Third, it provides a way to organize a number of confusing theories and
methods into an understandable whole. Here, of course, is found one of the weaknesses
of the theory (indeed, o f any theory). The attempt to reduce complex events in terms of
systems theory (or, again, of any theory) is doomed to hinder rather than aid
comprehension if applied too rigidly (Anderson and Carter, 1999, xix-xx). This paper
attempts to balance the structure of systems theory against the complexity of the events
described. The application of the theory to events in the past presents a distinct challenge,
namely the elucidation o f the cultural setting. In this study, this process includes an
explication of relevant elements within the society (e.g., current theories of disease) as
well as a review of the historical background of the town. Within the constraints of the
theory, we examine the utility of its description o f the nature of organizations as an
explanatory model for this event. In more formal terms, our basic research question asks
whether the organizational element of systems theory as delineated by Anderson and
Carter can increase our understanding of the Portsmouth yellow fever epidemic. In this
section, we describe some of the elements of systems theory.

Elements o f Systems Theory
The basis of systems theory is the notion of parts and the whole and the

4

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

interrelatedness of both. This is an idea of considerable antiquity. Chuang Tzu, the poetphilosopher of Taoism states it thus:

[H]e who wants to have right without wrong,
Order without disorder,
Does not understand the principles
of heaven and earth
He does not know how
They hang together (Anderson and Carter, p. 3).

Various systems theorists have placed their emphasis on different levels of
organizational development from the individual to the society as a whole (p. 4). Anderson
and Carter believe that each social entity, no matter how simple or complex, is a holon-an
entity that is at once a part and a whole (Anderson and Carter, p. 4).
The “basic stuff’ of any system is energy consisting of the exchange of both
information and resources internal to and external to the system. Anderson and Carter (p.
9) define energy as “capacity for action” or the “power to effect change.” System energy
is derived from many sources including physical capacities o f the society’s members, social
and cultural resources and the environment. Central to the concept of energy in social
systems is the notion of entropy and synergy. These terms derive from the discipline of
physics and are applied to society in basically the same way as they are applied to the
physical universe. Entropy, then, is the tendency of a society to move toward a
disorganized state characterized by a decrease in usable energy. Synergy refers to the
increasingly available energy displayed by a system with high interaction among its
components(Anderson and Carter, p. 10).
Energy can be secured either from within or from without the system.
Organization is necessary to gather energy, to maintain the system and to direct energy
toward societal goals. Indeed, to be called a social system, an entity requires a certain
degree o f organization(Anderson and Carter, pp. 12-14). Systems differ in their degrees

5
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of interrelatedness and complexity. Social systems are highly reactive to their
environments. Even very small changes from within or without can make a significant
impact on the energy and the organization of a particular system (Anderson and Carter,
p.l 8). Crises (as we shall see) radically change the sources o f energy and the degree and
kinds of organization associated with a system.
Energy exchange is the basic stuff of a system. Anderson and Carter use the term
“steady state” to describe a condition of system energy exchange “in which energies are
continually used to maintain the relationship of the parts and keep them from collapsing in
decay.” (Anderson and Carter, p. 24) A system is in a steady state when it is maintaining
“a viable relationship with its environment and its components, and its functions are being
performed in such a fashion as to ensure its continued existence (Anderson and Carter, p.
24). Steady does not mean static. It does mean that a dynamic balance is in play. This
balance is not fixed and systems may move from one steady state to another. It is,
however, crucial that the system maintain its identity when such movement occurs much
as a person retains his/her own personality as growth and maturation occur (Anderson and
Carter, pp. 26-7). Indeed, it may be that steady state is not the most desirable condition
for a social system. More complex systems may naturally exist in a constant state of
transition, even border on the edge o f chaos. In their self-transformations, systems may
alter, even radically alter, the relationships between their own parts as well as their
relationships with the external world.
A system must have some limits to be distinguished from its environment. Energy
levels mark system boundaries. A boundary occurs where the intensity o f energy
interchange is greater on one side than the other(28). Boundaries themselves are also open
to energy exchange, but no boundary is completely open since that would render one
system indistinguishable from another. Boundaries cannot be completely closed either
since a completely closed system would cease to exist (Anderson and Carter, pp. 28,30).
Parts of systems may be related in various ways. Hierarchical systems are
common. There may be differences in the ways energy is distributed or some parts may
exert power and control over others. Hierarchal arrangements can also be seen in

6
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institutions that claim moral authority and exert sanctions on or approval of other parts of
the system. Chronological hierarchies may also exist. For some events to happen, others
must have already occurred.
Continuous, self-initiated feedback cycles-a distinct form of communicative energy
exchange-enable a system to achieve and maintain identity and autonomy. Systems do not
simply respond to flows of energy and information, but, in fact, select and evaluate
information to create and maintain themselves. Changes in the relationships among system
components may be brought about by changes in communications. At the same time,
changes in relationships themselves occasion changes in communication. (Anderson and
Carter, pp. 27, 33, 37)
Complex systems are characterized by differentiation (division of functions) and
specialization (having parts that usually or always perform only a specific function).
Differentiation and specialization themselves create a greater need for communication and
integration to maintain the system(Anderson and Carter, p.34).
As mentioned above, systems theory is widely applicable. This is also true of the
elements o f the theory themselves. Moreover, elements can be applied to parts of society
as well as society as a whole and can also be utilized to explain the interrelatedness of
parts to each other and to the whole. Anderson and Carter examine the theory as it
applies to:
•

cultures,

•

communities,

•

organizations,

•

groups,

•

families, and

•

the person.

Systems theory places the person at the heart o f the system and assumes personal
interactions with an ever-expanding universe of system elements. (Figure 1). It must be
noted that the system itself is dynamic. At any time, the elements are interacting with each
other as well as with the person, the whole and external systems. As we shall see in the

7
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Portsmouth experience, different system elements may assume enhanced importance to the
individual and to the entire system under different conditions.
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Humanity
Society
Community
Organizations
Groups

Diagrams of a person's interaction with systems of increasing scale
(from Human Behavior m the Soda! Environment 4 Soda! Systems
Approach, Ralph E. Anderson and Irl Carteroith Gary R. Lowe,
Aldine De G ruyter, New York, Fifth Edition 1999.)

Figure 1

9
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Cultures
Cultures serve as a background to all social systems. Communities and
organizations are macrosystems as compared to entities of lesser size such as groups and
families(Anderson and Carter, p. 72). This dissertation focuses on organizations, but
these do not exist apart from the culture or, indeed, apart from other system elements. It
is necessary, therefore, to review Anderson and Carter’s work on all the above entities to
establish the context for the examination of communities and organizations.
Anderson and Carter define culture as “those qualities and attributes that seem to
be characteristic of all humankind.”(p. 44) This definition denotes the separation of
humans from the remainder of the animal kingdom. But there is a second, more familiar
use for the term “culture.” A society is a group of people who have learned to live and
work together. Culture is the way of life followed by a society. Thus there may be as
many cultures as there are societies.
Four attributes differentiate a culture as human. First, humans have the capacity to
think and communicate. Although the forms may change, they are organized into families.
Humans use language to communicate and humans, in their social systems, seek and
maintain territories. Six attributes differentiate human cultures one from another. These
are:
•

tool making and usage,

•

social organization,

•

language,

•

management of prolonged childhood,

•

urge to explain the world, and

•

social relationships (Anderson and Carter, p. 55).

Cultures vary in the way in which they use tools. Tools may be used in a
multiplicity of styles to amplify motor or sensory capabilities (e.g., hammers, microscopes)
or to enhance reasoning and thinking capabilities (e.g., computers). Their use may be
dependent on another attribute of human culture-social organization. All societies have a

10
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degree o f organization which may be in constant flux(Anderson and Carter, p. 57).
Cultures, in fact, may evolve as they become more complex. Organizational elements may
involve the roles different people or classes play in the society.
Cultures strongly influence the creation and use of language and symbols.
Language may be gestural (e.g., a clenched fist) or verbal. Some explain the phenomenon
as the transfer o f meaning involving interactions between the sender and the receiver, in
other words, feedback (Anderson and Carter, p. 60).
Humans have a prolonged childhood. Social arrangements to care for the needs of
infants and children vary considerably from place to place and also over time. Changes in
social relationships, e.g., the waning of the prevalence of extended families, the rise of
public schools, emerging new roles for women, reflect and affect the ways in which
children are reared.
As Aristotle famously remarked, “All men by nature desire to know.” Anderson
and Carter (p. 63) note that much o f the energy of cultural systems is expended in the
effort to find meaning and institutionalize it. In western culture, much of this energy has
been directed toward scientific explanations of phenomena.

Communities
Community exists as a state of mind as well as a social system. Both communities
and organizations are classified as macrosystems. Communities are distinguished from
organizations in that the former are held together by ties of sentiment while the latter are
sustained by rational considerations. Like organizations, communities mediate between
society as a whole and smaller, more intimate systems, e.g., the family. For adults,
communities or sectors of the community (e.g., educational or legal institutions) serve as
primary fields of interaction with the larger world. To individuals, communities shape
culture, but at the same time, the actions of individuals also shape the community’s culture
(Anderson and Carter, p. 72).
Anderson and Carter define three types of communities. First are place
communities. These are defined by the occupation of a common space. A village or a

11
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neighborhood would typify a place community. Nonplace communities have also been
called “mind communities.” These include such systems as religious orders or professions.
Some sociologists also classify networks (sets of interpersonal connections) as mind
communities. The third type of community is that formed by kinship ties. There are blood
relationships. These may include Amish communities, barrios or immigrant groups. Of
course these categories are not exclusive. Mind communities, for example, may have ties
to a certain place (e.g., nurses to a particular hospital) And the types of communities may
differ in other ways too. Place communities, e.g., a city may serve a breadth of needs and
interests, while a nonplace community is usually focused on a single or narrow range of
issues (Anderson and Carter, pp. 73-4, 76).
Keeping these considerations in mind, Anderson and Carter define a community as
a population whose members:

•

consciously identify with each other,

•

may occupy common territory,

•

engage in common activities, and

•

have some form of organization that provides for differentiation of
functions, which allows the community to adapt to its environment, thereby
meeting the needs of its components (p. 76).

Communities maintain the cultures of their members and provide for them ways to
satisfy their needs, interests and ambitions. Community members consciously identify with
the community, i.e., they define themselves at least in part as community members.
Communities must also meet the needs of their environments in order to survive for they
are parts o f a web of interactive systems. Religious communities for example may tailor
the services they perform to the changing needs of the population they serve.
Communities perform their work by means of energy exchange supplying energy both to
its own components (e.g., individuals) and its environment (e.g., cities) (Anderson and
Carter, pp. 77-80).

12
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Communities facilitate communication, a form of energy exchange. A continual
supply of new members is essential to community maintenance. Indeed, without new
members, a state of entropy ensues leading to the death of the community. Successful
communities must not only recruit members, they must also socialize them into the
community culture (Anderson and Carter, p. 90). Communities may utilize mild e.g., peer
pressure) or more pronounced means (e.g., sanctions) to enforce their mores.

Organizations
Anderson and Carter state “Modem societies are organizational societies.” They
have largely “replaced communities and families as mediating... institutions in
society.”(Anderson and Carter, p. 101) Talcott Parsons (1960, p. 17) states that primacy
of orientation to the attainment of a specific goal is the defining characteristic of an
organization. Anderson and Carter follow that concept and define an organization as “a
social system whose purpose is the achievement of specific, explicit goals” (p. 103). In
order to accomplish this, its members must confine themselves to a relatively narrow range
of behaviors intended to fulfill this purpose, exercise power over each other in the form of
authority and hierarchal control in order to assure compliance with the system’s goals and
adherence to the members’ prescribed roles(Anderson and Carter, p. 103). Because they
are dedicated to achieving specific goals, organizations have identifiable outputs—outputs
which are actually the inputs for other systems (Parsons, p. 17).

The Open Systems Perspective
Anderson and Carter (p. 113) concern themselves with an open systems model.
From this perspective, organizations are viewed as a system of interdependent activities.
They argue that organizations must, in fact, be more flexible than is allowed in the more
traditional models and that the systems model they propose allows for the necessary
flexibility. They set forth behavioral, structural and evolutionary aspects of the open
systems model.
What are the behavioral aspects of the open systems model? These comprise

13
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communications, goal direction, differentiation, power and control and leadership.
Communications are essential to all systems(Anderson and Carter, pp.l 14-15). To focus
attention on specific goals, organizations must set parameters for communications and
control the channels through which information flows. Communications arrangements
tend to mirror the nature of the organization, e.g., in a very centralized organization,
information flow is mainly top down. Communications may also be more or less precise,
technical and limited.
Goals are desired future conditions—a sort of “self-actualization.”(Anderson and
Carter, pp.l 16-17) Two aspects of goal attainment should be distinguished: effectiveness
and efficiency. The former refers to the degree to which the organization achieves its
goals. Simply put, the latter refers to how easily that achievement may be accomplished.
Goals may change. Sometimes efficiency may be stressed to a greater or lesser extent or
goals that are achieved may lead to the establishment of new goals. Goals may also
multiply as new needs are identified and they may be displaced as other goals assume
greater importance.
What traits specifically characterize organizations? Organizations are the most
efficient and effective of all social units. The latter is judged by the extent to which the
organization meets its goals, the former by the organization’s expenditure of resources
versus results. Measurements of both are easy or difficult depending on the complexity of
the organization. (Many organizations have multiple goals.)
The degree of differentiation is a marker for modernity of a system. Differentiation
refers to the division of specific functions within a system, e.g., education becomes a
function of schools rather than of parents. Even more, certain kinds of education become
specialized themselves, e.g., technical subjects versus humanities, of segregation of
students by age and/or level of accomplishment. A marked degree of differentiation may
be detrimental to the system itself when differentiated segments of the system work
toward conflicting goals.

Groups

14
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Social groups are the smaller entities in which people engage on a day to day basis.
Groups often come together for specific purposes of support or to accomplish a specific
task (e.g., committees). Groups tend to be highly dependent on specific persons whereas
organizations are generally designed to limit dependence on individuals (Anderson and
Carter, p. 146). Groups are systems if they display the characteristics of systems, e.g.,
defined boundaries, energy exchange. Groups as systems display both evolutionary and
structural aspects. As groups are formed, they pass through various stages of dynamic
development. Anderson and Carter (pp. 150-51) describe a complex process during which
group members gradually put aside their own goals, commit to the goals of the group,
enter into conflict and eventually participate in the disintegration of the group (either
planned or unplanned).
Groups may be structured in such a way that boundaries mark them out from other
entities and give them a degree of autonomy (Anderson and Carter, p. 156).
Differentiation of function occurs within a group as roles are acquired by individual
members. Groups may also be distinguished as systems by their behavior. They adapt to
the energy exchanging environment. They socialize their members, develop methods to
control conflict and to communicate (Anderson and Carter, p. 160).

Families
Although they may take different forms, families are a universal social system.
Families are distinguishable from other systems by their goals, functions and
microcultures. Above all, a family is marked by the high degree of relatedness among its
components. It is the smallest of the social systems. Typically, there is a high degree of
interdependence among its components (Anderson and Carter, p. 183). The intensity of
the interaction among family members sets the family’s behavioral boundaries apart from
other social systems. Within families, differentiation and specialization are reflected in role
allocations (e.g., some may work outside the home, others not). Socialization and social
control functions are characteristics of families.
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Persons
The person is the fundamental material element of the social system. He/she is the
kernel at the heart of social systems theory. As illustrated in Figure 1, the person,
throughout the course of a lifetime, interacts with an increasingly extensive set of system
elements. In the Portsmouth experience, these elements and their relative importance
changed radically.

Discussion
Systems theory offers a sometimes complex paradigm to explain infinitely more
complex social phenomena. This paper uses Anderson and Carter’s explication of systems
theory to interpret the experience of the town of Portsmouth during the yellow fever
epidemic of 1855. We are asking whether systems theory as elucidated by Anderson and
Carter can help us to understand the epidemic.
This paper depicts Portsmouth as it existed prior to the epidemic, reviews the
epidemic, and its management, and discusses the application of Anderson and Carter’s
explication of systems theory to the Portsmouth experience.

Significance of the Study
This work was begun when the notion of a fast-moving, urban general epidemic
seemed unthinkable. Since then, the SARS epidemic and the threat o f bioterrorism have
linked us in unexpected ways to those populations who have suffered and survived the
bane of plague times. What can a 19th century experience teach us about our own times?
On a very practical level, the activities of the Portsmouth Relief Association demonstrated
the necessity of having a single organization with the authority to make decisions
concerning all aspects of civic life and to make them quickly in emergent times. It also
suggests that such an organization should be small, flat, and comprised of people
experienced in civic affairs. On a macro level, the examination of this epidemic
demonstrates how these threats are lived out in contemporary terms. The experience of
the town of Portsmouth illuminated the beliefs of the times including (but not limited to)
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race, gender and ethnicity.
There is a substantial body of literature concerning 19th century American
epidemics. Nearly all of it is written by professional historians. Very little of it is read by
public health professionals (or any health professionals). Why is it important for public
health professionals to know and understand their history? First, because it is their story.
Practicing public health with no knowledge of its history is like being an American never
having heard of the Declaration of Independence, the Constitution or George Washington.
The standard public health mechanisms of our time (e.g., quarantine, Boards of Health)
have their origin in earlier periods.
Second, knowledge of our history causes us to be considerably less naive with
respect to the limits of our knowledge. In looking at 19th century epidemics, we see health
professionals practicing according to the best theories of their time. The theories were
wrong. But we also practice according to the best theories of our time. We could be
wrong too...and it is ironic, at the least, that the mechanisms mentioned above were bom
from wrong-headed theories o f disease and contagion.
Third, an epidemic is as much a social as a biological event and social reactions
demonstrate a certain constancy. Analysis of public reactions to the epidemic in
Portsmouth reveal uncomfortable parallels to experiences in our own times. The lack of
concern shown the Irish when they were the only victims of the disease and the abrogation
o f government actions in time of epidemic are not unlike the experience of AIDS victims
in the first decade of that epidemic. The Chinese were not the first to suppress knowledge
o f a worrisome disease outbreak (SARS, 2003). Review of earlier epidemics, including
the one covered in this work, reveals this to be a common phenomenon. Knowing our
history should have caused us to anticipate these reactions and to prepare for them.
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REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

Etiology of Epidemics
The experience of epidemics is age-old. According to Karlen (p. 55), accounts of
pestilences are found “in the ancient writings of the Sumerians, Babylonians, Hebrews,
Hittites, Egyptians, Greeks, Romans, Indians and Chinese.” Pathogens that may trigger
epidemics are everywhere. Wills (1996, pp. 30,36) describes the crowds of pathogens in
which all life, both plant and animal, exists as an always-present penumbra. But many
pathogens coexist with their prey in a balanced way. Wills (p. 46) notes that the
organisms that cause epidemics “spend most of their time minding their own business,
dining off what they can get, and keeping a commendably low profile”. Indeed, it is to a
pathogen’s advantage not to kill over-many of its hosts (McNeill, pp. 56-62, 130-1).
We know a great deal about how epidemics occur, but have paid far less attention
to why they occur. Epidemics do not happen to us alone. In concentrating on a purely
human perspective, we miss the more universal characteristics which constitute the real
frame of the disease event. It is simple to state that yellow fever is a viral disease spread
by an insect vector, in this case, the mosquito. But epidemics are not that simple. Even
the mosquito and the virus have tales of their own. Nature is complex and its elements are
interdependent to an extraordinary degree, and to a considerable extent, humankind has
brought about its own plagues by its drive to organize in cities, establish extended trade
routes, wage wars in foreign lands, and destroy the habitats of both pathogens and prey.
Prolonged interactions between hosts and infective organisms often result in
patterns of mutual adaptation that allow both to survive. A pathogen which quickly kills
all its hosts is equally at risk for survival as one that finds itself in an immune population.
Thus an epidemic presents real dangers for the survival of the pathogen as well as of the
host (Me Neill, 1976 p. 9). McNeill (1976, p. 7) notes that every biological system tends
to maintain its equilibrium, that “outside” disruptions tend to provoke compensatory
changes within the system, but that there are critical limits, which, when transgressed,
result in system breakdowns. In yellow fever, critical limits may be surpassed when the
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arboreal environment of sylvan yellow fever is destroyed, or, more directly, when a ship
carrying infected mosquitoes makes port.
Seen from an evolutionary perspective, plagues may drive the development of
diversity necessary for the adaptation and survival of the species involved. Wills (p. 23)
argues that there are, in fact, so many species of life on earth because of the presence of
disease. Host species protect themselves by becoming very different from each other
while pathogens become more specialized by changing to overcome the defenses of the
evolving hosts (Wills, p. 23) The latter changes do not necessarily increase virulence. To
ensure their survival, Wills (pp. 47-8) asserts that pathogens always revert to milder
infectious agents. Indeed, he suggests that pathogens are more fragile than we often
think, borrowing bits of DNA from other sources to survive and rapidly dying or evolving
when suitable ecological niches, e.g., virgin populations, are eliminated.
Evolution is, of course, the fruit of mutations. Clearly, the greater the absolute
numbers of a population, the greater the absolute numbers of mutations. The striking
increases in human populations in the recent past centuries have occasioned correlated
increases in the organisms for which we are the main meal. This creates opportunities for
rapid changes in both virulence and resistance. And humans have introduced a new and
dangerous (to us) variable that threatens to rapidly undo our hard-won ecological balance
altogether. The widespread use of antibiotics add greatly to pathogens’ opportunities to
adapt in a way favorable to them-and disastrous to us (Wills, p. 21). Worrisome also is
the “eradication” of certain diseases. Eradication destroys the “disease! partnership”
(McNeill, 1975, p. 10) built between populations and the organisms that prey on them. If,
then, the disease (or one very similar) should re-arise, all populations will be “virgin” to
that organism and therefore liable to decimation.
If humans and their parasites evolved on a parallel biological trajectory, changes in
both would be slow and mutual adaptation would be the rule. But adaptive mutations
evolve over generations, giving rapidly reproducing microorganisms a substantial
advantage over humans (Crawford, 2000, p. 36). Even with the slow rate of human
reproductive adaptation and human environmental depredation, many diseases which
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began as raging epidemics “gentled” with time, often becoming common childhood
diseases (Karlen, pp. 56-1)?’4 McNeill (1976, pp. 18-22) argues that the speed of the
human cultural revolution has largely outpaced the adaptive abilities of pathogens leading
to the episodes of extreme maladaptation we label as epidemics, that, in fact, humans
cause epidemics by intruding into the lives of pathogens rather than the other way around.
“Looked at from the point of view of other organisms, humankind therefore resembles an
acute epidemic disease, whose occasional lapses into less virulent forms of behavior have
never yet sufficed to permit any really stable, chronic relationship to establish itself.”
Karlen (1995, p. 11) provides an eloquent argument for this thesis in modem times.

We provide new ecological niches for microbes by tilling fields and domesticating
animals, and by bringing into existence gardens and second-growth forests, villages
and cities, homes and factories. We give them new homes in discarded truck tires
and water tanks, in air conditioners and hospital equipment. We transport them by
automobile, ship, and airplane. We alter their opportunities and affect their
evolution when we change our abodes, our sex behavior, our diets, our clothing.
The faster we change ourselves and our surroundings, the faster new infections
reach us. In the past century we have changed the biosphere as much as any

3 In the case of yellow fever, this phenomenon is also seen among primates with African
monkeys being less susceptible to the disease than their South American cousins. (Disease News
Yellow Fever, 2002)
4 This phenomenon can sometimes appear to reverse itself. Smallpox, having become a
mild childhood disease in Europe seemed for a time to regain its ferocity even among EuroAmericans in the New World (Hays, 2000, pp. 75-6). The theory of benign adaptation has even
been developed to suggest that viruses may act as a symbiote defending against invaders and
providing survivors with an advantage over others (Harper, 1998/1999). This optimistic picture,
however, is not universally accepted. Ewald (2000) envisions a more competitive scenario—a
constant war being waged between our immune systems and the microorganisms that share the
planet (as well as by individuals within the same species) with disaster waiting around every
comer. He argues that some pathogens will tend toward benignity and some will not. In any
case, it is doubtful that we fully understand the relationship of viruses with larger organisms at this
time.
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glacial surge or meteor impact ever has. So we and microbes are dancing faster
than ever in order to survive each other.

The “dance” started long ago. Karlen (p. 20) sets its beginning 5 million years ago
when human ancestors traded one ecological niche for another by leaving the trees for the
ground. But on a more universal scale, the dance had already begun. All creatures, in fact,
stay alive at some expense to others. Living things must create protein by taking in the
proteins or amino acids of other living things. However, since the process depends on
mutual dependence, it is self-limiting. In the end, the relationship can even become
symbiotic (e.g. the coliform bacteria that live in the large intestine) (Karlen, pp. 16-7).
When humanity moved again, this time from tropical to temperate latitudes, it found a
t

simpler, less threatening biological situation (McNeill, p. 28). However, humankind’s
predilection for movement also allowed the importation of tropical pathogens to foreign
shores, not to mention continual supplies of unexposed populations to serve as hosts.5
Increased crop yields and the development of capitalism brought about vibrant
market economies. Subsequent industrialization and the resultant crowding in cities
increased opportunities for infectious pathogens. (Hays, 2000, p. 109) According to
Karlen (pp. 48-9), for several million years, accidents and wounds were the main causes of
human deaths. The crowding of people into the crowded, circumscribed and filthy
circumstances of city life offered virgin populations to ambient pathogens and the
increased numbers of people meant that, once started, an epidemic could sustain itself.
Cities of only several thousand were enough to support most crowd diseases (Karlen, p.
49). Indeed, Reader (1998, p246-8) argues that throughout most of history the African
population lived in relatively small groups in order to maintain their mutually successful
adaptation with the teeming pathogens in their environment.
The development of cities was dependent on the ability of humans to reliably
produce adequate amounts of food through the domestication o f animals and plants

5 Hosts are not limited to humans. At one point, yellow fever imported from Africa almost
wiped out the population of howler monkeys in South America (Karlen, p. 19).
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(McNeill, pp. 33,36). In turn, the establishment o f cities demanded even greater food
supplies (Karlen, p. 49). The alterations of natural landscapes for agriculture-plowing and
irrigation—in themselves upset existing parasitic ecosystems (McNeill, p. 41, Karlen, p.
41) and dependence on single crops rather than the varied diet typical of hunters and food
gatherers produced nutritional deficits and vulnerability to chronic and epidemic disease6
(Karlen, 35-6). In the event of crop failure, city-dwellers were not able to move on to
other, more fertile areas (Karlen p. 50-1). The domestication of livestock placed humans
in close proximity (often in the same dwelling) to another reservoir of disease (McNeill,
pp. 51-8, Karlen, pp. 36-7). And cities, themselves, placed humans in close proximity to
one another-close enough that the ongoing die-off in cities was too great to sustain their
populations (McNeill, pp. 62-3). Cities, in a very real way, “consumed” excess population
from the countryside (McNeill, p. 67).
The nineteenth century has been called “the century o f cities” (Callow, 1982 p.
65). During the antebellum period, America exemplified this representation. From 1820
to 1860, the total population of the country increased by 226 percent, but the urban
population increased nearly 800 percent. This rapid settlement moved the percentage of
urban population from six to 20 percent in the same period (Callow, 1982 p. 65). Most
urban growth in America, however, took place in the north. By the end of the decade
under study here, one quarter of all northerners lived in a town or city of more than 2,500
inhabitants compared to fewer than 5 percent of southerners. Moreover, with the
exception of New Orleans, America’s largest cities (New York reached 1,000,00 during
this decade), were either in the north or on the northern borders of the south (Kolchin p,
176-7).
The degree o f southern participation in urbanization, however, has been a matter

6 Ecological changes wrought by colonizing Europeans provide a “fast forward” version of
disease-engendering development. Irrigation projects in Egypt, for instance, provided a perfect
environment for the growth o f the bilharzia parasite. Belgian rule in Zaire changed traditional
farming practices in a way that increased contact between humans and disease-bearing tsetse flies
(Farley’s Bilharzia: A History of Imperial Tropical Medicine: Prins’ But What was the Disease?
The Present State of Health and Healing in African Studies, both cited in Hays, 2000 p. 185).
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of controversy among historians (Goldfield, 1982). Curry (1974) even notes that some
maintain that southern cities were so atypical that they were not truly urban. Goldfield,
however, argues that the south was fully invested in urban growth. He maintains that the
industrialization that so often served as the base for urban growth was present in the south
to an unappreciated degree. Moreover, the supposed southern nostalgia for country life
was also present in the north and posed no more impediment to the growth of cities in the
south than it did above the Mason-Dixon line. Interest in building cities grew among
many southerners as feelings of sectional rivalry increased. It was believed that urban and
commercial development would allow the south to become self-sufficient. Moderates
believed that building southern cities would, in fact, calm sectionalist passions. In any
case, the antebellum south boasted a substantial number of urban apologists (Brownell,
1983, pp. 144-5).
There were also strong economic factors driving the growth of southern
urbanization. Southern landowners were prone to place their profits in investments (e.g.,
bank stock, municipal bonds) that undergirded and promoted the growth of cities
(Goldfield, p. 83). The decade between 1850 and 1860 was a period of particularly
intense growth with a quadrupling of southern railroad milage and an increase of 64
percent in southern industrial investment (Goldfield, p. 84).

Promoters of southern urban

growth looked to municipal expansion as a means to slow perceived northern expansion
(Goldfield, pp. 86-9). Growth of southern cities was also promoted as a means to
increased sectional strength and even as a strategy to change and elevate society
(Goldfield, pp. 84-5). Cities formed centers of business, of leadership, of
communications. Local governments took on new prominence assuming functions of
policing, fire-fighting, street-lighting and poor relief. Their power to tax grew
concomitantly (Goldfield, pp. 86-87). However, as fast as southern cities were growing,
those o f the north outpaced them because of their trade links with the rapidly expanding
west (Goldfield). However, northern cities also had a sectional population advantage.
Curry (1976) argues that between 1800 and 1850 the population of the south grew by
268.62 percent while the urban population grew by 946.52 percent. Comparative figures
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for the remainder of the nation were 403.51 percent and 1011.7 percent. However, total
regional population increases obscured the southern urbanization rate.
Rosen (1958/1993 pp. 177-9) argues that the spurt of urban growth occasioned by
the industrial revolution exacerbated the dangers that urbanization presented to public
health, “...the problem of the public health was inherent in the new industrial civilization.
The same process that created the market economy, the factory, and the modem urban
environment also brought into being the health problems that made necessary new means
of disease prevention and health protection.” In the absence of mechanized transportation,
increased urban growth meant increased housing density especially for the poor. It also
meant that rich and poor lived in close proximity, making the many diseases that started in
the most crowded areas of poverty a direct threat to the more affluent (Palen and Johnson,
1983).

The Mosquito
To understand yellow fever, it is first necessary to understand the mosquito. To us
in 21st century America, the mosquito is an annoyance. Until the discovery that the West
Nile virus had successfully established a foothold on this continent, most of us gave little
thought to the consequences of a mosquito bite other than looking for something to
relieve the itch. We had drastically underestimated the momentous consequences of the
presence o f this tiny creature. Andrew Spielman (2001), having spent a working lifetime
studying the mosquito, put it thusly:

No animal on earth has touched so directly and profoundly the lives of so many
human beings. For all of history and all over the globe she has been a nuisance, a
pain, and an angel of death. Mosquitoes have felled great leaders, decimated
armies, and decided the fate of nations. All this, and she is roughly the size and
weight of a grape seed (Spielman and D ’Antunio, p. xv).

Most people realize that mosquitoes breed in standing water. However, for a

24

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

mosquito, not all standing water is created equal. The most common mosquito on earth,
the Culexpipens, prefers filthy standing water.(Spielman and D’Antunio, 2001, p. 19).
Others prefer the edges o f streams or lakes and hide from predators in what is known as
the “intersection line”, the interface between liquid, solid and air (Spielman and
D’Antunio, p. 19). The Aedes aegypti mosquito, the most common vector of yellow fever,
prefers to lay eggs in the water found in sheltered cavities such as tree holes or coconut
husks or in manmade containers such as discarded food containers or tires (Spielman and
D’Antunio, p. 32).7
Mosquitoes are an ancient animal. They are descended from insects that are
thought to have emerged during the Jurassic Period and may have fed on dinosaurs
(Spielman and D’Antunio, pp. 36-37). They are ubiquitous, surviving even in the Arctic
(Spielman and D ’Antunio, p. 36) and show a remarkable ability to adapt to changing
conditions (Spielman and D’Antunio, p. 41). This ability to adapt has been well
demonstrated in the species relationship to humans. For many thousands of years before
humans evolved, the various species of mosquitoes held to their own territories (Spielman
and D’Antunio, p. 44). In fact, in the presence of only small bands of humans, mosquitoes
preferentially fed on other animals and their role as vectors of disease was largely limited
to primates in the forest canopy (Spielman and D’Antunio, 44), although loggers and
others who brought the canopy down on themselves also brought down the mosquitoes
and their diseases (Karlen,, 20). But human populations also put pressure on nearby
mosquitoes to adapt to the environmental changes they wrought. As they changed the
landscape, often destroying some wetlands and creating others, the niches for varieties of
mosquitoes changed also. As noted above, some mosquitoes learned to prefer breeding in
artifacts of civilization (Spielman and D’Antunio , 44-45). In the process, they also
learned to enjoy feeding on human blood. Taubes (1997, p. 40) provides a vivid

7 In the forest canopy, mosquitoes of the genus Haemogogus (in South America) and
Aedes simpsoni (in Africa) carry the disease among primates. Once the organism had been
introduced into human settlements, the ubiquitous Aedes aegypti, which prefers to breed in the
offcasts of human civilization (discarded bowls, tin cans), became the preferred vector (Bray,
1996, p. 108).
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description of the process.

It begins with a bite. She alights on your skin, a small, elegant, grayish mosquito
with a distinctive, silvery-white lyre-shaped pattern on her back. She has small
wings and femlike antennae. Her Latin name is Aedes aegypti. As with all
mosquitoes, only the female bites you. Nothing personal: she simply requires
protein to produce her eggs and has evolved the equipment to procure it from your
blood. Males live exclusively on nectar.

Upon landing, she probes for a blood vessel, inserting her mouthparts into your
skin a millimeter or two at a time, lubricating the motion with saliva, then pulling
back out. The motion is oddly reminiscent of fly-fishing, of dipping the rod in a
cast and bringing it back. When she finds a blood vessel, she forces the tip of her
proboscis through the skin and into the flow of the blood. She then simultaneously
sucks out blood while continuing to dribble saliva. The walls of her proboscis are
double-barreled, so saliva dribbles down one barrel while the blood is imbibed
throught the other. If she happens to be infected with a virus or a parasite, it will
pass by way of the saliva to you.

When humans lived in isolated communities, their infectious diseases, whether
mosquito-borne or not, stayed within their settlements. That changed as people began to
travel over long distances. As exploration and population shifts became widespread,
pathogenic organisms began to play a sometimes deciding role in historical events.
Pathogens could play offensive or defensive roles. Measles or smallpox, for example,
have devastating, even genocidal consequences when introduced into virgin populations
and can serve, therefore, as weapon for immune invaders-a phenomenon the historian
Alfred Crosby has designated as ecological imperialism (Karlen, 96). Smallpox
introduced by the European explorers and colonizers particularly devastated native
American populations (Hays, 2000 p. 73). Other diseases, e.g., endemic malaria, tend to
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keep newcomers out of certain areas. The native peoples of the Americas were most
unfortunate to possess few defensive pathogens and yet more unfortunate to have lacked
previous exposure to the virulent disorders introduced by incoming Europeans (Spielman
and D’Antunio, pp.51-53). However that imbalance would soon be redressed by the
people the same Europeans captured and enslaved. These souls sprang from a source that
was unusually well endowed with defensive organisms. The ships that brought slaves to
the New World also brought African mosquitoes and, with them, malaria and yellow fever
(Spielman and D’Antunio, p. 53).8
Yellow fever first broke out in the New World in 1648 in Yucatan and Cuba.
McNeill (p.213) speculates that the delay in its introduction was due to the time it took for
the Aedes Aegypti mosquito to establish a niche in an American climate (temperatures
always above 72 degrees Fahrenheit) that would allow it to propagate (McNeill p. 213).
It also established a sylvan reservoir in the new world monkey population (Karlen p. 106).
From this new home, it struck the American colonies and then the United States from
Boston to New Orleans 90 times between 1683 and 1880 and virtually every year
thereafter until 1879 (Tobey, 1930 p. 164; Rothstein, 1985 p. 59). It was even seen in
Canada (Bray p. 110). The last American epidemic (in New Orleans) occurred in 1905.9’10
Still, there are an estimated 200,000 cases of yellow fever in the world each year with an
estimated 30,000 deaths (Yellow Fever 2001 .www.who.int/inf-fs/en/factl OOhtmlT
The Aedes aegypti mosquito with its limited lifespan and its equally limited flight

8 Some theorists have speculated that yellow fever was known to the Mayans before the
arrival of Cortez, but the evidence is thin (Bray, p. 109).
9 The disease also traveled to Europe and Great Britain. In England, infected patients
were dressed in yellow jackets. The yellow flag that was flown over quarantined areas was
referred to as the “yellow jack” (Oldstone, p. 46). Yellow jack became the maritime name for the
disease and the yellow flag was also flown on infected ships (Trask, 1996).

10 The Aedes aegypti can pass on infection in its eggs, but the virus apparently had to be
imported to North America from the Carribean each year to spark an epidemic Downs. History of
Epidemiological Epidemics of Yellow Fever cited in Trask, 1996).
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range (less than 300 meters) (Oldstone, p. 46) might have remained a homebody, save for
its breeding site preferences which are particularly well suited for ocean travel. Partially
filled shipboard drinking casks served as ideal incubators for eggs laid by infected
mosquitoes. Crews and cargo (if a slave ship), all in enclosed spaces, served as a constant
blood supply. Two or three breeding cycles (ranging from four to ten days), each bringing
forth a new yield of infected mosquitoes, could be completed on a trans-Atlantic voyage
(Spielman and D’Antunio, p. 56-7; Womack, 1993).
Once on land, the 19th century Aedes aegypti found a plethora of breeding-friendly
sites in American cities. Trask (1997) lists “cisterns, fountains, horse troughs, rain barrels,
food tins, and roof gutters” as being favorites of the insect. With such hospitable
conditions, it was no wonder that visitors to southern cities often commented on the
hearty appetites o f the many mosquitoes there (Trask). Southern latitudes also provided
the Aedes aegypti larvae, which typically die at temperatures below 10 degrees Celsius,
with a friendly environment (Womack, 1993). The Aedes aegypti is a “skittish” mosquito,
one that is easily startled while feeding and so flies to the next victim giving it a high
vectorial capacity. It prefers to live indoors, often in darkly lighted closets, cabinets or
cupboards, and is therefore protected from weather conditions that might otherwise kill it
(Taubes, 1997; Womack, 1993). Its indoor habitat o f course also allows it ready access to
the sick and, in any case, ensures close proximity to human populations (Carrigan, 1994,
p. 5). Given suitable conditions, biting females can easily live up to a month (Womack).

Coming from an endemic area, many Africans had adapted to the disease and were
largely protected from its most severe effects. People of European origin were not so
blessed. From the mid-seventeenth century, the New World was struck again and again by
yellow fever epidemics. Quarantines, when implemented, were proved useless (Spielman
and D’Antunio, p. 56-7). Survivors were immune, but the nature of American
colonization was such that soldiers and settlers arrived from Europe and Great Britain in a
never-ending stream with each of them, oddly enough, serving as targets of a defensive
pathogen from a continent they had never visited. Yellow fever decimated European
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armies and recurred periodically in many American cities, always finding victims in those
who had arrived in the city since the last epidemic.11 Although the disease eventually
disappeared from the cooler areas of North America, the Caribbean and areas of the deep
south which seldom experienced killing frosts suffered continued epidemics and served as
reservoirs of infection for other areas. In 1793,10 percent of Philadelphia’s inhabitants
died o f it—5500 people. New Orleans suffered from the disease again and again. Two
years before the Portsmouth/Norfolk epidemic, it claimed 200 lives per day during its
course. More than 5000 died in Memphis in the late 19th century.(Spielman and
D’Antunio, pp. 61,63)
As has been mentioned previously, yellow fever is transmitted by the bite of female
mosquitoes (most often the Aedes aegypti). If the mosquito bites a yellow fever victim in
the first 3 or 4 days o f the disease, the virus passes from blood into the insect’s stomach.
For the next 12 days, the virus migrates to the salivary glands from which they are
introduced into the next victim. Once infected, the mosquito can inject the disease into a
new victim every 3 days. This continues as long as the insect lives (Powell, 1949, pp. viiviii). But every bite does not result in an epidemic. In certain tropical areas, yellow fever
exists in arboreal monkeys in the canopy. The disease presents considerable danger to
certain species (howler and spider monkeys) with infections of lesser import in others
(Disease News Yellow Fever Facts, 2002). The existence of this epizootic reservoir
presents danger to humans who disturb the canopy, usually by logging. These sylvan
cases are usually limited to the persons originally bitten by the disturbed and infected
mosquitoes (Karlen, p. 20). There are also, then, “zone of emergence” cases usually seen
in the African savannahs. These outbreaks occur where there are areas of increased
contact between humans and infected mosquitoes (Yellow Fever Facts, 2002
www.sho.int/inf-fs/en/factl00html). Usually these are “dead end” interactions, i.e., not
transmitted further (Flint, Enquist, Krug, Racaniello and Skalka, 2000 p. 731). These
11 One European army decimated by yellow fever was that of Napoleon’s expeditionary
force to San Domingo, sent to conquer that island and move into the Mississippi River valley.
Two thirds of the force perished from yellow fever within two months and the French
conquerors’s plans for an American invasion were destroyed (Tobey, 1930).
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outbreaks can shift to the urban epidemic pattern when the virus is introduced into areas
of high unvaccinated population density (Yellow Fever Facts, 2002 www.sho.int/inlfs/en/fact 1OOhtmD. As Carrigan (1994, p. 5) puts it

A delicate balance of conditions is necessary for the development of an epidemic
within an area where yellow fever is not an endemic disease. First the Aedes
aegypti must be concentrated in substantial numbers, and the weather must be
warm enough to allow for mosquito activity. Further, a considerable number of
non-immune persons must be concentrated in an area where the mosquitoes are
active, and the virus must be introduced into that area by a previously infected
mosquito or by a person in the incubation period or the earliest stage of the
disease.

The Virus
The name “virus” derives from the Latin term for poison (Flint, Enquist, Krug,
Racaniello and Skalka, 2000). A virus has been defined as “a piece of nucleic acid
surrounded by bad news” (P.B. Medawar, Aristotle to Zoos cited in Oldstone, 1998, p. 8).
Less poetically, the virion (the virus particle) is a nucleic acid genome in a protein coat
(capsid). The mission, so to speak, of the virus is to insinuate itself into a cell where it can
replicate (Harper, 1998/1999 p.l). The proteins are responsible for the infection of cells
and the production of new viruses while the nucleic acid provides the genetic code
required to produce the proteins (Harper, p. 2). Viruses are complex and difficult to
classify, but major systems of classification depend on whether the virus contains DNA or
RNA, presence or absence of an envelope membrane, size and shape, and major proteins.
The virus that causes yellow fever contains RNA, is enveloped, icosahedral (a solid figure
with 20 plane surfaces in the shape of identical equilateral triangles) in shape, measures
40-60 nm and contains 3-4 major proteins (Harper, pp. 2-4). It is classified as a flavivirus
of the Togaviridae family (Yellow Fever Facts, 02). A virus is arguably alive or not alive.
Harper (1998/1999, p .l) states that a virus may be defined as having “the potential for life
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in the same way that a disk containing the code for a computer program is only a potential
program until it is put into the host computer.”
Viruses are thought to have been associated with the earliest mammalian life forms
and to have co-evolved with humans. They thrived as the rapidly urbanizing and
commercial trends of the past 10,000 years brought humans into closer and closer
proximity both with animals and with each other. Viral diseases were recognized very
early. Early Mespotamian records mention rabid dogs and Hector was described as
“rabid” in the Iliad. Smallpox was known in the Ganges river basin by the 5th century
BCE. The “age” of the yellow fever virus is unknown, but epidemics of the disease have
been recorded as early as the 15th century, and it is speculated that shipboard yellow fever
may have been responsible for early legends about “ghost ships”-ships whose entire crews
mysteriously perished (Flint, Enquist, Krug, Racaniello and Skalka, 2000, pp. 4,10).
In terms o f the discovery of the mechanisms of infectious disease, viruses were
latecomers. Bacteria were isolated as disease agents in the mid-nineteenth century
(Oldstone). By the beginning of the 20th century, hundreds of bacteria had been isolated
(Crawford, p. 12). Still, it was clear that there were many infectious diseases for which no
bacteria could be identified. Late in the nineteenth century, European researchers were
able to transmit a tobacco disease caused by a virus, but the organism could still not be
seen and remained a subject o f debate. Finally, in 1903, a French researcher, though still
unable to see viruses, defined their main characteristics. They were filterable and therefore
very small. They could not be seen under a light microscope and they could not be
cultured in the same way bacteria could (Crawford, pp. 13-4). The yellow fever virus
was, in fact, the first human virus to be identified (Flint, Enquist, Krug, Racaniello and
Skalka, p. 10). Not until the invention of the electron microscope in 1938 could
researchers actually see the particles they had described (Crawford, pp. 13-4).
Viruses are such a simple form o f life (if they are life at all), that they cannot
replicate by themselves. They are non-cellular and consist simply o f a bit of genetic
material, a nucleic acid, and a protein coat (Oldstone, p. 8-9). Crawford (2000, p. 18)
describes them as “rogue pieces of genetic material which have somehow broken free from
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chromosomes and found a way to reproduce independently.” Even the genetic material
that they do possess is simple, containing between fewer than 10 genes (e.g., yellow fever)
to a few hundred genes (smallpox). Bacteria contain thousands of genes. Humans
possess tens of thousands (Oldstone, pp. 8-9). Not surprisingly, viruses are exceedingly
small. Bacteria are between 1 and 10 microns (a millionth of a meter) in length. If a virus
were to be expanded to the size of a person, a similarly treated bacterium would loom at
the size of the Statue of Liberty. Light microscopes, which easily allow the human eye to
see bacteria, are useless for the examination of viruses. They can be seen only with an
electron microscope capable of magnifying size 100,000 times (Crawford, 2000 p. 7).
Viruses are obligate parasites. To survive as a species, they must insinuate
themselves into more advanced life forms, plants or animals, that possess the ability to
reproduce (Oldstone). They are very successful at doing this. Viruses basically borrow
the abilities possessed by cells by entering them and “turning them into factories for virus
production” (Crawford, p. 9). If enough cells in an organism are affected, disease, even
death, can result (Crawford ). Since viruses cannot endure long outside a living organism,
it is not surprising that some of them find transmission by vector a successful survival
mechanism. For the yellow fever virus, the mosquito is not merely a means of
transmission, but also of reproduction. After ingestion, the virus multiplies in the insect’s
intestines and travels to the salivary glands ready for injection into the next victim
(Crawford, p. 25). But the introduction of a vector as a means of transmission also
occasions greater complexity and therefore greater uncertainty into the system of
transmission. The production of a degree of illness that confines the victim to bed allows
mosquitoes a stable target and time to feed (Crawford, p. 37). It also suggests why
vector-transmitted diseases tend to be more incapacitating than others (Ewald, 2000, p.
13).
Once injection has occurred, the virus is met by an army of defenders-the
mechanical ones of skin and mucous membranes and the antibody producing lymphocytes.
Once past these immunological defenses, viruses must enter cells in order to reproduce.
But cells, which exists in a melange of substances which they must repel, are not easy to
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enter. In fact, they posses a kind of lock and key mechanism which normally only admits a
restricted number of molecules. It is the genius of the virus that it is able to mimic the
molecular keys which allow them into body cells. The signs and symptoms of a viral
disease are an expression of the particular molecular key that virus possesses (Crawford,
pp. 29-33).
The causative virus of yellow fever is one of a group known as arboviruses
(arthropod-borne), belonging to the flavivirus group, making it a relative of the pathogens
causing Dengue Fever and hepatitis C, and transmitted by insects. More than 500
arboviruses have been identified. O f these, only about 100 cause disease in humans.
Some, such as the yellow fever virus also establish themselves in animal reservoirs, in this
case monkeys of the tropical forest canopy (Karlen, pp. 156-8; Harper, D.R., 1998;
Yellow fever fact sheet).

Clinical Course of Yellow Fever
After a bite from an infected mosquito, there is a short incubation period (3-6 days)
followed by the onset of flu-like symptoms and fever (Miller and Keane, “Medical
Encyclopedia”). Body temperature may run as high as 105 degrees (F). The patient may
suffer severely from nausea, headache, back and muscle pain, nausea and vomiting. After
3-4 days, there is a brief respite from the symptoms after which the disease may return in a
more virulent form (Oldstone, p. 49). The fever reappears, the patient becomes jaundiced
(hence the name of the disease) as the liver fails. Bleeding can occur from multiple sites
including the stomach which produces the characteristic “black vomit.” Kidney function
deteriorates. (“Yellow Fever Facts”, 2002 www.who.int/inf-fs/en/factl 00htmft. The
patient experiences a “violent and uncontrollable” delirium as major organ systems fail
(Oldstone, p. 49, Carrigan, p. 8).
Clinical descriptions, however, do not convey the impact of the signs and
symptoms on those who experienced the 19th century epidemics. Trask (1997, p. 50 citing
Hall The Manhattaner in New Orleans) quotes the experience of a recovered patient from
New Orleans who stated that the fever was like a civil war raging in his stomach

33

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

while the temples and pulse beat a tatoo [sic] for the engagement. The head feels
as if filled with molten lead which is burning the eyeballs. The back is like an
unhinged door.

The final stages of the disease are particularly severe with jaundice, hemorrhages from
various parts o f the body, and the sign most associated with yellow fever-the “black
vomit” (Carrigan). The color of the vomitus is that of blood acted upon by gastric
contents and is simply a sign of bleeding from another site. The bleeding itself is caused
by a lack of clotting factors as the liver fails. The ravages of the disease on the human
body have been described by a number of 19th century southern observers. A New
Orleans clergyman who was often called upon to offer comfort at the bedsides of its
victims described his experiences during one of the city’s many yellow fever visitations.

Often I have met and shook hands with some blooming, handsome young man
today, and...[later] I have been called to see him in the black vomit, with the
profuse hemorrhages from the mouth, nose, ears, eyes, and even the toes; the eyes
prominent, glistening, yellow, and staring; the face discolored with orange color
and dusky red.

The physiognomy of the yellow fever corpse is usually sad, sullen, and perturbed;
the countenance dark, mottled, livid, swollen, and stained with blood and black
vomit; the veins of the face and whole body become distended, and look as if they
were going to burst... (Duffy’s Parson Clapp of the Strangers’ Church of New
Orleans cited in Carrigan, 1988, p. 8).

Late in the nineteenth century, a Memphis resident in the city during an epidemic wrote to
a relative about his experiences nursing a young woman-most probably his niece.
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Lucille died at Ten O’Clock Tuesday night, after such suffering as I hope never
again to witness...Once or twice my nerve almost failed me, but I managed to stay.
The poor girl’s screams might be heard for half a square and at times I had to exert
my utmost strength to hold her in bed. Jaundice was marked, the skin being a
bright yellow hue: tongue and lips dark, cracked and blood oozing from the mouth
and nose...To me the most terrible and terrifying feature was the ‘black vomit’
which I never before witnessed...By Tuesday evening it was as black as ink and
would be ejected with terriffic [sic] force. I had my face and hands spattered but
had to stand by and hold her. Well it is too terrible to write any more about it
(George, W.E. To Mv Dear Friend, cited in Humphreys, 1992, p.6).

The Report of the Portsmouth Relief Association devotes a number of pages to a
vivid description of the disease. The writer states that

the organ in which the greatest suffering was experienced was the stomach. From
the beginning the irritability in this viscus was intense, and the patient almost
constantly complained of nausea and a sense of weight and oppression about the
precordia. We do not know how better to describe this feeling of distress, than by
repeating the language of a poor Irish woman, who declared that she was
‘smothering about her stomach.” A persistent disposition to vomit manifested
itself, and the intolerance of the stomach was so great that the very mildest fluids
could not be retained (pp. 143-4).

Indeed, one of the major goals of treatment was to prevent the persistent vomiting “which
it was impossible to relieve by any resources of the healing art” (p. 155).
The author of the Report goes on to note that after 24-72 hours, the gastric
symptoms might disappear and the patient might experience “a general feeling of ease and
comfort” (p. 144). In these cases, recovery ensued. In cases that progressed to a fatal
outcome, gastric signs and symptoms became even more pronounced and blood appeared
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in the vomitus and stools. Finally, the disease affected the brain resulting in excitement,
delirium, convulsions and coma. Hemorrhages were seen from a number of sites. Urine
production ceased and death occurred.
Even today, half the patients who progress to the second stage of the disease die
from liver, kidney and/or heart failure.12 Recovery takes a considerable time-up to a
month. Less susceptible populations (e.g., Africans or Creoles with long histories of
exposure), suffer the fever, joint pains and bleeding, but usually recover in a few days
(Oldstone, p. 49; “Yellow Fever Facts”, 2002 www.who.int/inf-fs/en/fact 1OOhtmD.
Although there is an effective vaccine for prevention, to this day, there is no effective drug
therapy once the disease is established (Miller and Keane, Oldstone, p. 49). Mosquito
control offers the best means of preventing or reducing the spread of the disease.13

The Black Experience of Yellow Fever—African-American Background
Even before leaving their homelands, Africans and Europeans experienced
emigration to America differently. Once on shipboard, Europeans were generally traveling
toward freedom and opportunity, Africans away from it. Not surprisingly, the black
populations of Portsmouth and Norfolk experienced the epidemic in a way different from
that of the white populations. Blacks had been set apart from white Virginians both in

12 Carrigan (p. 6-7) argues that the total mortality from the disease is considerably
overestimated due to the large number of mild unrecognized childhood infections.
13 Mosquitoes, though no doubt present, were seldom mentioned by those suffering
through yellow fever epidemics. One notable exception was the advice in a Philadelphia
newspaper during the 1793 epidemic in that city recommending the pouring of cooking oil into
rain-water casks and cisterns to control mosquitoes since they were “distressing to the sick, and
troublesome to those who are well” (Powell, 1949, p. 23). And, in denying the presence of
yellow fever during the great epidemic of 1853, The Weekly Delta (1853) declared that “we don’t
believe Yellow Jack will favor us with his grim presence the year, for the simple reason that
Providence does not afflict us with two curses at one and the same time; and, to add yellow fever
to the present terrible visitation of mosquitoes, would be too much for human endurance (cited in
Carrigan, 1994 p. 61). In the same epidemic, DeBow’s Review (1853) instanced the mosquitoes
as a proxy for the efficacy of the city’s fever-fighting measures. “The smoke of the burnt powder
and tar, wherever it appears, is a killing dose to the mosquitoes. This fact alone is proof that the
concussion and smoke act as powerful purifiers (cited in Carrigan, 1994, p. 67).
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terms of social discrimination and outright condition of servitude since colonial times.
These conditions disadvantaged them by restricting their options in response to the crisis.
However, they had retained a biological advantage from their homeland which greatly
enhanced their ability to survive.
African-Americans living in Norfolk and Portsmouth in 1855 had undergone a
long and tortuous adaptation to a Euro-dominated society. They were, in fact, actors in
what Berlin (1998, pp. 3-4) has described as the “minuet” between slave and master-the
constant re-negotiation of relationships between two mutually dependent groups. Now,
less than a decade before the Emancipation Proclamation, African-Americans in
Portsmouth were living in the final flower of a fully developed slave society.14
Blacks arrived in the New World to serve as slaves only 10 years after Columbus’
great discovery (Palmer, C.A., 2000, p. 3). They were but the beginning of the waves of
unfortunate peoples who were forcibly brought to build the Europeans’ dream of
remaking a new continent in their own image. Probably 12-15 million Africans were cargo
on slaving vessels with most being taken to Latin America and the Caribbean (Palmer,
p.7). The large numbers transported to Spanish and Portuguese colonies were not
surprising. Both nations had a deeply rooted tradition of bringing enslaved Africans to
their own shores (Palmer, p. 7-9). The British colonies entered the slave trade later and,
by 1807 (after which the trade was prohibited) had carried about 400,000-600,000
captured people to North America (Wood, 2000 p 71; Kolchin, p. 22).
In 1619, more than 20 captured Africans disembarked from a Dutch ship at the
settlement at Jamestown, Virginia (Palmer, C.A., p. 53). They were likely the first
Africans brought specifically for the purpose of slavery in North America although blacks,
both slave and free, had participated in Spanish conquests on the North American
continent (Wood, 2000, pp.53-58). Until the second half of the 17th century, the eventual
fate of Africans imported to North America as slaves was somewhat uncertain. Indeed, at
14 Berlin (pp. 8-14) has delineated the difference between a society with slaves and a slave
society. In the former, slaves are just one form of labor among many. In the latter, he explains,
“slavery stood at the center of economic production, and the master-slave relationship provided
the model for all social relations...”
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that time, 29 percent of blacks in the country were free (Wood as cited in Kolchin, 1993,
p. 16). Berlin (1998, pp. 29-46) describes the rather fluid situation of what he labels the
“charter generations” in the Chesapeake region-a situation where slaves might farm
independently, maintain their own households, and participate in an active slave economy- where they could buy their freedom and sometimes become landowners and even slave
holders themselves. Indeed, many became participants in the institutions of the wider
society, active in the churches and unhesitating in using the legal system to protect
themselves.
Many Europeans came to the continent under articles of indenture-a condition of
servitude that was time-limited (Wood, p.65) and voluntary, (Kolchin, pp. 16-17) but
which, in its brutality, resembled the model of African enslavement (Kolchin, pp. 15-16).
At one point, Virginia’s population of white servants outnumbered that of slaves three to
one (6,000 to 2,000) (A New Description of Virginia cited by Phillips, 1969). There was
at least some possibility that some sort of indenture arrangement might apply to
Africans-more so, perhaps, because the British-dominated colonies had no lengthy history
o f dealing in slaves. That changed, however, with the establishment of English sugar
plantations in the Caribbean. As Wood has observed, “English experiments at Barbados
and Providence Island showed that Protestant investors could easily overcome their moral
scruples.” (p. 65) In 1660, the Royal African Company was created for the purpose of
entering the slave trade (Wood, p. 66). By the time the Company’s patent expired in
1698, the trade was well established and fell easily into the hands of independent traders
both from England and the colonies (Wood, p. 67).
Still, there was no logical reason that slavery in North America should become
race-based. From the beginning, the labor force for the colonies was mixed in terms of
race, class, economic position and political power. Native Americans were exploited as
labor early on, however, they had a number of deficits as a long term solution for labor
requirements. First, because of their lack of resistence to offensive organisms (e.g.,
smallpox) brought by the Europeans (and later as victims of yellow fever brought by
Africans), there were simply not enough of them to serve as the legions of workers
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necessary to remodel continents (Kolchin, 1993, p. 8; Oldstone, 1998, p. 4). Indians too
were on their home ground and could easily escape into neighboring territories, (Wood, p.
66) and Indian slavery was inhibited by colonial policies that insisted either on killing
Indians or driving them as far away as possible (Kolchin, p. 8). Indentured Europeans
were, for a time, a ready labor pool. For most of the 17th century, they filled most o f the
labor needs of the British colonies. But they proved unsatisfactory on a long term basis.
When economic conditions at home were relatively good, the supply of indentured
servants dried up. There was also a feedback system. Potential workers in Europe were
in contact with those who had gone before them and were able to obtain information
concerning good and bad masters and positions. And above all, once the term of
indenture was completed, the worker became free to sell his/her own labor. After 1680,
the numbers of indentured servants in the Chesapeake colonies decreased sharply
(Kolchin, p. 11).
Enslaved Africans offered numerous apparent advantages as a labor force. First,
the supply of people seemed unending. Africa is a very large continent after all, and
slavery, though o f a very different type than the prevailing practice in North America, had
been an established cultural practice in much of it since biblical times (Kolchin, 1993 p. 4,
20; Lovejoy as cited in Harris, 2001 p. 6; Miers and Kopytoff as cited in Harris, p. 6;
Oliver, 1991, pp. 116-129). A number of African leaders proved willing to cooperate with
the slave-hungry American and European traders (Wood, p. 66; Kolchin, p. 19). At the
same time that the numbers of indentured servants were declining, Great Britain used its
new dominance o f the oceans to establish hegemony in the African slave trade (Kolchin, p.
12). Once transported, Africans were completely cut off from their homeland. This
eliminated both the problem of negative feedback to the home country and that of escape
into familiar territory. And whereas white, indentured servants might escape and
disappear into the general population, Africans’ dark skin marked them as possible
escapees no matter where they went (Kolchin, p. 13). Above all, institutionalized slavery
ensured not only one generation but many generations of free labor (Kolchin, p. 13).
Although there were many historic justifications for slavery (e.g., the price to be
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paid for a loss in battle), one line of thought held that enslavement was justified on the
basis of “otherness.” In the Mediterranean Basin, for example, otherness was defined
above all by religion. “Infidels” be they Christian or Muslim were routinely subject to
slavery (Wood, p. 65; Kolchin, p. 5). The English saw Africans as “other” in at least three
basic ways. First, they were a different race. Second, they were “savage” or
“uncivilized.” Third they were “heathens” (Kolchin, 1993, pp. 14-5). But as enslaved
Africans became both American and Christian, these latter characteristics became moot.
In the United States, in the 17th century, race gradually became the basic criterion for
condition of servitude. Africans came to be described as “black” rather than as “heathen”
and the legal system, which had been vague with regard to the status of African servants
was modified to ensure that people so described were condemned to perpetual serfdom
(Wood, p.68; Phillips, 1969, pp. 75-8). Crucial to the process was the regularizing of
inherited rights. In 1662, the Virginia Assembly reversed English Common Law which
held that children inherited the status of their fathers to its opposite. Thereon, all children
bom to enslaved women would, themselves, also be slaves. Other colonies soon followed
Virginia’s lead (Wood, p. 68). Law after law was passed gradually extinguishing the
rights of residents of African origin. Virginia again acted as a colonial bellwether by
enacting a comprehensive slave code in 1680 and strengthening it in 1705 (Kolchin, p. 17;
Wood, p. 72).
As racism bred slavery, so did slavery breed racism-a development which affected
both enslaved and free blacks. Portrayals of blacks as inferior became more common.
Intermarriage was forbidden. In Virginia, freed slaves were required to leave the colony
within six months. Even as their condition deteriorated, the numbers of blacks in the
colony rose dramatically. By 1720, blacks constituted almost a third of the population-up
from seven percent only 40 years before. Their number continued to grow during the
remainder of the century along with the expansion of the tobacco economy (Wood, pp.
73-4, 82). By the time of the Revolution, forty percent of the population o f Virginia were
slaves (Kolchin, p. 25).
With the proclamation of independence, blacks in America found themselves in an
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anomalous position. People living with few or no civil rights were embroiled in war that
was all about freedom. Both sides used African-Americans as pawns of war, promising
freedom for fighting on one side or the other, and blacks were not slow to avail
themselves of the opportunities the conflict presented. Some joined the British, others the
colonial rebels. A number of Portsmouth slaves joined British forces led by Benedict
Arnold. Others still took advantage of the prevailing social disorder to escape (Littlefield,
2000, pp.113-18; Wertenbaker and Schlegel, 1962, pp. 71-2). The escapees included the
87 slaves owned by John Willoughby in Norfolk County (Kolchin, p. 72). But at the end
of the war, the institution of slavery endured both north and south. There was, however,
some softening at the margins. Most northern states passed emancipation legislation.
Freedom in these domains would come slowly, but it would surely come. Virginia as well
as Delaware and Maryland made manumission easier. As a result the free black
population expanded considerably.
Freedom, however, did not mean acceptance into the community as an equal.
Thomas Jefferson, one of the many founding fathers who were slave owners and the
author o f the phrase “all men are created equal,” probably represented a not uncommon
attitude o f white Virginians toward their black counterparts. Although blacks were human
beings with the same rights of life and liberty accorded to whites, the races could not be
expected to live together. Blacks, therefore, should be returned to Africa (Littlefield, pp.
128-30). Even with such conflicted attitudes on the part of white Virginians, it is
conceivable that slaves may have been freed on a larger scale in the commonwealth had
not economics intervened. With the exhaustion o f the tobacco industry in the state and
the hunger of the lower south and the expanding west for labor in the anticipated absence
o f the trans-Atlantic trade, slaves themselves became a cash crop for the upper south
(Littlefield, p. 133). Enslaved families, who had already been tom asunder by the ravages
o f war, were now rent again for profit. Between 1790 and 1810,100,000 slaves from the
Chesapeake region were sold and shipped to newly-opening cotton lands (Littlefield, p.
154). From 1830-1860, about 300,000 slaves were transported south from Virginia to be
sold. Even free blacks were liable to be captured and sold (White, 2000, p. 171). The
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misery-based trade contributed to the economic revival of the region (Kolchin, p. 98).

As the domestic slave trade expanded, the potential window of opportunity for
widespread manumission closed. White attitudes hardened. Pro-slavery arguments
denying the very humanity of African Americans supported the new economic realties
(White, p. 173). The Virginia legislature, which had supported education for blacks
reversed its position and also forbade them to carry firearms (Littlefield, p. 168).
Paradoxically, however, even in the midst of the strains imposed on them by
perpetual uncertainty, the physical treatment of most slaves improved. Basically, it had to
for white owners needed now, in the absence of the trans-Atlantic trade, to keep their
“property” healthy enough to work and, most important, to reproduce (White, pp. 1723).15 In this, they were notably successful. The North American slave population was
already expanding by natural increase as early as 1740 (Harris, 2001, p. 4). The million
slaves present in North America when the slave trade ended in 1808 swelled to 4 million
by 1860 (Kolchin, p. 22). Slave women generally bore children every 2 V2 years from the
age of 19 to the age of 40 (White, p. 183). Masters were known to bestow gifts on the
births o f slave children (White). Thomas Jefferson himself, declared that fertile slave
women were more profitable than male slaves (Berlin, 1998, p. 127), and the penalty for
infertility could be sale (White, p. 174).
Not surprisingly, the threat of black insurrection rose in this constrained climate.
As the century opened, a planned revolt in Richmond went awry and its leaders were
executed (White, p. 169). Perhaps the most famous of all slave revolts occurred in
Virginia’s Southampton county in 1822. Nat Turner led about 70 slaves on a killing
spree. About 60 whites of both sexes and all ages were murdered. Although quickly
suppressed, the uprising occasioned fear throughout the white south. Severe measures
restricting activities such as religious services and travel were imposed (White, p. 198).

15 Black life expectancy (30 years for males, 32 years for females) in the antebellum south
at this time was eight years less than that for whites and declining (Byrd and Clayton, 2000, p.
286).
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This resulted in the oddity of treating slaves well to keep them content and fertile while at
the same time treating them badly to instill fear.
It is important to note that, by the time of the epidemic, blacks in Norfolk and
Portsmouth (as well as in the rest of the country) were solidly American. In fact,
American-born blacks (also known as Creoles) outnumbered African-born blacks by five
to one at the time o f the Revolution (Kolchin, p. 38). This population differed
considerably from blacks arriving in America in earlier years. In the beginning of the slave
trade, most captives were male. They, of course, spoke many languages-none of them
English. They often bore marks of cultural expression on their bodies (e.g., filed teeth and
scarification), and they practiced many different religions. Once here, they were usually
housed in barracks and put to work on the land. (Berlin, 1998, pp. 109-114) Mid
nineteenth century African-Americans looked and were very different from their forbears.
The male/female ratio had normalized (Kolchin, p. 39). They lived in families and spoke
English. They wore American style clothes and had generally abandoned tooth filing and
scarification.16 They were likely to be practicing Christians. And they worked
everywhere-in the fields, in homes, in factories, as craftspeople. In fact, as slavery was
considered to be necessary to maintain the plantation system, it was also viewed by many
white southerners as the means to urban growth and sectional progress. Slaves labored at
a comprehensive range of urban tasks (e.g., manufacturing, transporting goods) to fulfill
the ambitions of their owners (Goldfield, 1982, p. 89). Slaves, though, were still more
likely to be employed in the countryside rather than the city. In 1860, only about 5
percent of all slaves lived in towns of more than 2,500 people (Kolchin, p. 178).
All blacks in the south were not enslaved. Entering the century of the epidemic,
about ten percent of blacks in the upper south were free, a number that remained fairly
stable until mid-century (Kolchin, pp. 81-2). For free blacks, cities offered the greater
opportunities both for employment and a social life. Most free blacks were unskilled, and

16 Certainly, many outward signs of African culture disappeared in America. However, the
extent to which African-American culture retains its African roots is a matter o f considerable
debate (Kolchin, pp. 40-1, 60-1).
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most unskilled jobs were in cities. They were also numerous enough to form churches,
schools, and other social groups. In fact, free blacks were more urbanized than whites.
By 1860 in the south, about a third of free blacks lived in cities-twice the rate of whites
(White, p. 203).
The word “free” must be understood in relative terms. White (p. 204) refers to
blacks as being “quasi-free.” In the south, free blacks were experienced by the white
population as a threat to slavery and therefore to the prevailing social, economic, and
political order. In the north and the expanding west as well as the south, free blacks were
seen as competitors to white workers. Depending on location, “quasi-freedom” included
restrictions of freedom of movement, the payment of extra taxes, limitations on freedom
of assembly and travel, curfews, exclusion from public places, mob violence and continual
threats of falling back into slavery (White, p. 204-5, Berlin p. 285). In Baltimore, the law
prescribed that free blacks were liable to the same punishments as slaves and for the same
offenses and, indeed, as the grip of slavery loosened in the cities, public and social policies
were directed more at the issue of race rather than condition of servitude. In short, fewer
and fewer differentiations were made between free blacks and enslaved blacks. Race and
race alone became controlling (Wade, pp. 249, 266-77). Even so, both unskilled and
skilled free blacks were able to carve out occupational niches-mainly by accepting lower
wages than whites in the same jobs. Women worked mainly in domestic service
occupations. Men worked in factories, and filled openings in trades (e.g., carpentry) when
white men were not available. They also established a monopoly on the barbering trade in
the south (White, p. 206). Despite the restrictions against them, free blacks advanced
economically in the decades prior to the Civil War. In Virginia, black property ownership
doubled between 1830 and 1860 (Sowell, 1979).
For most, slave or free, the church was the center of black life. White opinion on
black churches was divided. Some believed that black ministers diminished the authority
of the master and that relatively independent black organizations such as the church
threatened the authority of the slave society (Wade, p. 83). Others came to believe that
Christianity made blacks more controllable and therefore less dangerous, but did not
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believe in integrated churches. And for all, there was the problem that instruction in the
Scriptures might include instruction in reading and writing (Wade, p. 173).17 The notion
that churches must be segregated allowed for the growth of strong African American
churches-organizations that provided schools and served as centers of cultural life for
their communities (White, p. 207). Urban free blacks also formed benevolent associations
that provided for members of the community in times of need.

Urban African-Americans
In some ways, blacks in urban areas were considerably better off than their
counterparts in the rural south. Generally, they were better housed, better fed, and better
clothed (Wade, pp. 115-34). But other forces were at work to improve the condition of
the urban slave. Historically, cities have provided an escape for those trapped in
traditional states o f legal or economic bondage. Die Stadtluft macht frei. “The air of the
city makes free.” was a literal truth in medieval cities where escaped serfs who managed to
live undetected within city limits a year and a day were liberated automatically (Pirenne,
1925/56, p. 138). The liberating effects of urban environments attracted fugitive slaves
from the countryside and the traffic in and out of cities made it easier for urban slaves to
escape (Wade, p. 215). But all urban slaves enjoyed a freer life than their plantation
counterparts, and, in fact, no significant slave uprising ever occurred in a southern city
(Berlin, 2003, pp. 78-81; Wade, p. 226). A Kentuckian noted in 1848 that “slavery exists
in Louisville and St. Louis only in name” and continued

there are two things that always, and under all circumstances, abrogates slavery.
The first is dense population...and the next [is] the intelligence of slaves. Both of
these are silently and imperceptibly working their legitimate results (Louisville
Daily Journal February 22,1848 cited in Wade, 1964, p. 3).

17 It is likely that there were far more literate urban blacks than the white population
believed. Despite laws against teaching slaves to read and write and frequent warnings its danger
to the (white) society, black literacy continued to spread in the cities (Wade p. 173).
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Other writers of the time claimed that slavery could only survive in the countryside and
Frederick Douglas himself pointed out the advantage of urban conditions for the slave
when he stated that his life as a slave in Baltimore was a “paradise” compared to
“plantation existence” (Douglas, Mv Bondage and Mv Freedom cited in Wade, p.246).
But the relative freedom enjoyed by urban slaves was not a long-lived
phenomenon. Wade (1964, p. 3) states that less than 40 years before the period under
study, the substantial (20 percent) urban slave populations seemed stable and vigorous.
(The discussion of urban slavery is drawn from Wade, 1964.) But by 1860, slavery was
disintegrating in southern cities. As noted elsewhere in this work, the south, though
primarily rural, still participated in the urbanization of 19th century America. Initially, as
southern cities grew, the numbers of slaves within them grew also, at times even outpacing
the growth o f the white populations. But by mid-century, the numbers of slaves in
southern cities had either plateaued or was declining (Wade, p. 16). Not only did the
numbers of urban slaves decline, but their sex ratio changed also. Males, especially young
males, were likely to be sold for plantation work while females remained in the cities to
perform domestic work (Wade, pp. 23, 28). While life in the countryside tended to be
stable, slaves in the city were dealing with a dynamic environment.
But it was an environment that allowed them far more freedom of movement and
chances to interact than was afforded their plantation counterparts. The close housing
arrangements necessitated by city life meant that slaves were in much closer contact with
their masters but also with slaves of other masters housed in adjoining quarters (Wade, pp.
56-7).18 Both men and women were expected to run the errands necessary to the
maintenance of city households. Men often worked in industries and in public works.
Slaves performed most menial jobs and sometimes more skilled labor in the building and
other trades (Wade, pp. 29-30). At the same time, living in close proximity to their
owners, they (and their children old enough to perform simple tasks) were “on call” all or
most of the time. Domestic crises or even the presence of guests in the house increased

18 Masters were not blind to the threat of increased slave contacts outside the household.
Urban slave quarters were usually surrounded by high walls (Wade pp. 59-60).
46

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

the duties of slaves. And if there was thought to be not enough work at home, both adult
and child slaves were “hired out” for other work. In many cities, the market for “hires”
tended to be very fluid with slaves hired out for days or for lengthy periods. Slaves might
also serve as firemen, a situation which, in Portsmouth, caused the Common Council to
authorize special freedom of movement passes for black fire fighters.
The practice of hiring out had unanticipated consequences. In New Orleans, the
city itself brokered the labor of hired slaves and thus inserted itself between master and
slave. Elsewhere, many owners had slaves find their own employment, often simply
paying their masters a certain sum per month and possibly finding housing at some
distance from the owner, an arrangement as common as it was illegal (Wade). While such
arrangements hardly constituted freedom, they were certainly closer to a free state than
any arrangements enjoyed by plantation labor...and sometimes resulted in slaves
accumulating enough money to buy their freedom (Wade). Since black labor was always
sold for less than that of whites, these arrangements could cause considerable resentment
among whites who were employed in similar jobs. But the most threatening aspect of this
arrangement for many whites was the degree of freedom it offered for the hired out slaves.
Indeed, the connection between owner and slave did often become extended, remote, and
perhaps, at some point, non-existent. In 1860,400 hired slaves were noted in the census
as having “owner unknown” (Wade, p. 51). As a group of South Carolinians put it,

The evil is that he [the slave] buys the control of his own time from his owner...He
avoids the discipline and surveillance of his master and is separated from his
observation and superintendance...slaves are permitted to go at large, exercising all
the privileges of free persons, making contracts, doing work and in every way
being and conducting themselves as if they were not slaves...It seems., .that the evil
is the same...whether the slave so working out on his own account, is mechanic or
handicraftsman, a stevedore, a laborer, a Porter, a drayman or anything else
(Mobile Commercial Register November 7, 1833 cited in Wade, p. 52).
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Once more, hiring out exposed slaves to another way of life.

The city, with its intelligence and enterprise, is a dangerous place for the slave. He
acquires knowledge of human rights, by working with others who receive wages
when he receives none; who can come and go at their pleasure, when he from the
cradle to the grave must obey a master’s will (De Bows Review cited in Wade, p.
245).

Independence of the slave was assumed to be not only a threat to white dominance, but
also a threat to the well-being of the slave. It was assumed by many white writers that
unsupervised slaves would become idle, discontented, disorderly and turn to criminal acts
(Wade, p. 245-6). (It should be recalled that criminal acts were liberally defined for the
black population.) A New Orleans editor exemplified this view, speaking of

the absolute idleness, the thriftlessness, the laziness, the dishonesty, the
drunkenness, the proneness to vagrancy and vice of the negro [57'c] when free from
all the restraints of servitude (New Orleans Bee April 16,1858 cited in Wade p.
251).

Southern legislatures passed bill after bill against these arrangements, but the fact was that
urban economies could not do without the available, fluid labor pool that hired out slaves
provided. And masters often found it exceptionally profitable to simply receive payments
from an independent slave without having to provide the slave’s support. For the slave,
hiring out could mean the opportunity to live away from the master. In the antebellum
period, slaves took increasing advantage of opportunities to live somewhere other than
their master’s slave quarters (Wade). We see evidence of this practice in the Portsmouth
epidemic when a slave owner found it necessary to travel to his slave’s home. In this case,
the slave apparently enjoyed a warm relationship with his master. In some cities, slaves
with poorer relationships to their masters kept their own quarters as places of semi-
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concealment (Wade).
Hiring out was only one of the peculiarities of urban life that threatened the
restrictions of movement customarily placed on slaves. Cities often used systems of
passes to limit slave movements, but these proved to be a major inconvenience to whites.
Owners had to ensure that slaves had the proper passes, and a slave delayed on an errand
might be detained creating even more problems. In any case, it was necessary for slaves
to leave their masters’ homes almost constantly with every instance an occasion for
meeting new people, learning new ideas and forming associations exclusive of the masterslave relationship. These included the opportunities to engage in trade (illegal, but not
uncommon) and to gather at homes, grog shops, vacant lots or even on the streets with
other slaves or with free blacks. Slaves often took advantage of their mobility not only to
socialize, but to learn to read. Newspaper articles warned against these practices, but
owners simply could not establish the kind of control possible on plantations in the urban
environment (Wade). And slave owners faced a conundrum. They were the final
authorities over their slaves’ behaviors. But under urban conditions, municipal authorities
were charged with keeping order. In some cities, whipping and/or imprisonment was
undertaken by the civil authorities at the request of slave owners. Such arrangements
relieved owners o f an unpleasant job, but helped to set up a dual system of authority, for
municipalities also kept order themselves by detaining and punishing slaves as they saw fit
- thus undermining the authority of the master. Indeed the substantial civic apparatus
necessary to maintain public authority over slaves (armed patrols, jails, public whippings)
were often noted by northern visitors (Wade, pp. 97-8). The presence o f such apparatus
offered only a glimmer o f the dangers and humiliations involved in “living while black” in
an antebellum southern city. Blacks were not allowed to smoke on the streets, to
congregate at each other’s homes, to show impudence to a white, to be abroad without
papers, or to behave in almost any manner that demonstrated independence. Any o f these
“offenses” could mean jail and/or whipping, all without Constitutional protections (Wade
p, 181-91). And since, urban blacks were more likely to be sold than rural blacks (Wade,
p. 197), a slave considered to be unruly might find himself in a slave market.
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Effects of the African-American Experience of Yellow Fever
The white belief that blacks were immune to yellow fever was widespread in the
south and was sustained by mortality statistics in a number of southern cities. New
Orleans, Memphis, Savannah, and Charleston all reported far lower black than white
mortality rates in times o f yellow fever (Wade). In the great New Orleans epidemic of
1853, the black death rate was only 1.4 per thousand while the white rate was 63 per
thousand (Carrigan, 1994, p. 71). While medical thought tended to focus on the
susceptibility of poor and especially immigrant whites, notice was taken of the relative
resistance of blacks. But even in the last year of yellow fever in the United States, racist
doctrine trumped biological theory. If immigrants died of fright during yellow fever
epidemics, blacks survived because of their “fatalistic attitude” and their lack of fear or
worry (Carter Territory of New Orleans. Louisiana Courier. New Orleans Medical and
Surgical Journal cited in Carrigan, 1994, p. 243).
The matter o f black resistance to the disease did not go unnoticed by those seeking
to buttress arguments both against and for the institution of slavery. Abolitionists
contended that the presence of yellow fever in the slave states of the union was a
punishment for slavery (Carrigan, 1994, p. 337).19 Pro-slavery advocates responded with
arguments of their own. Slavery “protected” blacks by keeping them in the south so they
would not lose their immunity to the disease. Yellow fever also provided an economic
argument for using black rather than white labor since whites would be less able to
continue working during times of epidemic (Carrigan, 1988). Perhaps the most pernicious
pro-slavery arguments were couched in medical language. Dr. Samuel A. Cartwright
(New Orleans Medical and Surgical Journal. 1853 cited in Carrigan, 1994, p.255-6) set
forth a bizarre chain o f “medical” logic that devalued both African Americans and recent
immigrants to the south in his justification of the peculiar institution.
19 The question o f yellow fever was only a part of the medical arguments for and against
slavery. Savitt (1988) provides an overall view of the issue. The issue of a special black biology
was also used to buttress the arguments for a “special” southern medicine discussed elsewhere in
this paper. (Shryock, 1930)
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Nature scorns to see the aristocracy of the white skin-the only kind known to
American institutions-reduced to drudgery work under a Southern sun, and, has
issued her fiat, that here at least, whether of Celtic or Teutonic origin they shall not
be hewers of wood or drawers of water, or wallow in the sloughs of intemperance,
under pain o f three fourths o f their number being cut off...

Dr. Cartwright went on to explain that the disease occurred in immigrants from the north
because o f their intemperate habits but also because o f their “drudgery labor” in the
southern sun-labor for which blacks were intended. Yellow fever occurred almost
exclusively to those

unacclimated persons who attempt to jostle the negro [s/c] from his stool, and to
take from him those outdoor, laborious employments in the sun, wisely given to
him as a precious inheritance to lift him up from brutish barbarism upon the
platform of civilization, by forcing him to expand his lungs and oxygenate his
blood.

Although slavery died in the United States only a few years after the yellow fever
epidemic, the racist biological theories used to support it lived well on into the next
century.

Medical Response to the Epidemic
What treatments were used to deal with the fever? A New Orleans physician of
the time, well experienced in the treatment of patients with yellow fever, maintained
“Yellow fever is a self-limited disease; it is to be managed.” He claimed also, that no
matter what was done, the mortality was 33-75 percent (Report of the Philadelphia Relief
Committee. 1856, p.24). Duffy (1996, pp. 168-9) confirms that the great New Orleans
yellow fever epidemic of 1853 had convinced local physicians that no form of treatment
was effective. “Good nursing and minimal medication provided the best hope for yellow
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fever patients.”
Many physicians were unconvinced by the New Orleans model. Some followed
what was called an “expectant plan” of therapy. At the onset of the fever, the patient was
put to bed and covered with blankets. The feet were immersed in mustard water. To
promote perspiration, warm drinks were given, but in limited quantities. A purge was
accomplished by means of castor oil and a warm soap suds enema. The room was
darkened and the patient was made to rest for several days. Local applications of mustard
or cold packs were used to relieve localized pain. Some Portsmouth physicians treated the
disease with calomel and large doses of quinine. In an attempt to limit vomiting, food and
fluids were limited. When vomiting occurred, an astounding variety of remedies (e.g.,
turpentine, silver nitrate, opium) were administered. Not surprisingly, no method of
treatment was demonstrated to be more effective than any other. Supportive care for
patients and convalescents included the use of bay rum, cologne water (used as a
disinfectant), and lemons, arrowroot, tapioca, sago, barley, ice cream and oatmeal to feed
convalescents (Report of the Philadelphia Relief Committee, p. 93).
The dizzying variety of treatment regimens clearly reflected the state of American
medical therapeutics of the time. We in the 21st century have certain expectations of
medical practice that were simply not present 150 years ago. We expect our health care
practitioners to have standardized training and state-sanctioned practices. We suppose
that quantifiable research provides the underlayment for diagnosis and treatment. We
expect specific diagnoses and treatments based on explicit etiologies. In looking at mid
nineteenth century diagnostic and therapeutic modalities, it is necessary to abandon our
fixed ideas o f what they should be and examine them on their own terms-as, indeed,
historians 150 years hence now will be doing vis a vis our own medical practices.
It is fair to say that 19th century physicians did not treat disease per se, but rather
the patient as a totality. A host of environmental influences were thought to affect both
the nature o f the patient and the nature of the disease. Moreover, the nature of the patient
himself/herself (temperament, physique) provided a unique template for the action of any
particular disease (Carrigan, 1994, p. 294). No case was ever, therefore, like any other
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case and treatment had to be individualized. A New Orleans physician elucidated this
approach.

As to the details of the treatment, they must be left to the judgment of the
physician. Any specific treatment is just as absurd in yellow fever, as in any other
disease. The physician is not called to treat an abstraction, but a sick man. The
treatment must be varied accordingly to the peculiarities of the cases. Remedies,
beneficial in one case, may be most injurious in another; and success in practice
will depend, in a great degree, upon the sagacity and acquirements of the
physicians (New Orleans Journal of Medicine and Surgery. November, 1843 cited
by Carrigan, 1994, p. 295).

The disparities in the treatment of yellow fever were the reflection of where
American medical practice found itself in the mid-nineteenth century.20 As Duffy (1959, p.
53) has remarked, from medieval times to the time of the period under study, there had
actually been little change in medical practice. In fact, 19th century medical theories were
of even greater antiquity reaching back even to the works of Hippocrates and Galen
(Duffy, 1959, p. 54). However, the forces that would bring about the coming
transformation were already at work. American medicine entered the 19th century as an
exemplar o f “heroic practices.” Bleeding, purging, toxic doses of drugs were standard
methods of treatment. Nowhere, in fact, were these methods more in evidence than in the
Philadelphia yellow fever epidemic of 1793. It was the renowned Dr. Benjamin Rush who
was the strongest proponent of energetic bleeding, believing it relieved “capillary tension.”
(Hays, 2000, p. 216).21 By the end of the century under study, the era of scientific

20 Although nursing care was, and still is, crucial in the care of yellow fever victims, the
discussion in this paper centers on medical practice since nursing was not yet established as a

profession at the time of the epidemic.
21 Dr. Rush believed that capillary tension was at the root of all disease. Unitary theories
o f diseases were common at the time (Hays, 2000, p. 216). At the present time, there is an odd
echo of unitary theory as accumulating literature points to theories of inflammation as being
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medicine was well underway. This is a practice style familiar to all of us-technological,
specific, putatively based on laboratory science.
Rosenberg (1992) describes a nineteenth century situation where an increasing
belief in empiricism coupled with the competition from a variety of healers offering less
unpleasant treatments drastically reduced the use of heroic practices well before the
advent o f scientific medicine. But the use of such practices was, in fact, based on an
understanding of health and disease common to both physician and patient. The body was
seen as being in dynamic interaction with its environment. And as the environment might
affect the body, so too could one part of the body affect other parts. The mind was also in
continuous interaction with the body. The balance required among all these components
to maintain health was obviously somewhat precarious. Diagnosis and treatment was
aimed at restoring this balance. Physicians of the time, lacking modalities that would
expand their perceptions beyond the sensory, relied on physical diagnoses and treatments
that produced an obvious result. Treatments were “successful” when they produced the
desired effect-sweating, vomiting, blistering, etc. By 1830, these methods were under
serious question. Nevertheless, they continued, though practiced less and less, through
much o f the century. (This discussion is drawn largely from Rosenberg, 1992, pp. 9-31.)
A number of southern physicians, too, had become disenchanted with the harshness and
ineffectiveness of traditional treatments, moving to more moderate dosages and often
substituting quinine for the poisonous calomel (Duffy, 1959).22 By the time of the yellow
fever epidemic, the ambivalence concerning drastic treatment is clearly reflected by the
advice of the New Orleans physicians’ empiric advice to rely on comfort measures versus

responsible for a wide variety o f illnesses (Faloon, 2002).

22 Quinine was widely used as a treatment for malaria, the most common endemic disease
in early 19th century America. Because of ignorance of its proper use, it’s success was limited. It
was often used against yellow fever in the belief that the disease was an intensified form of malaria
(Rothstein, 1985, pp. 56-7, 60).
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the belief by other practitioners in the more traditional regimens.23,24
With confusion prevailing in the regular medical community, and given the antiregulatory climate of the times (medical licensing as we know it did not exist) and an
active free market economy, it is not surprising that a variety of practitioners enjoyed
thriving practices (Hays, 2000, p. 213, Duffy, 1993, pp. 139-41). In the south, the most
popular were Thomsonians, hydropaths and homeopaths (Duffy, 1959, p. 67). The firstnamed was founded by Samuel Thomson, a New Hampshire farmer. His system, based on
botanies and natural treatments that could be practiced in the home, attained considerable
popularity in both the north and the south. Hydropathic practitioners based their
therapeutic regimens on moderate exercise and the use of cool water both internally and
externally. Homeopaths,.who based their system on the teachings of a German physician,
Samuel Hahnemann, offered gentle doses of substances to enhance the body’s own
immune system (Duffy, 1959). Clearly all these methods offered treatment without tears,
a far less fearsome prospect than most regular medical interventions.
But even within the regular (allopathic) medical community, there was little
standardization of preparation. Apprenticeship, common in the beginning of the century,
was less common by mid-century, but had not entirely disappeared by the time of the
epidemic (Rothstein, 1985, pp.85-7). There was dramatic growth in the number of
medical schools, but most of these were proprietary, not affiliated with institutions of
higher learning, offered meager curricula and little or no laboratory or hospital experience

23 “Ambivalence” may be too mild a term. Duffy (1959, p. 55) reports that disagreements
over differing theories “reached a point at which opposing medical men resorted to fists, knives,
and pistols.” The city of New Orleans went so far as to limit the membership of physicians on its
board of health because of their disagreements. An earlier board in New York City had excluded
them altogether for the same reason (Duffy, 1993, p. 149).
24Not only had New Orleans physicians gained substantial experience in the treatment of
yellow fever due to its continual presence in their city, they were also, due to their French

connections, among the first American practitioners of the Paris Clinical School of medical
treatment. A forerunner of scientific medicine, the Paris Clinical model advocated autopsies to
determine causes o f death and the modification of therapeutics based on those findings (Duffy,
1993, pp. 71-3). Physicians in New Orleans also had unusual access to large numbers of corpses
for autopsy due to great numbers of deaths in the city’s Charity Hospital (Duffy, 1993, p. 133).
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(Rothstein, 1985, pp. 87-100). A survey completed in 1847 documented that about one
quarter of Virginia physicians had neither a medical degree nor a license (Duffy, 1993 p.
144). The obituaries of the Norfolk physicians who died fighting the epidemic confirm the
variety o f preparation necessary to call oneself a physician of the time. A record of
apprenticeship and “attending lectures” for one, a university degree, hospital residency and
study abroad for another, apprenticeship and a medical diploma for still another clearly
demonstrate the near-chaotic state of accepted preparation for medical practice at mid
century (Forrest, 1856, pp. 231-48).
Fevers of all kinds presented a diagnostic puzzle. To us, a fever is a symptom
only-a non-specific finding common to many underlying conditions. To 19th century
physicians, fevers in a very real way were the disease. Estes (1997, p. 1) outlines the
categorical divisions of fevers, each having its own implications for diagnosis, treatment
and prognosis. First, it should be noted, that fevers were observed not by measurement of
temperature, but by noting the pulse rate. An increased heart rate implied an increased
temperature.25 Other accompanying signs and symptoms including loss of appetite,
general disability, headache and “a difficulty in performing some of the vital or animal
functions” also presented as fever (Rothstein, 1985, pp. 42-3). Fevers could be
intermittent (e.g., the periodic exacerbations of malaria) or continued (fevers typical of
acute disease processes that peaked in a limited time and then began to wane). Fevers
were further defined by the signs and symptoms that accompanied them, e.g., jaundice, or
by poorly-defined conditions such as inflammation (Estes, 1997). An additional
complication was the contemporary concept of “blended” fevers. It was thought that a
number of different kinds of fevers (numbering 27 according to the 1847 New Orleans
Board of Health mortality reports) could merge with each other with milder fevers
morphing into more severe presentations (New Orleans Medical and Surgical Journal.
September, 1847 and January, 1848 cited in Carrigan, 1994, p. 47).

25 There is a relationship between body temperature and heart rate. Typically, when a
patient’s temperature is increased, we usually expect to find an increased heart rate also.
However, 21st century clinicians do not assume the presence of fever in the presence of an
increased heart rate.
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Understanding of the etiology of the epidemic drove not only individual
therapeutic regimens, but also the public health response of both cities and communities
where refugees might flee. Inherent in this understanding were fundamental conflicts
concerning both the cause(s) of the disease and the manner of its spread. These conflicts
again reflected both the transitional nature of medical understanding of health and disease
of the time and classic aspects of blame and foreign responsibility. The Irish were the
popular object o f blame in both Portsmouth and Norfolk. In their unpopularity, they
reflected the mid-nineteenth century experience of other Irish immigrants in American port
cities. Fleeing wretched conditions in Ireland (Percival, 1995), they found themselves
largely unwelcome strangers in their new land, even the victims of arson and riots
(Anbinder, 2001, pp. 29-32). With them, they brought their religion leading to an
expansion of the Roman Catholic church in America and bringing on themselves even
more prejudice (Nelson, 2001, p. 34-5). As a virgin population, they were naturally highly
susceptible to the yellow fever virus.26 But such susceptibility brought blame rather than
empathy. Intemperance, imprudent eating, living in filthy hovels, exposing themselves to
dampness and rain brought yellow fever on them and threatened the rest of the community
as well (Carrigan, 1994, pp. 239-45).27 After the 1822 epidemic, New Orleans, a city both
cosmopolitan and Catholic, offered financial aid to indigent strangers -largely Irish and
German-who were willing to depart the city (Carrigan, 1994, p.45). In short, absent any
fundamental understanding of the true cause of the epidemic, the argument about local
versus foreign origin thrived. It is important to note that the positions taken, even if not
politically driven, had political implications. Arguments concerning the foreign origin of
disease have persistently been used as an argument for limiting immigration while those of
local origin support activist, more intrusive public health programs. Pernick (1997, pp.

26 It is estimated that, to prevent a yellow fever epidemic, at least 80 percent o f a
population must be immune fwww.who .int/inf-fs/en/faet 1OOhtmll.

27 In fairness, the Irish were not the only immigrant groups accused of these behaviors.
But the massive emigration from their homeland meant that there were large numbers of them in
American port cities, making them easy targets.
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123-4), writing about the great yellow fever epidemic in Philadelphia in 1793, correlated
opinions concerning the etiology of the epidemic with party affiliations. Local Federalist
leaders saw the disease as a foreign import while Republicans assigned the cause to local
conditions. Thomas Jefferson, who was present in Philadelphia at the beginning of the
outbreak blamed the nature of cities themselves and framed the epidemic in terms of the
good it would do in the realization of his dream of America as an agrarian paradise.

When great evils happen, I am in the habit of looking out for what good may arise
from them as consolations to us, and Providence has in fact so established the
order of things, as that most evils are means of producing some good. The yellow
fever will discourage the growth of great cities in our nation, & I view great cities
as pestilential to the morals, the health, and the liberties of man. True, they
nourish some o f the elegant arts, but the useful ones can thrive elsewhere, and less
perfection in the others, with more health, virtue & freedom would be my choice
(Jefferson to Rush, 23 September 1800 in P. L. Ford (Ed.). The Writings of
Thomas Jefferson, cited in Stickle, p. 282).

On the other extreme, attributing epidemics to local causes was seen by some as a form of
treason (Pemick, p. 125). Like Portsmouth a half a century later, Philadelphia “solved” its
epidemic problem by taking actions that addressed the possibility of both local and foreign
origin.
There was, however, a “cause” that, while more difficult to address, continually
arose with regard to epidemics-that o f divine responsibility and intervention. In the west,
moralists from Moses to Pat Robertson have seen civic calamity as a means of purification
or as punishment for sinful acts. Karlen (p. 66) has argued that one particular religion
benefitted from epidemic disease, “...plagues paid dividends to Christianity. The new
faith, with its contempt for comfort and for life in this world, and its hope of resurrection
in a better one, profited from infections that scourged the Roman world from the second
century A.D. on.” Yellow fever was problematic in this regard since it was clearly often
not confined to the poor (considered to be blameworthy because of their “idleness and
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intemperance”) and since people of color (rather than the dominant white population)
suffered least from its effects28 (Swenson, 1988, p. 188). Still, evidence often counts for
little in the face o f the human capacity for denial. In her work on the frequent appearances
of yellow fever in New Orleans, Carrigan (1994) recounts how the newspapers ignored all
but the most severe outbreaks. In 1837, for example, deaths had reached 75-100 per day
when the papers broke their silence. In fact, the opposite was the case. As she states,
“The worse the epidemics became, the more loudly editors, physicians, and others
protested that New Orleans was the healthiest city in the Union-except during occasional
epidemic years.” Physicians noted that the fever was not contagious, but was produced by
the summer heat. It was an ordinary summer ailment that “became a fatal disorder in
certain individuals and groups because of their imprudent or intemperate ‘mode of living’
or by an excess of fear that literally scared them to death” (Carrigan, 1994, p. 37).
As we will see, the imprint of the epidemic can readily be noted in the minutes of
the Portsmouth Common Council meetings during the years immediately following the
epidemic. A number of measures were enacted in a effort to prevent a recurrence. In
substance, they echoed the pre-epidemic measures concerning themselves mainly with
public cleanliness, but were applied more intensively. The measures reflected the best
sanitarian principles of the time (see below) and addressed the problems identified by the
American Medical Association’s report on 11 American cities. These problems included
poor drainage, inadequate street cleaning, impure water, inadequate ventilation, nuisances
(e.g., manufacturing waste), and inadequate use of disinfectants as basic causes of disease
(First Report of the Committee on Public Hygiene of the American Medical Association.
1849).29 In these activities, they were not unlike certain other cities that had faced yellow
28 This cleavage in thought that separated the epidemic experience of the poor from that of
wealthier classes was not new. A citizen o f Toulouse thanked God in 1561 that “The contagion
only ever hits the poor people...God by his grace will have it so.” But apparently
God was assisted by the fact that “The rich protect themselves against it.” (Kamen’s The Iron
Centurv: Social Change in Europe 1550-1660) cited in Anderson and Zinsser, 1988, p. 382).
However, in major epidemics, even the nobility fled (Anderson and Zinsser, p. 382).
29 It should be remembered that the American Medical Association was, at this time, a
fledgling and rather weak body, and it is not clear how much credence the report was given. The
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fever. In their investigations of epidemics from 1790-1825, physicians in New York City
had identified poor, waterfront neighborhoods as the “ground center of the calamity” (J.
Ford. Slums and Housing, with Special Reference to New York City as cited in Blackmar,
1995, pp. 44-6). New York, too, extended the common law concept of “nuisance” into
land use by government, e.g., by filling in lots or cleaning out refuse, and, most important,
hiring an inspector to enforce public health regulations (Blackmar, p. 45). New York, it
should be noted, had been granted authority by the state legislature to pass its own health
laws following a major yellow fever epidemic in 1798. The 19th century in the city saw the
development of a permanent public health establishment combining both medical and
police functions (Rowen, 1993, pp. 210-1).
Indeed the combination of medical and enforcement functions is one of the classic
conundrums of public health in free societies. Public health regulations are nothing if not
intrusive. They prescribe how lives are to be lived (children must be immunized), how
businesses are to be conducted (food-handling restrictions), how products may be
manufactured (OSHA regulations), and, in time of epidemic, who may or may not leave
the area-often who may live and who may die. They are virtually always at odds with
bottom-line business practices. For these reasons, populations tend to be most willing to
pass and obey public health laws in times of a perceived threat and most willing to declare
their freedom from such practices in times of greater comfort.
The Portsmouth epidemic occurred not only in a transitional period between
dominant medical paradigms, but also at a time when public health methods were also
being transformed. Chadwick had published his landmark study, Report on the sanitary
condition o f the labouring population o f Great Britain, only 13 years previously. This
report offered evidence to demonstrate that disease was caused by “filthy environmental
conditions, polluted water supplies, and the decaying garbage and wastes clogging the
streets” (Rosen, 1958/1993, p. xxvi). But the title of the work indicates an underlying
approach to public health that concerned itself with human capital. Disease was a drain on

report itself is a remarkable mix of science and moralizing. It does, however, demonstrate the
growing interest in statistics as a basis for public health administration.
.
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the ability of a society to produce. Clearly, mid-nineteenth century Great Britain was
farther along the path of the industrial revolution than a small town in the American south,
but human capital arguments for epidemic prevention provided an economic foundation
for action that served as a buttress for compassionate concerns.
Public acceptance of the 19th century death rate from infectious disease,
particularly among children, is a source of amazement to later observers. Duffy (1971)
suggests that common diseases occasioning high mortality became familiar, a sort of
“background” to ordinary life and therefore caused little concern. Epidemic diseases,
however, inspired fear because they were unfamiliar.30 Foege (1991, pp. 12-4) notes this
phenomenon also, adding that people perceive risks as greater when they lack a sense of
control over events. Blaming others for the disease is one way to explain an epidemic and
thereby restore a sense of control (Nelkin and Gilman, 1991, p. 40). Blame can be placed
on ethnic or racial groups, social classes, those who behave outside established social
norms, those who are perceived as a threat, or on God’s will. Douglas (Purity and Danger
cited by Nelkin and Gilman, p. 41) notes that “Blame is in effect a social construct, a
reflection of the worldviews, social stereotypes, and political biases that prevail at a given
time.” Locating blame not only establishes a sense of control, but also speaks to other
social prejudices-the need to set boundaries from the “others” and, since illness is so often
associated with poverty, of justification of social inequities (Nelkin and Gilman, p. 41). In
a similar way, the insistence on yellow fever as a “strangers’” disease established regional
boundaries.
The analysis of the fear of epidemics in terms of social disintegration and alien
threats certainly has merit, but the affected populations fully realized that epidemic
diseases truly threatened their societies in a way that endemic illnesses, even those with
very high mortality rates, generally did not. Of course, epidemic diseases also claimed
lives at a much faster rate. A yellow fever epidemic could claim 250 lives a day (Carrigan.

30 Epidemics, though “unfamiliar”, were apparently not uncommon in 19th century
America. With no reporting requirements and no central data repository, their exact frequency is
unknown. A compendium of 19th century American epidemics can be found in Appendix 1.
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Yellow fever: Scourge o f the south, Ellis. The New Orleans yellow fever epidemic in
1878: A note on the affective history o f societies and communities cited in Trask, 1996).
And, because of their firestorm-like progression, epidemic diseases could and often did
cause civic breakdowns which, in themselves, could be fatal to large populations. As
Trask (1997) notes, yellow fever halted normal commerce and deprived residents of even
ordinary services. Fear on the part of outsiders isolates epidemic areas and those with the
resources for flight leave taking their skills with them. As we will see, conditions of
scarcity prevailed in Portsmouth during the epidemic. Many who survived the disease
may well have starved to death without the intervention of the Relief Association.
At base, reactions to the epidemic reflected the theoretical underpinnings typical of
19th century medicine. Diseases were not well demarcated as specific entities. In fact, the
body itself was not well demarcated from its environment. A constant interplay between
the two lay at the base of health and disease. The balanced maintenance of “intake and
outgo” in the forms of diet and excretion were crucial to the health of the individual, thus
the careful attention to the effects of drugs on secretions and excretions. Drugs, in fact,
were not categorized by use in certain disease, but by their physiological effects. One
reason for the popularity of mercury as a treatment was its unequivocal relationship of
dose and effect on salivation (Rosenberg, 1985, pp. 40-3). In current terms, the
effectiveness of a drug was not measured by its ability to cure, but by its ability to exhibit
an effect on the body. In fact, the term for administering a drug was to “exhibit” it
(Rosenberg, 1985, p. 43). And within the body, a similar balance among its components
(including the mind) were also necessary (Rosenberg, 1985, pp. 40). The source thought
to be responsible for an outbreak was equally indefinite. Rosenberg (1992, pp. 295-6)
cites three major concepts thought to be at fault. First, the always-precarious balance
between the body and the environment may become deranged (configuration). There
could be a source of contamination from the outside. Lastly, there was the matter of pre
disposition or susceptibility - the question of why some became sick while others,
apparently with the same exposure, remained well. In great part, susceptibility was
thought to be explained by the influences of humors. Humoral theory is ancient, and
reduces the persona to an amalgam of influences based on body fluids. Alterations in
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yellow and black bile, blood and phlegm affected the personality and interacted with the
environment to produce healthy and diseased states. Humoral theory extended far beyond
individual biology. Each humor (secretion) is associated with a type of “prime matter”
(air, earth, fire, water), with seasons of the year, and with astrological phenomena (Haller,
1981, pp. 4-35). In all, humoral theory presented physicians with the intellectual challenge
of correlating signs, symptoms, personality, climate, and planetary influences in the
process of diagnosis and treatment. It also buttressed the notion that physicians must
know the person and his/her situation very well, preferably over a lengthy period of time,
in order to treat each illness successfully.
In the absence of effective medical treatments for most conditions, much of 19th
century medicine was domestic, medicine practiced in the home by family members using
methods and materials that were widely available. This blurring of distinctions between
home remedies and those offered by physicians meant that physicians’ remedies could also
be used by non-physicians. In August of the epidemic year, The Virginia Gazette took
note of the prevalence of yellow fever and offered the following remedies taken from a
medical text.

A soon as the symptoms of the fever appear such as headache, nausea, drowsiness,
pain in the limbs, back, etc., an emetic should be immediately administered, (this
emetic is composed of one part pulverized ipecac, one part pulverized lobelia, and
half a part of pulverized blood root; dose fifteen grains and repeat after a quarter
of an hour if not successful, making the patient drink plentifully of warm camomile
tea; fifteen grains of simple ipecac, may be substituted if the first deemed too
powerful; followed as soon as practicable, (say in four to six hours,) by an active
purge; this is composed of two parts Alaxandria [sz'c] senna pulverized, and one
part of powdered cloves, dose one drachm, or a small teaspoonful, on which pomhalf a gill of boiling water, sweeten and left to coll, soaking the feet frequently in
hot ley [szc] or mustard water. If relief be not speedy, and the blood tends to the
head or bowels, causing internal heat of irritation, pain or oppression in the
stomach, with coolness or unequal circulation in the extremities, there is a danger
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of congestion, and recourse must be had at once to mustard poultices, (make those
with good, strong, fresh mustard and vinegar, mixing a little fine meal or flour, and
when spread, put on a thin layer of pounded garlic,) commencing on the inside of
the legs at both ancles [sic], and removing them upwards as the burning becomes
insupportable, to the calves, then to the thighs, wrists, middle and upper parts of
the arms and, should there be pain in the head, to the temples, behind the ears and
back of the neck, bathing the head (keeping it wet) with diluted camphorated
spirits, or rum and water, (the best application is equal parts of New England rum,
rain water and vinegar, with the addition of a little salt.)-During these applications,
acidulated mucilagenour [sic] drinks should be freely given, and cooling
applications, (where there is pain) and cloths etc., applied to the bowels.

This passage not only demonstrates the complex rituals common to many practitioners of
the time, but its publication in the press assumes the knowledge and ability of patients’
families to follow the same rituals on their own. Shipboard manuals recommended similar
treatments (Folsom’s The Mariner’s Medical Guide Designed for Use of Ships. Families,
and Plantations cited by Trask).

The Sanitarian Movement
The nineteenth century sanitarian movement, the precursor to modem public
health, was an accompaniment to the rise of an urban industrial society (Ellis, 1992, p. 1).
Largely following the British experience of the urban poverty and overcrowding
occasioned by the industrial revolution, those concerned with public health in America
began studying conditions in their own cities. The results were discouraging (Ellis, pp.27). While local boards of health came (usually under the threat of an epidemic) and
disappeared (when the threat dissipated), public health reformers consistently pointed out
the need for permanent agencies with real powers to implement sanitary reforms (Ellis, p.
9).
Sanitarian theory depended largely on the belief in miasmas as the basis of
epidemic disease. Miasmas, literally “bad air” were an etiology o f considerable pedigree.
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The theory was based on the notion that an environmental process, namely putrefaction,
was at the root of disease. On a larger scale, it echoed the medical belief at the time that
people and the environment were interdependent and that disease was a result of a
disharmony in this interaction (Alewitz, 1989). Like the attention paid to physical
symptomatology in individual cases, this theory looked at the considerable “filth” in urban
environments and declared it to be evil. Certainly, they had plenty to look at. Effective
trash and garbage collections and sanitary systems were not a feature of 19th century
American cities. The waste of animals used for transportation added to the waste on the
streets. Runoffs from such industries as abattoirs often found their way directly to the
streets (First Report of the Committee on Public Hygiene of the American Medical
Association. 1849). A committee in Charleston investigating the yellow fever epidemic of
1858 described the condition of the city.

Occupants of lots place the offal, garbage, and particularly the filth of cowyards
openly in the streets...Another and greater evil [resulted from] houses crowded, or
rather packed, with human beings, and the yards or lots of small dimensions
[cluttered with all kinds of things] and in some instances hogs and dogs. [The filth
and refuse were then put outside] with the morning sun beating down on it and
disengaging the foeted [sfc] emanations from streets, alleyways and courts, the
poisonous gases of putrifying animals and vegetable matter passing into the
atmosphere to the injury of every section of the city, and all classes of society.
(Report of the Committee of the City Council of Charleston, upon the Epidemic of
Yellow Fever of 1858 cited in Wade (1964, pp. 136-7)

Not uncommonly, swine and dogs were relied upon to rid streets of waste products by
consuming them. The “bad air” given off by all this putrefying matter was thought to
contain unknown substances which poisoned the environment and caused disease by an
interaction with susceptible individuals. But the effluvia of decaying matter did not always
result in epidemics. Clearly, at least one other factor must be at work. One of these was
the epidemic constitution of the atmosphere. Heat, dampness, even astronomical forces
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were thought to interact with the atmosphere to cause epidemic disease.31 Dr. Benjamin
Rush and Noah Webster, theorizing on the 1793 yellow fever epidemic in Philadelphia,
discounted theories of contagion and importation and pointed to the interaction of
decaying animal and vegetable matter with heat and moisture as the cause. (Rush
incidentally noted the presence of a great number of mosquitoes.) This interpretation
influenced medical thought for the next seven decades (Carrigan, 1994, pp. 208-9). It was
this theory that gave rise to the considerable speculation with regard to the role of the
weather in the epidemic. In addition to ruminations on the heat and drought, some looked
at the “electrical tension” of the atmosphere as manifested in lightning storms and low
barometer readings as causative (Forrest, 1857, pp. 303-5).32
Contagion was a different matter. If a disease was thought to be contagious, it
was believed that some sort of poisonous matter could be passed from infected persons
(or their belongings such as infected bedding) to susceptible individuals to cause disease.
Obviously, the receptivity of other locales to refugees from an epidemic area was
conditioned by whichever theory of transmission was accepted. If refugees were simply
fleeing conditions of bad air, it was safe to accept them. But if the disease was
transmissible by contagion, clearly the refugees brought peril with them.
Theories of bad air and poisons gave rise to practices of wearing camphor or spice bags
near the nose or the firing of cannon and burning of torches (to break up the bad air)

31 The Report of the Portsmouth Relief Association devoted a number of pages to
describing areas in the town that were wet-marshes, wharves-as well as detailed charts of the
temperature and wind conditions that summer and comparisons to climatic conditions thought to
have led to previous outbreaks in a number of cities.
32 The notion that weather conditions affect disease is at least as old as Hippocrates. The
ancient physician begins his treatise “Airs, Waters and Places” with this instruction. “Whoever

wishes to pursue properly the science of medicine must proceed thus. First he ought to consider
what effects each season of the year can produce; for the seasons are not at all alike, but differ
widely both in themselves and at their changes. The next point is the hot wind and the cold,
especially those that are universal, but also those that are peculiar to each region” (Hippocrates, p.
71).
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during times of epidemic (Trask, 1996).33
The miasma theory was often conflated with ideas of disease as the result of
immoral behavior at least since medieval times. The combination of theories offered a
plausible explanation of why some were more susceptible to the influence of bad air than
others (Slack, 1991, p. 116). “Bad air” was associated with the smells common in poor
neighborhoods (Nelkin and Gilman, 1991, pp. 44-5). The poor in the popular mind were
associated with sinful behavior. Associating disease with immoral behavior reinforces
socially defined boundaries and often associates disease with a notion of divine retribution.
Early public-health reformers in America reinforced the connection between health and
piety (Nelkin and Gilman, 1991, pp. 44-8). Lifestyle, e.g., the Irish custom of keeping
domestic animals in their homes, was also seen as a cause of disease (Nelkin and Gilman,
1991, pp. 44-8;). Historically, measures to prevent plagues (e.g., limitations on
movement, incarceration) also served as measures of social control of poor populations
(Slack, pp. 125-6).

Yellow Fever North and South
Yellow fever epidemics were not an uncommon phenomenon in the American
south of the time under study. In one instance, Stickle (1979) reports on a yellow fever
epidemic in Baltimore, August-October, 1800 and argues that the poor of the city were
disproportionately affected. As in Portsmouth, the index cases occurred close to the
water (in Fell’s Point) and news of the sickness was not released by the city authorities (in
this case, the Board of Health) until several deaths had occurred. As soon as the news
was made public, scores of businesses announced closings and relocations. Unlike the
later Portsmouth/Norfolk epidemic, the city government continued functioning. Daily
death statistics were compiled and released by the Board of Health (although only two

33 There was a third, less common, theory as to the origin of yellow fever-that it
originated aboard ships. According to this belief, improved ship ventilation and hygiene would
prevent the disease. Even when this theory was not accepted, few denied the inescapable
connection between yellow fever and shipping (Hargis, Yellow Fever: Its Ship Origin cited by
Trask, 1997).
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members of the Board actually remained in the city). The city also set up a temporary
hospital. However, after the epidemic, the city’s efforts were widely believed to be
inadequate and there were pressures to replace the Board of Health and set up a
dispensary for the poor. Stickle has carefully documented the disproportionate loss of life
in Fell’s Point, the poorest section of the city. However, it is not clear whether this was
due to increased susceptibility of a poor population, the flight of the middle class, or the
documented mosquito-friendly conditions of the Fell’s Point locale.
Carrigan (1988) argues that yellow fever (“the Scourge of the South) - or disease
in general-was a significant component in southern distinctiveness or “otherness.” She
maintains that yellow fever was a major factor in limiting population and economic
growth. She cites the negative consequences of more than a century of epidemics-“the
disruption of trade, and its diversion to other areas; delay of commerce associated with the
harvest; and the consumption of energy and resources in the care of the sick, burial of the
dead, provision for orphans, and relief for the families of the unemployed” (Carrigan, pp.
69-70). Humphreys (1992, p. 49) agrees and notes estimates of $10.5 million annual
losses by New Orleans from yellow fever between 1846 and 1851 alone.
Yellow fever, as well as other southern epidemic diseases, drove southern
physicians to emphasize their regional difference in medical experience. In the 18th and
19th centuries, a number o f works appeared describing the medical conditions thought to
be peculiar to the American south (Breedon, 1988, p.9). At the fringes, theories of
southern medicine tended toward the extreme. A New Orleans physicians argued that the
practice o f medicine had begun in the southern climate of Greece only to have been
corrupted by barbarian invaders from northern Europe. Physicians in the American south
were advised to return to medicine as it had originally been practiced (Young, 1988, p.
160). In some ways, the diseases of the south also defined the meaning of being southern.
It was thought that a period of “seasoning” was necessary to develop resistance to the
diseases o f the south (Breedon, 1988, p. 9). Survivors of the seasoning experience had, in
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a way, proved their fitness for the southern climate.34
Southern diseases also sparked an interest in southern medical independence. It
was important to have southern medical schools, southern medical journals, experience
with southern populations (Carrigan, 1988, p. 62).35 In fact, a number of medical schools
(including those at the University of Virginia and in Richmond) were opened in the south
during the first half of the 19th century. They offered the standard four to five months of
lectures with a preceptorship. During the same period, southern medical journals were
published in New Orleans, Charleston, Nashville, Richmond and Savannah. (For a brief
time, the Confederacy published its own medical journal - Shryock, 1930).
According to Warner (1985, pp. 53-8), antebellum southern physicians argued that
the south had a distinct medical character and, therefore, required a different kind of
medical practice. This distinctiveness was based on

geographic patterns o f disease distribution, virulence, and classification; the large
population of blacks and relatively small proportion of recent European immigrants
in the South; and regional peculiarities in climate, topography, and diet... (Warner,
1985, p. 53).

In particular, the region’s hot weather combined with its marshes and wetlands were
thought to give rise to “noxious miasmata”, the bad air that gave rise to disease. These
unhealthy conditions necessitated larger doses of medications than would be given in the
north. Bleeding, however, was thought to be less effective in the presence of southern
diseases and was practiced less than in the north. It is important to note, however, that
34 The Report of the Portsmouth Relief Association stresses that “new comers” to the
region, especially “foreigners” were not only more likely to contract the disease, “but also to have
it in its most malignant form” (p. 126). Their views were even more local, implying that even
birth elsewhere in Virginia (rather than Portsmouth) afforded a lesser degree of protection. Note
also the belief that yellow fever was changeable in form.
35 The notion o f southern medical distinctiveness is part of a much larger cultural
understanding of the south as a place apart, outside the norm of the American experience
(Breedon, 1988).
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the drugs used by physicians were the same and that basic principles of anatomy and
physiology were thought to be the same regardless of region. It was the application of
these principles that were thought to necessitate a different style of practice.
The source of these arguments were to be found not only in southern tendencies to
view themselves as different from northerners in multiple spheres (e.g., agriculture), but
also from the basic understanding of the place of climate in the etiology of disease
prevalent at the time. The thought that disease was environment-specific had a 2000 year
old pedigree, dating from Hippocrates’ On airs, waters, and places. The constitution of
the patient interacted with the patient’s environment to produce a plethora of
presentations of the same disease. Climate loomed large as an environmental factor
affecting the presentation o f disease.36 American medical practice therefore was required
to differ from European practice, and southern practices must be different from those of
the north. A Tennessee physician made the case in 1860.

Medicine, like disease, must spring from the very elements, soil, sunshine,
moisture, etc., that produce disease. The very circumstances that develop the one,
contains, and suggest also, the antidote. The study and cure of disease in one
locality does not necessarily give the information requisite to success in another
locality...Again, we have a population here that book-makers in the north know
absolutely nothing about-a people widely different from the race with which they
are familiar, and of whose diseases they are no more competent to write than to
give a history o f the inhabitants of the moon. A southern medical literature is the
desideratum-a literature that can be relied upon-a literature drawn from
demonstrations in a southern field, whose fauna and flora are different, having
different botanical and zoological provinces-whose geology is different-whose
heat and moisture are different in degrees and whose genus homo is different in
dynamical force, and whose diseases are modified or rendered virulent by these

36 Most early American medical societies appointed committees to study the role of
weather in disease. (Duffy, 1992, p. 67)
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many differences, all of which have to be studied in their natural relations (Warner
and Tighe, 2001, p. 107).

However, this same theoretical grounding in the relationship between climate and
disease did not bring about calls from northern physicians for a “northern” medical
practice style, although there were some northerners who publicly maintained that
“southern” medicine was inferior. To Warner (pp. 61-5), the zeal with which southern
physicians called for a distinctive style of practice “must be ascribed to the same engines
that drove southerners from a variety of occupations in their rising defense of the southern
way of life.” It demonstrated southern physicians’ anxieties concerning both their low
economic and social status-problems that, in fact, were endemic to most American
medical practice at the time. In the south, these anxieties drove the creation of a southern
revisionist medical history in which “true” medicine was a product of a southern climate
(Greece and Rome) that had undergone perversion by dominant northern European
influences. It became then the task of the southern physician to reject the corrupted
version o f practice and re-institute “true” medicine.
The view from the north, however, was different. While there was no call for a
“northern” practice of medicine, northerners did view the south as different medically.
Basically, they viewed it as dangerous. Southern mortality was clearly the highest in the
nation. New Orleans, known as the “graveyard of the Southwest” had a death rate three
times that of New York or Philadelphia (Breedon, p. 10). Northern insurance companies
charged their southern policyholders higher premiums (Breedon). Disease, especially
malaria which saps the strength of the victim, contributed to the belief in the “lazy
southerner” (Breedon, p. 11). Lazy or not, the high rates of disease constituted a drain on
the southern economy. It was estimated that its high rates of illness was costing the city
of New Orleans $45 million annually by the 1850s (Shryock, 1930). In the 1840s, it was
estimated that 85-94 of 100 babies bom in selected northern states would be alive at the
end of 5 years, but only 73-80 of their southern counterparts (Shryock, 1930). Even
though a number of them waited out the summer disease season in northern locales,
southerners typically reacted defensively to northern ideas of the south as sickly place,
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thereby strengthening their own belief in regional distinctiveness (Shyrock, 1930; Breedon,
p. 11). In rejecting northern theories of the south as a sick region, some southern
physicians began employing the most basic methodology in public health to prove their
case. They began counting births and deaths and calling for the establishment of vital
records registries (Humphreys, 1992, pp. 50-1).

Discussion
The examination of an epidemic experience provides unique insights into the
biological and social forces that meet at the intersection point of the outbreak. The very
occurrence of the epidemic signifies that human environmental intrusions have met
resistance from the natural world. The epidemic represents a renegotiation of the terms of
accommodation between people and pathogens. Social and cultural beliefs of the society
are illuminated as the community struggles to survive. Urbanization, racism, xenophobia,
and regionalism were among the phenomena that were focused and displayed during
antebellum American epidemics.
The Portsmouth epidemic experience demonstrates the conflicts inherent in the
violent convergence between urbanized populations and natural pathogens. With the
increase in its virgin population (as well as that of Norfolk across the water) and with
commercial traffic from infected areas regularly arriving in the port, it was perhaps only a
question of when rather than if such an epidemic would occur. As its inhabitants can
testify, Hampton Roads is a mosquito-rich area. When a substantial dose of the yellow
fever virus arrived in the port, the three conditions necessary for an epidemic-a virgin
population and the presence of both the pathogen and the vector needed for its spread
were present. Those infected suffered a predictable and most unpleasant course. For
most survivors, the experience resembled a particularly severe case of the flu. Those who
died suffered multi-systems failure.
The epidemic experience emphasized a number of characteristics of antebellum
southern society. As the black and white experience was different in health, so was it
different in disease. And so was the difference utilized by white writers to justify the
institution o f slavery. The epidemic and its aftermath was met with the best efforts of both
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medicine and public health of the time. The former, informed by a variety o f medical
models, demonstrated a dizzying array of remedies. The latter, vacillating between
theories o f domestic contagion and foreign importation, prescribed a combination of
isolation and sanitation. And the epidemic o f a disease now absent in northern cities
manifested the regionalism o f the times.
This study is the first to examine the epidemic as it occurred in Portsmouth. It
utilizes primary sources to depict the experience as it occurred, describes the causes and
clinical course of the yellow fever, and provides a broad background of social and medical
conditions of the time that were exemplified in the Portsmouth story. In particular, it
focuses on the organization that replaced the government and aided in the survival of the
town’s inhabitants. The organization is examined in terms of systems theory as elucidated
by Anderson and Carter. The theory argues that human society is comprised of
components that are related both to each other and to the society as a whole. In the
Portsmouth case, one component, an organization, arose to replace another as the
governing authority. In addition to replacing another organization, it managed the
maintain the essential society as a whole even as other components (e.g., the family, the
church) failed.
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METHODS
Public health is both an old and a new discipline. It was bom in the efforts to
contain periodic plagues and continues both in that tradition as well as in modem efforts
to prevent chronic conditions. The history of the discipline may extend to Biblical reports
of disease outbreaks, but probably the best known report is that of the plague of Athens
recounted by Thucydides (Thucydides, trans. 1954/1972). Thucydides carefully described
the clinical manifestations o f the disease that devastated Athens in 430 B.C.E. as well as
the social effects on the population. So compelling is his account that it serves as a
paradigm for all later reports of epidemic diseases. Quite naturally, more attention has
been paid by health officials to the biological causes and effects of epidemics rather than to
their social consequences. That may have been Thucydides’ own intention since he stated
he was writing his account so that the disease might be recognized in the future.
However, his description of the social chaos occasioned by the plague of Athens provides
a singular insight into the disintegration of systems of community control under
overwhelming biological stress. Indeed, it gives us an object lesson in just how fragile
those systems are.
The yellow fever epidemic which stmck Portsmouth in 1855 similarly disintegrated
existing social systems. However, in this case, an alternative system was quickly
assembled to cope with the emergency. In some instances, the new system was created
out of the remnants of previous institutions. Some clergy, for example continued to visit
and conduct services. The dominant part of the new system, the Portsmouth Relief
Association, was newly founded. Although suffering was great, the general state of
indulgence and lawlessness described by Thucydides was largely avoided.
The relative success of the cities in adapting their social systems to the needs of the
epidemic was examined in terms of the framework set forth by Anderson and Carter
(1999) in their description o f the application of systems theory to communities. In
particular, they have elucidated elements of the theory which provide a structure for
examining the epidemic from a systems perspective. These include, but are not limited to:
•

Energy and information exchange,
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•

Structural and behavioral aspects of social systems, and

•

Characteristics of specific system components (communities, organizations,
groups and families).

Data sufficient to illuminate the event were drawn from diverse sources.
Numerous works concerning general history of the time for Portsmouth, and the state of
Virginia were consulted. Standard medical sources for the study of tropical disease were
used to develop a picture of the clinical presentation and the epidemiology of yellow fever.
However, care was taken to ensure that present knowledge did not contaminate the view
of the biology of the epidemic as seen by both medical experts and the population affected
at the time. For those views, secondary and primary sources dealing with 19th century
medical knowledge and contemporary accounts were consulted. (Primary sources are
those written at or about the time of the epidemic. Secondary sources are those written at
a later date.)
Diverse primary sources concerning the cities and the event were utilized, most
notably:
•

newspapers of the period,

•

family papers as available,

•

1850 census and mortality data,

•

survivor accounts,

•

church records,

•

reports of the local association that functioned as a quasigovernment during the epidemic,

•

report o f the Philadelphians who sent both people and goods to

Portsmouth to aid in the epidemic, and
•

Portsmouth Common Council minutes.

The theoretical framework was developed in greater depth by the use of relevant
texts.
The first analysis consisted of setting up background to the epidemic, that is,
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developing a general portrayal of what the town was like prior to the epidemic. For this,
standard sources (e.g., census data, maps, historical monographs) served as data sources.
The second analytic task was piecing together the story of what happened, i.e., the
construction of an accurate chronology o f events, to “flesh out” the events in human
terms, i.e., to address what it would have been like to be in the cities during this period,
and to place the experience within the framework of medical understanding of the time as
well as what we know about yellow fever in 2005. Contemporary news reports, survivor
accounts and medical history monographs served as the main data sources for this part of
the work. The event was then examined as a historical phenomenon with the major
analytic task being the examination of events in terms of systems theory as set forth by
Anderson and Carter. The focus of the work was the dissolution and formation of the
governing organization o f the town. As the analysis proceded, additional development of
issues concerning the nature of yellow fever, its vector (the mosquito), the place of yellow
fever in the development of the American South, and broad concepts of nature of
epidemics and their social effects were undertaken.
In the beginning, an initial list of data sources and their locations were assembled.
These included, for example, Portsmouth Common Council meeting minutes and relevant
holdings o f the Perry Library at Old Dominion University. Numerous additional library
resources have been identified. Most were held by the Norfolk Public Library, the
Portsmouth Public Library, and the State Library of Virginia. I should add that it was not
only the materials that were helpful, but also the librarians. For example the archivists at
both the Norfolk and Portsmouth libraries are long term residents of Hampton Roads and
have generously shared the benefits of their extensive local experience. The archivist at
the Perry Library kindly passed on to me a paper he had written concerning Norfolk
politics of the time. As far as books are concerned, in addition to library sources, a number
of volumes were located via the Internet. Other Internet sites (e.g., Medline) were also
consulted for additional materials.
As expected, the number of possible sources tended to snowball as the research
proceeded. Yellow fever, now long forgotten, was an integral part of American history,
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and writings concerning it are abundant. A serious effort was be made examine every
appropriate source. However, because of the abundance of potential sources, some works
were excluded. Criteria for selection were directed to which sources contributed most to
developing the Portsmouth story and relating it to the larger history o f medicine at the
time and to the examination of this epidemic in light of systems theory with particular
emphasis on the nature of organizations. I might add that the role of serendipity in
research cannot be overestimated. Colleagues have pointed me to experts they “happened
to know” and the day I stumbled on a first person account of the epidemic on the Internet
was truly glorious.
Data collection was performed the old fashioned way-usually by extensive notetaking. Some simple collection instruments (e.g., to collate 19th century causes of death)
were devised. Whenever possible, copies of relevant materials were made and added to
subject files. Initial research efforts were directed at establishing a societal picture of the
town of Portsmouth. These included, for the most part, analyzing the numerical data
available (e.g., census and mortality data), reviewing primary documents (e.g., Common
Council meeting minutes), and examining standard sources on Virginia and local history.
The progress of the epidemic was tracked mainly through primary sources - contemporary
survivor accounts, newspaper reports, and reports of various groups that dealt with the
emergency. Common Council meeting minutes and newspaper accounts were especially
useful again to demonstrate how the societies were re-knit as the epidemic became a
memory.
Insofar as possible, a first pass at data analysis was be made as the data were
collected. As readings were undertaken, a running list of concepts to be explored was
assembled. This list served as part of a feedback loop between research in progress and
work on the document itself. The concepts list changed as more data were collected.
Historical research is, by definition, dependent on the work o f others. Documents,
whether government surveys, diaries, newspapers, or meeting minutes are as accurate as
the recorder. Furthermore, questions of bias both of the recorder and the historian are
ever-present. As to accuracy, the attempt was made wherever possible to “triangulate”
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findings, i.e., to verify information from more than one source. The numbers of deaths,
for example, were estimated both by the physicians who treated the victims and could be
verified against lists compiled by the organizations who buried the dead.
It is always somewhat of a shock to recognize the biases of those who wrote the
primary sources consulted. It is even more of a shock to confront your own. Three major
issues which elucidated the differences in points of view between the writers of the
primary (and some of the secondary) source documents and the writer of this work arose
repeatedly during the course of the research. First was the question of civic responsibility.
It seems shocking to a 21st century observer that an entire government would not only
simply desert its citizens in a time of crisis, but would be welcomed back by those same
citizens once the crisis was over. Second was the pervasive “we know better now”
thoughts that rattle through the mind of a modem health professional when confronted
with 19th century medical theory and practice. Mid 19th century American medicine is
particularly problematic since it existed in the lacuna between the general abandonment of
“heroic” methods and the adoption of the methodologies of “scientific” medicine. (See
review of the literature.) Most disturbing, however, was the radical divide between the
time under study and the present with regard to issues of race. As a white American, born
and educated in New York, my acquaintance with the realities of what it meant to be black
and living in antebellum Virginia was cursory to say the least. Indeed, one of the first
puzzles I encountered in my initial research brought me up short. Why did different
reports contain wildly different death rates? Turning to lessons learned in Public Health
101, the denominators were examined and it was seen that people were simply being
counted differently. Blacks did not figure in the same lists as whites and free blacks were
not found in the same documents as enslaved blacks.
In general, in these issues, as well as others, every effort was made to let voices
from the past speak for themselves, and, after all, sometimes, the past is more like the
present than we like to believe. Those living with AIDS have learned about government
denial of responsibility, and there is still no specific treatment for yellow fever. However,
with regard to issues of race (and to some extent gender and ethnicity), the writer has
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made specific efforts to present a counterweight to the accounts of the dominant class of
the time which was largely white, Protestant and male.37
In addition to issues of bias, some errors may be present simply due to the
functional difficulties in dealing with old documents. Most problematic were the 1850
census figures, photographed from microfiche, and often exceedingly difficult to discern.
Although efforts were made to eliminate systematic errors, it is quite possible that another
examiner might come up with different figures.

37 Traditional Western historians have tended to see history in terms of war, politics and
economics-areas of white male dominance. Beginning in the 1960s, the increasing numbers of
minority and female historians in history graduate programs turned their attention to social history
emphasizing those groups who had been overlooked by earlier generations of historians. This
dissertation follows their lead.
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BACKGROUND AND COURSE OF THE EPIDEMIC
In the mid-nineteenth century, the town of Portsmouth and its neighboring city of
Norfolk were about to be struck by two cataclysmic events. The second of these, the Civil
War, would come soon enough. The first, the yellow fever epidemic of 1855, may have
served as a portent of civil crises. The epidemic experience in Portsmouth is the subject of
this work.
A catastrophe is shaped not only by its own nature, but also by the substrate on
which it acts. Many filaments of events and ideas had woven themselves into the civil life
of the two cities prior to the epidemic. The disease event tore the fabric of the region
apart and re-wove it in a different texture. American towns and cities exist as population
foci within their individual states and are significantly affected by the forces that shape the
states themselves. Following Dabney (1971), we will briefly examine the general sweep of
the events shaping the state before taking a closer look at Portsmouth itself.

Virginia Background
It was December of 1606 when three ships carrying over 100 men set sail from
London for the New World. From the first, things did not go well. Hailey’s Comet,
considered to be an evil omen, lighted the sky as the ships prepared to sail. Winter storms
tossed the vessels about, and it was six weeks before they were able to leave the English
coast (Dabney, p. 2). Many wished to turn back even before setting out on the Atlantic,
but were persuaded by a minister aboard to press on. The expedition sailed into open
water in mid-February. There was bickering and dissension during the trip, but the ships
landed safely in the West Indies and headed for the Virginia coast. After surviving yet
another storm, the crew sighted land on April 26th and a party was sent ashore. The men
found themselves on the south side of the entrance to Chesapeake Bay. They found a
wilderness that delighted them and native Americans who welcomed them. These pleasing
impressions were short lived. The men sailed some 60 miles up the James River and laid
out a settlement on an island-like piece of land. By autumn’s end, more than half of them
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were dead.(Dabney, p. 5)
The settlement, known as Jamestown, was established as a commune, a form of
government that served as a powerful disincentive to maximum food production. By midJuly, the colony was starving, diseased and under harassment from native Americans. The
winter of 1607-08 - one of the coldest on record - brought more deaths, the destruction
of their common storehouse from fire, and yet more settlers who consumed yet more food
and who also fell ill. But it also brought aid from friendly Indians who taught the colonists
how to survive by fishing.
Progress was slow and deadly. The winter of 1609-10 became known as the
“Starving Time.” Eventually, however, with additional conquests of the Indians, a
stubborn determination to survive the many sicknesses afflicting them and additional
shiploads of settlers, a reasonably secure foothold on a permanent colony was solidified.
Eventually too, the colonists established the cash crop for which the commonwealth would
become renowned. By 1630, Virginia tobacco exports reached 500,000 pounds. At mid
century, conditions in the settlements along the James and the Tidewater region were
improving (Dabney, p. 48).
A General Assembly was established in 1619 (Dabney, p. 29). In 1661, that body
took a fateful step by legalizing Negro slavery(Dabney, p. 53). There had been blacks in
the colony since 1619 (Dabney, p. 32), but now their numbers grew appreciably. In 1671,
there were 2000 slaves in the population of 40,000 (Dabney, p. 53). Still though, that was
only one third the number of white indentured servants. However, as both Virginia and
the mother country came to depend more and more on the revenues brought in by the
ever-increasing production o f tobacco, the temptation to use slaves in preference to more
expensive forms of labor became irresistible (Dabney, pp. 53-5). By 1700, 6000 slaves
had been brought into the colony. Their labor contributed to an economy that was ever
more reliant on a single crop - a crop whose production was becoming ever more
concentrated in the hands of a few large planters.(Dabney, p. 71). As it entered the 18th
century, Virginia was a colony of marked social divisions.
This century saw a strong push to the west and the settlement o f the mountain

81

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

regions. But certainly the most significant events of this period were political for it was
this time that saw the establishment of the United States as a fledgling country. Virginians
served prominently in both military and political capacities in midwiving the new polity.
Virginia also served as the site for a number of major battles of the Revolutionary War
including the one which proved decisive.
When peace was declared in 1783, the people of Virginia attempted to return to
normal conditions (Dabney, p. 154). The state had not suffered overmuch in terms of
physical devastation, but substantial emigration from the state had reduced the population
(Dabney, p. 155). Moreover, although the old order may have passed, the shape of the
future was less than apparent. Within the state, issues of race (e.g., the position of free
blacks) and religious toleration had to be settled. And without, Virginia soon became a
part of the process for developing a long-lasting constitution for the Republic.
The 19th century began with war. The British blockade and the United States’ own
embargo on foreign trade dining the War of 1812 choked traffic in and out of Norfolk,
Virginia’s principal seaport (Dabney, p. 207). Once the war ended, the integrity of the
state itself came into question as the western part of the state raised issues of geographic
discrimination. Their discontent sprang from the perceived lack of response on the part of
the General Assembly in meeting transportation needs and from the westerners’ pressure
to extend the franchise to all taxpayers (Dabney, p. 213). Greater representation was given
to some areas of the west and, by 1850, all white males were allowed to vote. But the
issue of transportation continued to be a problem. Some turnpikes were built and some
attention was paid to canals, but most in the state failed to realize the importance of
railroads and their construction was delayed. This meant that produce from the west was
largely diverted northward to the port of Baltimore rather than to Norfolk (Dabney, pp.
120-1). The situation became so tense in Norfolk that some there pushed the city to
secede from the state and become part of North Carolina (Dabney, pp. 220-1).
As the specter of epidemic approached, the cities o f Norfolk and Portsmouth found
themselves in a state that seemed to be on a downhill slide. The state’s devotion to a
single crop - tobacco - had depleted the soil. The population drain had continued. In
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1850, there were fewer than a million Virginians (white and free black) while 388,000
former Virginians lived in other states (Dabney, p. 275). Virginia’s congressional
delegation was only about half what it had been in 1810. Travelers to the commonwealth
commonly reported depressed conditions (Dabney, p .-276). Education was poor. The
state rated near the bottom of the country in literacy (Dabney, p. 279). Manufacturing
lagged...and for the inhabitants of Hampton Roads, things were about to get much worse.

Portsmouth Background
In their report to the Common Council after the epidemic, the Portsmouth Relief
Association described Portsmouth as a peninsula in the county of Norfolk lying at a
latitude of 36° 50' north and longitude 76° 19' west and being

beautifully situated on the south side of the Elizabeth River, having a frontage of
nearly a mile on that river. On the opposite bank of the same stream, at a distance
of three quarters of a mile, lies the city of Norfolk with a population of near
sixteen thousand. The river flows between the two cities, affording sufficient
depth of water to float vessels of the very largest class. The social and business
intercourse existing between them is most intimate, and is maintained by steam
ferry boats, which ply continuously during the day, and, for a considerable part of
the night.” (Report of the Portsmouth Relief Association. 1856, p. 77)

The town was comprised of Portsmouth proper with two added sections: Gosport
(described later in this paper) and Newtown, a sparsely populated marshy area. The
Report notes that the streets drain into the waters surrounding the town and “they thus
become the receptacles of all the filth of the town. On their margins, in many places, are
pig-pens, stables, and other nuisances.” (p. 79)
Butt (1971, 1973) provides a background account of the town. The area around
Portsmouth, Virginia was settled by Europeans in the 17th century. In 1608, Captain John
Smith came upon the area in his explorations. Patents of land in the area were granted to
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a Captain William Carver in 1659 and 1664, but reverted to the crown in 1676 when the
Captain was hanged for his part in Bacon’s rebellion. In 1716, Carver’s land was j oined
with additional acreage (totaling 1129 acres) and granted to Colonel William Crawford, a
merchant, justice of the Norfolk County Court and member of the House of Burgesses.
Portsmouth was established as a town in 1752 when Colonel Crawford set aside
approximately 65 acres from his plantation for the purpose. The waterfront town was laid
out in a typical grid fashion. The design of the town proved durable. A hundred years
later, Portsmouth was reported to be “a pretty town, laid out very regularly, with streets
crossing each other at right angle. (Report on the Origin of the Yellow Fever in Norfolk
during the Summer of 18551. Even today, it is possible to find one’s way around the
downtown area with a map from that era. Not surprisingly, most of the town’s first lot
owners were engaged in maritime activities, either directly or as merchants or
craftspeople. A range of social classes was represented from ship-owners to butchers. A
large tract of land was soon acquired by a businessman named Andrew Sprowle who used
it to establish the Gosport Shipyard (now confusingly called the Norfolk Naval Shipyard)
next to the town in 1767 (Butt, 1973). A creek (now paved over) separated Gosport from
Portsmouth (Butt, 1973). In 1785, Gosport became part of Portsmouth.38
During the Revolution, a Tory raiding party burned Gosport and stole a large
number o f naval stores and 137 vessels of various kinds (Parramore, Stewart and Bogger,
1994, 86-102). Nonetheless, Portsmouth suffered far less damage than Norfolk and was
well-placed to become the leading port in the Commonwealth. This did not happen. For
generations, the port’s main business had been with the West Indies. Now, with the
British Navigation Acts forbidding the now-foreign United States’ carriers from engaging
in this trade, Portsmouth businessmen found themselves unwilling or unable to find other
markets. Wertenbaker and Schlegel (1962, p. 75) blame some of the town’s ill fortune on
its treatment of Scotch and English merchants who, believing the town could surpass

38 The naming of Gosport as an area next to Portsmouth mimicked the
Portsmouth/Gosport area in England. The early English spelling of Gosport was God’s Port.
(Butt, 1973)
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Norfolk as the leading seaport of Virginia, tried to emigrate there. Still resentful of the
British, Portsmouth citizens, according to one account, “formed a mob and drove them
off.” (Norfolk Herald. August 10,1802 cited by Wertenbaker and Schlegel, 1962, p. 75 )
Crossing to the other side of the Elizabeth River, the businessmen established themselves
in Norfolk and contributed significantly to the recovery of that city. But even earlier (in
1794), a visiting Frenchman described Portsmouth as being “down at the heels because it
has no commerce of its own.” Comparing the town to its neighbor across the river, he
noted that “house rents are much less than in Norfolk, proving the inferiority of
Portsmouth which must import everything from Norfolk” (Butt, 1971, pp. 24-5). War
with the Barbary States at the end of the century provided some degree of economic
revival due to the construction of a frigate at the shipyard. In 1801, the federal
government established a significant presence in Portsmouth by purchasing the Yard for
$12,000. The Navy added to its facilities in Portsmouth by the construction of its first
hospital there in 1830.
Portsmouth was subject to a number of abortive agricultural booms during the first
half of the 19th century. At one point, a number of immigrants decided to plant sugar and
citrus groves-crops requiring a different climate. After these failed, there was a mulberrygrowing craze. Failed agricultural ventures aside, an increasing military presence and a
growing shipbuilding industry (the largest clipper ship ever built south of New York was
launched from the soon to be infamous Page and Allen’s Shipyard in 1853) promoted
“steady and great” growth - growth that brought an influx of people into the town
occasioning an acute need for housing (Holladay, 1936). By 1850, more than 10 percent
of the town’s population came from outside the state. Nearly half of these were from
Europe-mainly from Ireland, Germany and England39 (United States Census, 1850). To
accommodate increasing numbers of travelers, two new hotels were erected in the town in
the early 1850s (Emmerson, 1944, p. 215). Still, Portsmouth was reported to be a town
of “but little commerce” (Report on the Origin of the Yellow Fever in Norfolk during the

39 This number was calculated from a 10 percent random sample of census data. Gosport
data were excluded.
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Summer of 1855V
Vache (1962) claims that there were 10,000 residents in Portsmouth at the time of
the epidemic. Census data (United States Census, 1850) demonstrate a figure closer to
8,000. However, the census data captured only the free citizens of the town (black and
white). There were approximately 470 free blacks.40 If Vache is correct, there were,
then, about 2,000 slaves. Schoolfield (Report of the Portsmouth Relief Association. 1856,
p. 80) places the 1850 population at 10,000-11,000 with one quarter being black-an
estimate which is fairly consistent with both Vache’s figures and the census data. A
Portsmouth town councilman of the time described the population as unlikely to have the
resources to meet an epidemic. “Our population is mainly a mechanical one, and most of
our people are dependent on daily labor for support” (Report of the Philadelphia Relief
Committee, 1856, p.89). The Report of the Portsmouth Relief Association (pp. 79-80),
however, saw the population in a more favorable light.

On the whole, the population is of a better class than is usually found in seaport
towns of equal size. Composed for the most part of well educated mechanics, and
respectable laborers, who find employment at the government works at the
Gosport Navy Yard, where first rate wages and constant work is obtained, they
are enabled to supply themselves comfortably with house room, and to procure
proper food and clothing.

Census data (United States Census, 1850) indicated that Portsmouth was a working class
town with occupations largely oriented to maritime activities, both military and civilian..
The mean worth of real estate owned was $200 per person.41 The Gosport area, with
about 550 residents, consisted largely of military personnel. Noted below are the most

40 This number was calculated from a 10 percent random sample of census data. Those
noted as “mulatto” were included as black. Gosport data were excluded.
41 This number was calculated from a 10 percent random sample of census data. Gosport
data were excluded.
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common adult occupations for the remainder of Portsmouth.42

Laborer

363

Carpenter

126

Ships Carpenter

93

Sailor/Mariner/Seaman

71

Machinist

65

Blacksmith

63

U.S. Navy/Marines

61

Clerk

51

Merchant

40

Nearly 200 young people were apprentices (United States Census, 1850). Unlike
its larger neighbor across the water, Portsmouth had had a public school system (for white
children) since 1845 and several private schools well before that (Holladay, 1936; Butt, p.
29). There is some discrepancy, however, as to the number of children actually attending
school. Holladay claims that 900 children attended for a full term in 1852. Census data
for 1850 put the number of children attending school at 1500.43 The mean age of the
population was just under 40 years.44 Eighty four percent of the adult population claimed

42A 100 percent sample of occupations was examined. Approximately 95 percent of
census entries were legible enough to be used with confidence. Where notation was not clear, the
entry was omitted from the calculation. There were 2 systematic omissions. “Lawyer” could not
be differentiated from “sawyer.” “Printer” could not be differentiated from “painter.” Gosport
data were excluded.
43 Calculation is based on a 10 percent sample of census data. Gosport data were
excluded.
44 Calculation is based on a 10 percent sample of census data. Gosport data were
excluded.
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to be literate45 (United States Census, 1850). The town had at least a rudimentary cultural
life with performances by local and visiting musicians and regular dramatic performances
(Holladay). The town also supported a literary and library society that met weekly
(Minutes of the Portsmouth Common Council, 9/5/54).
According to the Report of the Portsmouth Relief Committee, (p. 80) the
population was well-housed, with houses accommodating mainly single families. There
was “wholesome and abundant” water supplied from pumps, wells and cisterns and, at
least in the summer, reasonably-priced fruits, vegetables and fish available at the market.
The years preceding the epidemic largely followed a pattern of civic development
described by Curry (1974) as common to antebellum American cities and documented in
the minutes of Common Council meetings (1845-55) including council elections (yearly in
April) and the establishment of education and policing systems (usually beginning as a
night watch). They also shared common concems-street paving and lighting, filth and
garbage in the streets, the containment of loose swine and dogs, water supplies, waste
disposal and care for the poor. Commercial enterprises were regulated and taxed. In the
case of Portsmouth, there was also substantial provision for public schools including funds
to purchase books for indigent children. A tithe of $2.00 was levied on every white male
for the schools’ support (Minutes of the Portsmouth Common Council 1/18/50).
The Council’s assumption of responsibility for public health lay mainly in their
concern for clean streets and the consideration given to the question of a Naval pesthouse
(a hospital that would serve to isolate victims of contagious disease). Wardens were
appointed to “visit the premises of every individual in their respective wards and cause all
offal and other substances calculated to generate disease to be removed therefrom into the
streets.” Citizens were urged to cooperate in cleaning the premises of “all impurities”
(Minutes of the Common Council, 3/24/49). They heard too from concerned citizens.
The meeting of 8/5/51 included consideration of a petition for an ordinance “prohibiting
the throwing of filth, unwholesome articles, or any substance calculated to fill up the Fish

45 Calculation is based on a 10 percent sample of census data. Gosport data were
excluded.
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Dock.” At one point, when it was felt that cholera was a threat, the Council ordered lime
or other disinfecting agents for use by the Town Sergeant or police (Minutes of the
Portsmouth Common Council, 7/20/54). Hogs were banned from roaming in the streets
(Minutes o f the Portsmouth Common Council, 8/7/50), but the streets, though wide,
remained unpaved and badly drained (Report on the Origin of the Yellow Fever in Norfolk
during the Summer o f 1855). Police responsibilities included the killing and burial of
roaming dogs. They were paid by the dog (Minutes of the Portsmouth Common Council,
2/5/50, 3/6/55), the going rate in 1854 being 50 cents per dog (Minutes of the Portsmouth
Common Council, 12/7/54). The action concerning a the erection o f a pesthouse
consisted o f sending of a letter to the United States Navy protesting the planned building
o f a pesthouse on the Magazine grounds because it “would cause fear o f spreading
contagious disease and be bad for business.” The Council reminded the Navy that it
already had a hospital and advised it to use Craney Island to build its pesthouse (Minutes
of the Portsmouth Common Council, 12/8/53). In the end, no pesthouse was built
(Minutes of the Portsmouth Common Council, 1/3/54).
Much of the Council’s time was taken with issues of public safety and
infrastructure. In 1845, the town constable was finally paid $150 for the three years he
had served without receiving pay. During the following years, the police presence was
regularized and strengthened. Police functions were centered on night watch activities.
Although there is no mention of their specific activities in the Common Council minutes,
in most southern cities, a large part of night watch duties was devoted to the social control
o f blacks who might use the opportunity of darkness to visit each other or to seek
entertainment in drinking or gambling-all activities as common as they were illegal (Wade,
p. 148). In 1850, two watchmen were appointed to “preserve good order of the town
during the night time” (Minutes of the Portsmouth Common Council, 4/9/50). In 1852,
policemen’s salaries were increased to $200 and later, provisions were made to ensure
monthly payment of police (Minutes of the Portsmouth Common Council, 12/7/52,
3/1/53). Reports of police activities were regularly reported to the Council and the force
was expanded (Minutes of the Portsmouth Common Council, 6/6/54). In the beginning of
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1855, the mayor was given power over the police with tighter controls over their activities
(Minutes of the Portsmouth Common Council, 12/55). The town sergeant’s activities
were varied ranging from collection of taxes in arrears (later the duty of the town
attorney) to responsibility for the town burial ground, to public health activities (Minutes
of the Portsmouth Common Council, 5/23/49, 3/7/54, 7/20/54, 6/5/55, 7/8/55).
Fire protection was also a major agenda item dining these years. Aside from
frequent allocation o f substantial funds for equipment and some salaries, attention was
paid to keeping order among the volunteer companies. There was also the matter of
preventing companies from Norfolk from responding to fires in Portsmouth (Minutes of
the Portsmouth Common Council, 5/7/50). Provisions were made for water sources for
the companies (Minutes o f the Portsmouth Common Council, 8/13/50, 8/5/51, 9/6/53).
By 1854, the Council was called on to ensure that the town had a principle engineer and
fire wardens to comply with Virginia law and was looking toward a true fire department
(Minutes of the Portsmouth Common Council, 9/5/54,12/7/54).
Infrastructure concerns revolved around streets, bridges and the buildings and
equipment needed to promote commerce. Issues concerning street grading and cleaning,
bridge traffic and maintenance arose again and again during Council sessions.46 The need
for a new bridge once sent the town sergeant on rounds to collect taxes in arrears to help
pay for it (Minutes of the Portsmouth Common Council, 8/7/49). The Market House
(used for the sale o f food and other commodities) was also an object of attention. The
purchase of new scales and their housing and elections for persons to measure or inspect
commodities were prominent agenda items. Conditions at the Market House became a
special object of attention when the epidemic began.
The Council minutes prior to the epidemic reveal an urban government moving,
often stumbling, toward more professional governance and struggling with the changes
around them. During this period, public health and safety measures were regularized and

46 The concern for street maintenance was a hallmark of the times. Goldfield (1979) notes
that by 1830, local governments in the country were paying more for street repair than for any
other municipal service.
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improved, with the former being a police rather than a medical responsibility-an
arrangement that would lead to problems later. The town sergeant and the mayor were
placed on salary rather than being paid by fees collected (Minutes of the Portsmouth
Common Council, 6/30/49, 2/6/55). Salaries for other officials were set and reviewed
(Minutes of the Portsmouth Common Council, 11/30/49, 12/7/52, 1/3/53, 9/6/53). A
town attorney was appointed (Minutes of the Portsmouth Common Council, 3/6/55). The
system o f committees to oversee specific government functions grew. At the same time,
the Council was coping with the technological changes of the mid-19th century.
Arrangements were made for the provision of telegraph and gas services. The Council’s
most problematic dealings came with the Seaboard and Roanoke Rail Road Company.
Throughout much of the decade prior to the epidemic, the Council and the railroad
company seesawed between agreements and disputes regarding routes and the activities of
the company within the town. But they did manage to bring the railroad directly into the
town continually bringing in loads of “staves, lumber, tobacco, flour, naval stores, and
cotton” (Wertenbaker and Schlegel, 1967, p. 181).
But the same period was marked by fumbling and probably dishonesty. There
were occasions when meetings could not be held due to lack of a quorum. On occasion,
pay for officials was in arrears and officials were removed after disputes (Minutes of the
Portsmouth Common Council, 3/24/49, 7/3/49). There was a record of questionable
audits. In 1853, the clerk treasurer resigned and auditors were at least temporarily unable
to locate the town account books (Minutes o f the Portsmouth Common Council, 1/31/53).
Above all, the period was marked by high levels of town debt. The enormous
deficit seen as the town entered the epidemic year (debt service at fifty percent of the
budget) was of long standing. The Council sessions were marked by careful attention to
financial details, but also by questionable audits and investments. The government’s
inability to set its financial house in order meant that some projects were impossible to
undertake. A year before the epidemic, the Council received estimates to build a water
supply system for the town. At approximately $50,000 (about twice the estimated yearly
budget), it is difficult to see how the town could finance such a project, and, indeed, they

91

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

didn’t. But smaller matters suffered for want of funds also. At the end of 1854, the
Council was unable to reorganize the fire department and to hire a fire engineer due to
“the financial condition o f the town” (Minutes o f the Portsmouth Common Council,
12/7/54, 12/12/55). And, although we cannot know what would have been the case if the
town funds had been plentiful, provisions for the poor were small and scarce-$100 for
books for indigent schoolchildren and a one time appropriation of $200 for wood to be
distributed to the poor during the winter of 1854-5. In 1850, however, $300 was
appropriated for a public meeting to honor the late president Zachary Taylor. That sum
was equal to the entire year’s salary for the town clerk/treasurer. In these actions, the
Council acted in a manner appropriate for the time. Goldfield (1979) notes that, since the
range o f potential urban services was infinite and the source of funding for them was
largely limited to the taxes paid principally by the property owners who ran or influenced
their governments, cities acted out of a simple cost-benefit calculation. Expenditures were
largely directed at activities that benefitted the property owners.
In summary, as Portsmouth entered its trial by yellow fever, the town government
was largely concerned with day to day affairs that benefitted the well-off. There was no
strategic plan for development and certainly none for meeting a crisis of any kind from
hurricanes to epidemics. With government a largely amateur activity for well-meaning
citizens, its failure in addressing an extreme situation might have been predicted.

The Epidemic in Portsmouth
Blanton (1933, pp. 224-236) provides an account of the start of the epidemic. As
in most southern cities in the 19th century, an outbreak of yellow fever was not a new
experience for Portsmouth or for Norfolk. Despite active quarantine measures, the 1855
eruption was one of two in Portsmouth and nine in Norfolk during the century. There
had, in fact, been a number o f cases of the disease in the area in the 1850s. In 1852,
several cases had been admitted to the Marine Hospital in Norfolk. In the summer of
1854, the Chimere arrived from the West Indies with nearly the entire crew sickened with
yellow fever. Most of them were admitted to the Naval Hospital. Traditionally, the 1855
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epidemic is laid at the feet of the Ben Franklin, a steamer from the West Indies that
arrived in Hampton Roads in June, 1855. The putative index case for the epidemic was
identified in Gosport. He was a boiler repairman who had been working in the holds of
the Ben Franklin while it was anchored at a Gosport shipyard.
The Ben Franklin had not been without problems on its voyage to the area.47 It
had entered the harbor June 6th and dropped anchor in the quarantine grounds about a mile
below Norfolk. Even before reaching anchorage, the ship had transferred her 50-60
passengers to The Baltimore, a steamboat in the bay, apparently to continue to New York
City.48 The captain told the Norfolk health officer, Robert H. Gordon, that both
passengers and crew had been in good health during the 10-day voyage. However, he did
report two deaths. The first was that of a fireman who had suffered sudden chest pain and
shortness o f breath and expired in half an hour. The second was a sailor said to be unused
to the working in the heat of the boiler room and who had died apparently of heat
exhaustion.

The doctor found the ship to be clean and the crew to be healthy, but in

view o f the fact that the ship had come from an area with an active yellow fever epidemic,
she was ordered to stay in quarantine. The captain and crew were allowed to go ashore.
On June 18th, the captain, noting the ship’s urgent need for repairs, requested permission
to proceed to Gosport. Dr. Gordon again examined both ship and crew and granted
permission to proceed to the Page and Allen Shipyard (Report on the Origin of the Yellow
Fever in Norfolk during the Summer of 1855.1857).
Holcomb (1930, pp. 252-5) indicates that the Ben Franklin should have been

47 Forrest (1856, p. 10) reports that the troubles may have started at sea. The ship had
been bound for New York City. While still at sea, the captain held a meeting of passengers to
decide whether they should proceed to Norfolk or to Baltimore. The reason for this change of
plan is unknown. It may have been because of the presence of disease on board. However, the
ship was leaking when it appeared in Norfolk, so the decision may have been taken because of the
need for repairs.
48 There is some discrepancy in the reports of the numbers of passengers who left the Ben
Franklin and the name of the ship to which they transferred. A local newspaper of the time put
the number at 49 and reported the name of their new vessel as the Louisiana (Abstracts from the
Norfolk and Portsmouth newspapers in The Emmerson Papers).
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treated with greater suspicion by the inspecting authorities. After all, the ship had come
from an epidemic area and two men had died on the voyage. The passengers on board the
steamer may have had doubts about the nature o f the deaths for they, “consumed by
panic,” all left the ship at Old Point Comfort. While still in quarantine, a member of the
crew died. His body was taken ashore and clandestinely buried. Most of the crew
deserted the ship. Since the vessel was leaking and badly in need of repair, loss of the
crew presented a serious difficulty to the captain. On June 25th, the health officer, with the
consent of the Norfolk Board of Health,49 granted permission for the ship to proceed to
Page and Allen’s Shipyard in the Gosport section of Portsmouth. However, the captain
was ordered not to break out the ship’s hold. Outside repairs only were to be done.
These orders were blatantly disobeyed. Once at the shipyard, bilge water was pumped
out, much of the ship’s stores were brought out on deck, and a portion of her ballast was
discharged on the wharf. Men were sent down into the ship to work on the engines and
boilers. This work continued at least until July 8th when the unfortunate boiler repairman
was diagnosed with yellow fever. Several physicians examined him including two naval
physicians who were very familiar with the disease.50 It was their report that caused the
Common Council to meet in extraordinary session.
Why did this particular report occasion the meeting? Forrest (1856, pp. 22-3)
reports that consultants who had been aboard the Ben Franklin determining the need for
repairs had told several citizens o f Portsmouth that there was yellow fever aboard the ship.
Forrest (pp. 12-5) suggests there was additional evidence of trouble even while the Ben
Franklin was undergoing repair. He states that a “gentleman of undoubted veracity” had
gone aboard the vessel at the shipyard and was informed by the crew that there was yellow
fever aboard and had actually observed a body being placed in a coffin. There was
another report of men jumping overboard and swimming for shore to escape the disease.
In any case, on the day it heard the news o f the boiler repairman, the Portsmouth

49 Portsmouth did not have a Board o f Health prior to the epidemic.
50Naval physicians had good reason to be familiar with the disease. Fifty-four cases of
yellow fever had been treated at the Naval Hospital the previous year (Forrest, 1856, p.23).
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Common Council was convened in an extraordinary session to consider the case of yellow
fever “caused by exposure while at work on board the steamship Ben Franklin lying at
Page and Allen’s wharf.” The Council was sufficiently concerned to order the Town
Sergeant to call on the captain of the Ben Franklin and “require her removal forthwith to
the Quarantine Grounds...” and was determined to brook no resistance. If the captain did
not remove the ship, the Sergeant was to have the ship removed to the Grounds at the
expense of her owners. (In fact, the captain did resist and moved the ship back to the
Quarantine Grounds only after taking legal advice [Holladay, 1936]). After ordering the
removal of the ship, the Council adjourned with the provision that no publication of the
meetings’ proceedings was to be made in the town newspapers (Minutes of the
Portsmouth Common Council, 1855). O f course, word did, in fact, leak out. Holladay
(1936) reports that “a perfect tremor of fear passed over the town” at the news of the
boiler repairman’s death. Schoolfield (Report of the Portsmouth Relief Association. 1856,
p. 88) relates the fact that a man had died of yellow fever “spread quickly throughout the
community and created the most intensive discussion...Groups discussed it on street
comers with fear and consternation.”
An anonymous letter writer in Portsmouth confirmed that the first group suffering
from the epidemic were the Irish (“Yellow fever in Portsmouth”, 1885, July 26;
“Telegraph-Yellow fever-Gosport”, 1855, July 27). Gosport was an area of Portsmouth
lying across a wide marshy creek from the body of the town. It was home to five or six
hundred Irish workers and their families as well as the Page and Allen Shipyard. (Report
on the Origin of the Yellow Fever in Norfolk during the Summer of 1855.1857) Labeled
by the Report of the Portsmouth Relief Association (p. 80) as “some of the worst
population of the town,” the residents of Gosport were crowded into about 60 houses.
The Irish were noted in the Report as not having “been here sufficiently long to become
acclimated” and also as clinging to the ways of their homeland living “huddled together in
small, close apartments, in which no regard is paid by them to cleanliness, or to ventilation
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(pp. 80-1).51 The Report went on:

On Water street, opposite the ship yard, and distant only a few yards, is located a
row of three story brick buildings, eight in number. This block of buildings, was
built five or six years ago, and is familiarly called “Leigh’s” or “Irish row;” and the
tenements of which it is composed are exclusively occupied by Irish, of the very
lowest description. They are filled to the utmost capacity with people regardless
alike [sic] of cleanliness and comfort. We do not assert a fact likely to be
controverted, when we say that each room in every house lodged a family, and that
the population of the “row” at the breaking out of the epidemic exceeded two
hundred. The basements of these houses are occupied as low groggeries, and
abound in filth and noisome odors. The back lots, which extended to the marsh on
the west, were in keeping with the other parts of the premises. The habitations of
the pig, that favorite animal of the Irish peasantry, were numerous, and in close
companionship of cow sheds and other nuisances. All the lots were insufferably
filthy and disgusting; and if their condition was not such as would breed a
pestilence, it was certainly well calculated to feed one (p. 82).

According to the Report, the other parts of Gosport were “as clean as any other parts of
the town...” (p. 82).
The Shipyard fronted on the river for several hundred feet and extended to Water
Street, Gosport’s main street. Three or four wooden tenements housing workers stood
hard by the Shipyard (Report on the Origin of the Yellow Fever in Norfolk during the
Summer of 1855. 1857). The yard’s wharf was old and decaying with its pine logs
saturated with water and rotting. The debris of shipbuilding-wood chips and
shavings-covered the wharf to a depth of several inches. Beyond an old brick warehouse

51 The theory of acclimatization is raised again by the Report’s reference to a number of
Gosport workmen hailing from Maine as “being entirely unaccustomed to a southern climate (p.
82).
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on the property, lay a structure once used as a dock lined with mud and filled with several
feet of refuse from the yard (Report of the Portsmouth Relief Association, pp. 80-2).
Despite efforts to quarantine the Gosport area (erecting a fence, posting watchmen
at every avenue, partially destroying the bridge between Gosport and Portsmouth, cutting
communications with the Navy yard), there were five cases of the fever in Portsmouth
proper by July 22nd (“Yellow Fever in Portsmouth”, 1885, July 26; “Telegraph-Yellow
fever-Gosport”, 1855, July 27). By the 30th, 20 cases were reported in Gosport, “most of
whom are our adopted Irish citizens” (“The Yellow Fever at Gosport, 1855, July 30).
Schoolfield (Report of the Portsmouth Relief Association. 1856, p. 127) reports especially
bad conditions among the Irish in Gosport as well as the total lack of any municipal efforts
to ameliorate the situation. By July, the cases in Gosport:

had become so numerous that there were not well persons enough left to wait
upon the sick; and it was utterly impossible to procure nurses for them. Suffering
and alone, the poor creatures were lying without the attendance of anyone, to give
them even a drink of cold water. With the exception o f the physicians and their
drivers, and one or two other fearless and humane individuals, they were shunned
by the whole community, and abandoned to their hapless fate.

Still, the main concern of the community was the belief that no cases were actually
originating in Portsmouth (rather than Gosport).
The relative indifference to the threat presented by the high incidence of cases
among the Irish population was probably, at least in part, a reflection of the common
southern belief that yellow fever was a “strangers’ disease” (Trask, 1996). It was a
popular belief that immigrants to the south required a period of “seasoning” to become
adapted to the maladies common to the area. Indeed, their was some validity to the idea
of seasoning since, as noted earlier in this work, populations and pathogens do tend to
adapt over time to the benefit of both.
The Council did not meet again until July 21st when a session was “convened to
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take measures for preventing the spread of the ‘yellow fever’.”52 Since the fever was
“prevailing to some extent in Gosport,” the Council appointed a Sanitary Committee
consisting of three members of the Council-Dr. Schoolfield (a physician) and two laymen.
The Committee was to “take the matter into consideration, and to take such measures as
may be necessary to retard the spread of the disease and secure the public health.” The
immediate provision of direct care to the sick (still concentrated in Gosport) was not
considered (Minutes of the Portsmouth Common Council, 1855). The Committee
instructed physicians o f the town to submit case reports to a Dispensary in the High
Street. This reporting mechanism failed in early August when the head of the Sanitary
Committee himself fell ill (Report of the Portsmouth Relief Association. 1856, p. 124).
By July 24th, news of the fever was spreading. In Richmond, The Daily Dispatch
o f that date noted that there were cases of yellow fever in Portsmouth proper. The paper
also observed that there was no news of this in either the Portsmouth or Norfolk
newspapers.53 The following day, however, the Richmond newspaper ran an article on the
fever taken from the Norfolk Herald. Cases of the disease were said to be confined to
Gosport (“Yellow Fever at Gosport”, 1855). The Sanitary Committee believed that all
cases occurring in the month of July “could be positively traced to Gosport” (Report of
the Portsmouth Relief Association. 1856, pp. 124-5). Until the end of July, all cases were
thought to have originated in Gosport (“Yellow Fever in Gosport, 1855, July 27). By the
first week in August, however, it was clear that cases were originating in Portsmouth and
the Sanitary Committee declared the disease to be epidemic there also. When the presence
of an epidemic was recognized in the town, Schoolfield (Emmerson, p. 219) describes a
pathetic scene as, in a street “alive with people,” a wagon, covered with white, containing
an elderly woman and her young daughter looking “for the last time on the familiar objects
52

By the time of this meeting, the alleged conveyer of the fever was gone from the port.
The Ben Franklin had passed another inspection requested by her captain. She sailed July
13th (Blanton, pp. 258-9).
53

Duffy (1996, p.16) confirms that ignoring the news of the presence of a local epidemic
disease was customary practice for the time.
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o f earth,” moved slowly to the hospital. Whenever or however the disease reached
Portsmouth, Forrest (1856, pp. 128-9) describes a swift spread there. He states that the
disease reached the main part of the town within two weeks. Deaths rapidly increased to
about a half dozen a day. “Citizens hurried away by the thousand.” Even with a smaller
population, deaths increased still more rapidly. There were soon 400 cases of yellow fever
in the town with about 30 people dying daily even before the disease spread to Norfolk.
The Common Council attempted to hold meetings (apparently to deal with the
contagion) on July 28th and August 1st, but failed due to lack of a quorum. There is
evidence that Council members were attempting to meet the demands of the growing
catastrophe even without a formal meeting. On the 28th, they appointed a three-man
committee to travel to Washington to request assistance from the Secretary o f the Navy.
The latter gave consent for use of the Naval Hospital for yellow fever patients54
(Holcomb, p. 258). Until this time, the sick had been cared for (or not cared for) at home.
However, at the end of July, a hospital was hastily built about one mile west of the town
(“Yellow Fever at Norfolk and Gosport,” 1855, August 2). Martha Buxton (1929), a
well-born Portsmouth resident, noted that the “authorities” had at first attempted to
isolate the cases by transporting the patients out of town. She recalled “peeping through
the slats of the closed front windows at the procession of people, ill of the disease, carried
by carts, on their way to the pesthouses, built just out of town...” (Porter family records,
p. 14). In fact, the yellow fever hospital, which had been the notion of the Sanitary
Committee had been erected in the course of just two days (Holladay, 1936) by a large

54 At a time when permanent hospitals were uncommon, Portsmouth was singularly
blessed in having the U.S. Naval Hospital within its borders. It should be noted that the Hospital
did, in fact, also serve a great use for its normal population. The earliest cases to enter the
Hospital came from the Marine Barracks. By August 10th, there were 40 cases of yellow fever
under treatment in the Hospital (“Yellow Fever in Norfolk and Portsmouth,” 1855, August 11).
Two weeks later, that number had doubled. (“Naval Hospital,” 1855, August 25) By midSeptember, the wards at times contained 150-200 patients (Forrest, 1856, p. 227). In all, over the
course o f the epidemic, 587 yellow fever patients were cared for in the institution. O f those
admitted, 200 died. (Holcomb, p. 264) The Federal government also assisted in supplying coffins
to the town. (Holcomb, p. 259) The boat shop at the Navy Yard was converted to the
manufacture of coffins during the emergency (Emmerson, 1944, p. 216).
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force o f volunteers, stocked with bedding and medicines, and opened the last day of July.
Finding occupants for the hospital presented unexpected difficulties. At this point in the
epidemic, the patients in need of care were found mainly among the Irish in Gosport.
According to the Reverend James Chisholm, Rector of St. John’s Episcopal Church at the
time, this population positively refused to leave their “pestilential abodes.” Father Devlin,
the town’s only Roman Catholic priest, gained their consent to go to the hospital “by
mingled threats and promises.” When the patients agreed to come to the hospital, a new
obstacle presented itself. Wagons and people to load sick people into them were nowhere
to be had. Finally, the next morning, the doctors themselves loaded nine wagons-a
practice they continued throughout the course of the epidemic. Some of the patients,
relates Reverend Chisholm, were “lying prostrate, others in sitting posture, all with
agonized faces and uttering fearful groans.” (Chisholm cited in Holladay, 1936) By
nightfall of that day, the 20 by 40-foot structure was completely filled. At that point,
permission was obtained for the use of the Naval Hospital. The patients were moved to
the latter institution and the temporary hospital was immediately closed (Report of the
Portsmouth Relief Association. 1856, p. 128).55
The Council did succeed in meeting on the 2nd of August. It was formally
announced at this meeting that the Naval Hospital had been “obtained for the
accommodation o f the sick.”56 Two members were added to the Sanitary Committee and
five hundred dollars were appropriated for Dr. Schoolfield’s use. An assistant to the
Town Sergeant was appointed. The Council took further measures to address the
epidemic. Following classic sanitarian principles, they voted to add three horses and carts
(to the existing three) to remove “rubbish and filth” from the streets every day (Minutes of
the Portsmouth Common Council. 1855). Portsmouth streets were particularly
problematic. Although they were well laid out, wide, and straight, newspapers of the time
often called attention to their poor condition. Legislation had been passed so that pigs and

55 Butt (p. 29) also reports that the building used to house the town’s first public school
was also used as a yellow fever hospital and later as an orphan asylum.
56 The town promised to pay for the use of the Naval Hospital.
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cattle were no longer allowed to roam at will, but the streets, perhaps as a result, were
choked with grass and weeds (Holladay, 1936). The Sanitary Committee ordered that
hogs were to be removed from their in-town pens and the sites were to be limed. This
measure was to be enforced by the police. They resolved to enforce the city ordinance
against burials within the precincts of the town since there had been illegal burials “of
late.” (In-town burials had been forbidden by the state since 1832 [Holladay]). However
the Market House, initially closed, was reopened despite its “offensive odor.” The
Council resolved to meet every day during the epidemic. However, it was five days until
the next meeting at which two members resigned their offices. Three hundred additional
dollars were appropriated for the use of the Sanitary Committee. That was the last
meeting for three months (Minutes of the Portsmouth Common Council). There was
official action, however. The mayor set aside August 8th as a day of humiliation and
prayer “for the confession of sins, and earnest prayer to the Almighty that His scourge
may be removed” (Yellow Fever in Norfolk and Portsmouth, 1855, August 9th). By the
middle of the month, it was reported that only one councilman (possibly Dr. Schoolfield)
remained in the town, yet the president of the Common Council wrote to the Mayor of
Baltimore requesting medical aid on the 20th (Yellow Fever in Norfolk and Portsmouth,
1855, August 16th; Report of the Portsmouth Relief Association, p. 136). On the 15t,!,
Frederick Cridland, Her Britannic Majesty’s Acting Consul at Norfolk, Virginia sent a
dispatch to the Earl o f Clarendon, Secretary of State for the Foreign Office reporting on
the epidemic in both cities.

It is my painful duty to report to Your Lordship that the Yellow fever in a very
malignant form and as an epidemic is now raging in this City and in the Town of
Portsmouth.
The Board of Health reports that the disease is on the increase and likely to
continue as an epidemic for 40 days.57 The Merchants and Citizens generally panic
struck, have abandoned their businesses and fled from the Port and almost a total
57 Forty days is a traditional quarantine period.
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suspension of business has been the consequence.

From this dispatch, the news was disseminated in Europe causing a number of countries to
implement quarantines for shipping from a number of American cities {Shipping Gazette
and Lloyd’s Weekly Summary cited by Trask).
A notice in the Portsmouth Transcript on September 25th stated that the Council
was still without a quorum, however, “those of them who remain, cooperated with by a
few citizens, have undertaken the management of affairs.” These affairs included
supplying the wants of the needy and attending to the sick and dying. The mayor himself
remained and was very active in bringing relief into the town. He fell ill of the disease, but
recovered (Forrest, 1856, p. 79; Report of the Philadelphia Relief Committee. 1856;
Report of the Portsmouth Relief Association. 1856).
When the disease seemed confined to Gosport, some residents of that section
moved to Portsmouth seeking “purer air and cleaner quarters.” A number o f them found
refuge in the Academy, a private school (Holladay, 1936). Not surprisingly, when the true
extent of the epidemic became known, Portsmouth residents began to flee the town.
According to Vache, (1962, p. 52) only about 4,000 residents (evenly divided between
black and white) remained in the town during the course of the pestilence. Holladay
confirms this figure. Forrest (1856, pp. 171, 205) estimates that 15,000 people left the
two cities during the epidemic and that about 10,000 people left Norfolk. That being true,
5.000 left Portsmouth. Taken together, the two accounts would indicate that between
5.000 and 6,000 people left the town. This figure is corroborated by Councilman James
G. Holladay who estimated that 5,000 people remained in Portsmouth in late August
(Report o f the Philadelphia Relief Committee. 1856, p. 88). Another report placed the
number remaining in Portsmouth in late August at 4,000 (“Portsmouth”, 1855, August
31). Yet another placed it at 2,00058 ( “From Portsmouth”, 1855, August 31). A

58 Of course no official records of those who left were kept. An additional problem is that
the black population, whether slave or free, were apparently not consistently included (or
excluded) from estimates made at the time. This low estimate may be for whites only.
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thousand workers in the Navy Yard had “taken their discharges” by the middle of August
(“From Norfolk and Portsmouth”, 1855, August 16).
Who remained in the town? Trask (1997) notes that those who remained in
southern cities during yellow fever epidemics were “mostly slaves, free blacks, and
working-class whites.” Certainly this was the case in Portsmouth. Holladay (1936) states
the remaining population were those who did not have the resources to leave. “Most of
those remaining here are persons whose rather limited means did not admit of flight, and
who in health, were rather short o f ‘helps’.” Blacks figured largely in the numbers of
those who could not leave. The Portsmouth Transcript reported in mid-August that
“probably not more than 1,500-2,000 whites” remained in town (“Progress of the Fever”,
1855, August 20). Schoolfield reports that a little over 2,000 whites remained in
Portsmouth (Report of the Portsmouth Relief Association. 1856, p. 142). There were, at
the time o f the epidemic, about 2500 blacks living in Portsmouth (Report on the Origin of
the Yellow Fever in Norfolk during the Summer of 1855. 1857). Taken together, the
figures suggest that nearly all of the black population remained in Portsmouth.59 Chisholm
(cited in Emmerson, 1944) adds contemporary verification in his statement that, by August
4th, “whole streets of the best located and built in the town, are left without a white
inhabitant.” Certainly the free black population lacked the resources for flight...and where
could they go in the slaveholding south? But why did slave owners leave their valuable
property behind? Perhaps the belief, common at the time, that blacks did not suffer from
yellow fever, enabled slave holders to leave their people behind with equanimity. Then
too, slaves may have been left behind in the expectation that they would protect their
owners’ property.
At least one slave owner, in fact, remained and cared for his slaves. John L.
Porter, a prominent Portsmouth citizen, sent his family to Washington, DC, then
attempted to gather his few slaves, who were hired out, at his home where he made

>9A similar racial difference in the ability to flee the epidemic was also seen in the
Philadelphia experience of 1793 when one in four white Philadelphians fled, but only one in ten
blacks. A lower incidence in black death rates was also noted there (Klepp, 1997, p. 167).
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arrangements to care for them. One, a certain Willis Hodges, refused to come. But when
Hodges fell ill in his own cottage, Porter found a wheelbarrow and two black women to
lift him into it and wheel him to Porter’s home. There, he recovered. Porter’s care was
repaid when he himself fell ill. His slave stayed by his side for three days and nights,
“never changing his clothes, never neglecting him one minute in his helplesness, with his
people all away, until the fever broke and the danger was past... (Buxton, p. 17). Porter,
however, was not a typical slave owner. Indeed, his grandfather had freed all his slaves on
his death and the few slaves owned by John Porter had come into the family as possessions
of his wife. One of these was Willis Hodges. Hodges had married Matilda, a woman
owned by a Colonel Binford and they had three children. On the Colonel’s death, Matilda
and the children were to be sold. Hodges begged Porter to buy them to keep the family
together, and, although he did not feel the need for additional slaves, he did so. Matilda
apparently became the Porter’s cook, and a very poor one at that. Willis Hodges seemed
to enjoy a special place in the family. In fact, he spent evenings in the kitchen being taught
to read by the Porter’s young daughter-an illegal activity at the time (Buxton, pp. 14-18;
Kolchin, p. 129). Hodges’ motives for the heroic nursing care of his master are unknown,
but it was clearly in his best interest that Porter survive. There was a slave market in
Norfolk, and ships left the port regularly bearing cargoes of slaves destined for the market
in New Orleans (Johnson, 1999). Porter’s death could shatter Hodges’ own family.
Locales surrounding Portsmouth immediately established quarantine measures,
although these were, for the most part, temporary (Armstrong).60 But, despite the
prospect of fines as high as $100 for Portsmouth citizens entering the countryside
surrounding the town (Report of the Portsmouth Relief Association. 1856, pp. 116-7,
130), contemporary accounts tell of the areas around Portsmouth being “overrun” “...private houses, bams, kitchens, schoolhouses, churches, tents, cabins and other kinds of
shelter are all crammed” (Forrest, 1856, p. 47). Schoolfield states that “two or three, or
60 Norfolk, suffering its own epidemic, established a quarantine directed at Portsmouth
residents. A passport certifying that the bearer had not been exposed to yellow fever and
permission from the Norfolk Board of Health was necessary to enter Norfolk (Portsmouth-toNorfolk passport Required, 1964).
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even more families were sometimes crowded together in the same house, and in some
instances in the same room” (Emmerson, p. 219). Many citizens simply camped in the
woods at a distance from the town (“Yellow Fever in Norfolk and Portsmouth”, 1855,
August 16) or built temporary huts along the road for shelter (Holladay, 1936).
The population also fled by ship. Although some ships were avoiding the port,
others stopped to provide transportation for a panicked people. The steamer Coffee, for
instance, was reported to have left Portsmouth “loaded to her guards” and leaving 100
people on the dock “praying to be taken on board” (Yellow Fever at Norfolk and
Portsmouth, 1855, August 7). Holladay reports an eyewitness account of the crowds at
the wharf hoping to escape.

I never witnessed such a panic as I encountered this morning. Nearly an hour
before the boat started, the whole space was covered by trunks, carpet bags and
boxes; thronged by an immense mass of human beings, of all ages and conditions;
such a number that it was feared that the boat could not take all on board. When
she made fast there was not only pushing and shoving, but actual fighting
occurred.

By mid-August, yellow fever cases were continuing to multiply. Nurses were
desperately needed. Efforts to recruit black nurses for twice the usual wage were
unavailing (“Yellow Fever in Norfolk and Portsmouth,” 1855, August 16). The Common
Council reported that $5,000 had been spent to that point “for the sufferers” and that their
funds and resources were “well nigh out”61 (“Want Money”, 1855, August 13). Forrest
(1856, p. 55) reports that about the 24th of August, 20-30 Portsmouth citizens per day
were “falling” [sick]. An incidence of 30 cases per day would amount to nearly a
thousand in a month-well beyond the normal capacity of the town to cope. It was
61

Portsmouth was poorly prepared to sustain the costs of an epidemic. At the first
Common Council meeting of the year (January 2), the town was noted to have a debt of
more than $171,000 (Minutes of the Portsmouth Common Council. 1855).
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reported that on the 23rd, one physician alone (Dr. Trugien) saw 100 cases (Report of the
Portsmouth Relief Association, p. 169). By the 28th, a member of the Common Council
reported that there were at least 300-400 active cases (Report of the Philadelphia Relief
Committee. 1856, 88). Another report placed the case number at 500 at this time
(“Progress of the Fever”, 1855, August 28). One reporter told of 212 deaths between
August 9th and 27th (“The Latest for Portsmouth”, 1855, August 28). Another reported 94
deaths during five days alone (“The Fever at Norfolk and Portsmouth,” 1855, August 29).
At first, September brought no relief. During the first week of the month, 150
persons died (Report of the Portsmouth Relief Association. 1856, p. 137). The condition
of the population was desperate.

Nurses cannot be obtained, friends desert, and in very many cases there is not a
soul to attend the sick and dying, but the undertakers’ employees (his hearse
driver, and driver’s companion, both colored men) to put the dead into their
coffins and graves. Literally the sick attend the sick, and almost literally, the dead
bury their dead.. .This disease has deranged every department of business, and is
prevailing to a greater or less degree in almost every family. The result is, great,
and general destitution prevails ...(Report of the Philadelphia Relief Committee.
1856, pp. 88-9).

Accounts reaching Petersburg described a situation where “whole families are lying
ill, without the means of getting a drop of water to cool their parched tongues”
(“Appalling Accounts,” 1855, August 23). According to a visitor, the town presented “a
gloomy and desolate appearance. Nearly every store is closed, and the streets are more
quiet than on Sunday” (“From Norfolk and Portsmouth, 1855, August 24). Another
observer wrote:

I find this place even more deserted than Norfolk. I have spent some three hours
here, and as yet have seen no one I have known before, although enjoying the
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acquaintance of many here about three months ago. The stores are nearly every
one closed, and a general gloominess and desolation prevails. There is not a hotel
open in the place, and from appearances I infer all have left except the sick and
those attending to them” (“Progress of the Fever, 1855, August 27).

Another visitor coming from Norfolk agreed.

On landing on the Portsmouth side of the river, all seemed changed.. .The streets
seemed literally deserted...I met but one white person, and saw but one store open.
As I passed the end of the market house, usually crowded by the country people, I
saw but two market carts. The negro [m'c] drivers of these carts were sitting on
the curb-stone beside them, and they, with their horses looked as if wilted by the
heat; I saw no one there to buy their marketing (Armstrong cited in Emmerson,
1944, p. 223).

The visitor noticed that a man who knocked at a house door was not admitted, but rather
engaged in conversation from a second floor window as if to prevent infection by direct
contact, and goes on to describe a silent, empty downtown and an almost deserted ferry
station where all talk was of the fever (Armstrong). One sound, however, became
characteristic during the period. Wagons loaded with empty coffins passed continually
through the streets (Report of the Portsmouth Relief Association, cited in Emmerson, p.
222 ).

One undertaker remained in the town (Report of the Portsmouth Relief
Association, p. 138). Grave diggers were in short supply. There were reports of hastily
dug over-shallow graves (“Progress of the Fever,” 1855, August 24). The usual complex
rites concerning burials disappeared, replaced by an almost assembly-line type process.

In burying the dead, there is little ceremony; before the poor sufferer has breathed
his last, his coffin is spoken for, and arrangements are made for his interment.
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Within an hour or two after the breath has left the body, it is placed in a rude,
stained coffin, deposited in a hearse and driven off by a negro [szc] to the grave
yard, without (in almost every instance) a single relative or friend to see it
deposited in the grave. No religious services are performed, and unhonored and
unsung, and I had almost said-unwept, they are put out of your sight forever
(“The Fever at Norfolk and Portsmouth, 1855, August 29).

Schoolfield (Report o f the Portsmouth Relief Association, p. 139) even reports “an over
anxiety to get rid o f the hapless victims as speedily as possible. When all hope of recovery
was gone, and death was inevitable, its approach was looked for with manifest
impatience.” Arrangements were made for burials even before deaths had occurred. One
victim who survived, actually recalled hearing friends making arrangements for his funeral
(Emmerson, 1944). Unshrouded, unmoumed bodies were simply placed in common
coffins, loaded into hearses, and buried without notice (Report o f the Portsmouth Relief
Association. 1856, p. 139). As conditions worsened, trenches were dug for burial of up to
eight bodies at a time (Holladay, 1936). These accounts of burials without ceremony are
particularly striking in view of the fact that the customary Portsmouth funeral rites o f the
time were ‘conducted with as much etiquette as a coronation” and included vigils over the
body, specially printed funeral invitations, special clothing and decorations, lavish food,
flowers, long processions, and a great gathering of family and friends (Holladay). Coffins
were in short supply. The Reverend Chisholm describes quarreling and fighting over a
load of coffins that arrived on a boat from Baltimore (Chisolm cited in Holladay). The
commanding officer of the Gosport Navy Yard put his remaining staff to work to supply
the necessary “rude tenements of the dead”, although it appears that this effort was
personal rather than official (Report of the Portsmouth Relief Association. 1856, p. 138).
All the business of the town-“all merchantile pursuits and operation’-essentially
stopped (Report of the Portsmouth Relief Association. 1856, p. 13). The port closed save
for the small steamer, the J.E. Coffee, which Armstrong (1856) reports went to meet
incoming relief ships from Richmond and Baltimore. Coffins were the main import.
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Armstrong reports that the Coffee’s entire deck would be “piled with empty coffins.” As
the port closed to traffic and chains of supply became compromised, conditions of scarcity
developed. Holladay (1936) reports conditions of near famine. By the latter part of
August, only three grocery stores remained open (“From Norfolk and Portsmouth, 1855,
August 23). By September, these were closed (Holladay). People were reported as living
“almost entirely on salt provisions (“Progress of the Fever”, 1855, August 31). Only one
of the three drugstores was open (Progress of the Fever” , 1855, August 25). At one
time, it was reported that there were no more than 30 ounces of quinine (used for the
treatment of the fever) in Portsmouth (Report of the Philadelphia Relief Committee. 1856,
p. 88). In both Norfolk and Portsmouth, provisions of any kind (supplied largely from the
cities of Philadelphia and Baltimore) were not to be had from any source other than the
Relief Association (Portsmouth) and the Howard Association (Norfolk).62 Indeed, Forrest
(1856 pp, 59,159) reports that crowds almost constantly gathered at the office of the
Portsmouth Relief Association “seeking supplies for their destitute families.”
In the latter part of September, the air cooled and the number of new cases fell off sharply
(Report o f the Portsmouth Relief Association. 1856, pp. 139-40). By the eighth of
October, Dr. Schoolfield stated the diseases had “nearly burnt out” mainly because nearly
everyone in Portsmouth had already had it. In fact, he estimated that 90 percent of the
population had been sick and that 35 percent of them had died (Report of the Portsmouth
Relief Association. 1856, p. 114). The epidemic, in fact, was nearly over. By midOctober, the town’s inhabitants were returning (Holladay, 1936), although the last deaths
from the disease were not reported until November 10th (Emmerson, 1944, p. 224). The
doctor’s estimate of the dead was a bit high. The Relief Association reported a little over
1,000 deaths (Report of the Portsmouth Relief Association, pp. 185-93). The Common

62 Howard Associations, named after the 18th century philanthropist, John Howard, existed
in a number o f cities. The best known was incorporated in new Orleans in 1842 to care for
epidemic victims. Although men from diverse occupations were eventually included, the original
“Howards” were clerks and members of a Fire Company. In early epidemics they provided direct
care. But as time went on, they served more as organizers, fund raisers, and managers (Carrigan,
1994, p. 347).
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Council did not meet again until the 11th of November. Oddly enough, there was no
mention of the epidemic at that meeting although the business of the meeting consisted of
filling official vacancies. The four remaining meetings that year dealt with the aftermath of
the epidemic-additional filling of vacancies, a public meeting to “express the gratitude of
the people” for assistance received during the epidemic, to appropriate extra monies to the
police for their services during the epidemic,63 and to arrange for care of the orphaned
children (Minutes of the Portsmouth Common Council. 1855). There were a substantial
number of orphans. The Philadelphia Relief Committee utilized “leftover” funds for
investment to be remitted to orphan asylums in Portsmouth and Norfolk that were to be
established in the wake of the sickness. Holt Wilson of Portsmouth identified 48 children
as having been orphaned in that town by the epidemic (Report of the Philadelphia Relief
Committee, pp. 21,116). In December, the Portsmouth Common Council noted 45
orphans of the epidemic as still being housed in Richmond. Several members of the
Council, assuming the former duties of the Relief Association, had traveled to Richmond
to start to make provision for their care and support (Minutes of the Portsmouth Common
Council!. At year’s end, the transition from Relief Association to normal government,
from dealing with the epidemic to looking to prevent the next pestilence disaster had
begun.

The African-American Experience of Yellow Fever in Portsmouth
Approximately 2500 blacks were living in Portsmouth at the time of the epidemic.
About 2000 of these were enslaved. All, slave or free, experienced life in a very different
way from the white population. Following the urban customs described elsewhere in this
paper, many slaves were hired out to others, sometimes on rather lengthy contracts. Male
slaves were required to have a license to work for someone other than their masters. A

63 The extent of the role of the police in the Portsmouth epidemic is not clear. There may
have been some disorder in town since The Virginia Gazette reported on September 6th that a
representative from Portsmouth and Norfolk had been sent to the see the President of the United
States to request that the cities be placed under martial law “for the protection of property there.”
In any case, martial law was never declared.
110

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

system of passes allowed slaves to move about the town to and from their employers.
Slaves caught on the streets without a pass were subject to imprisonment or whipping.
The criminal justice system also treated persons according to color. For stealing chicken
eggs, for instance, whites were fined $10 for each offense while slaves or free persons of
color received 15-30 lashes (Minutes of the Portsmouth Common Council, 7/2/49). A
sign placed on the Pritchard bridge announced that for driving “any horse, dray, cart, or
other vehicle” over the bridge, the penalty was $2 for whites and “not more than 20
lashes” for slaves or free negroes [s/c] (Minutes of the Portsmouth Common Council,
6/3/51).
Free blacks were hardly free. Many laws that applied to slaves also applied to
them. Free blacks, like slaves, were forbidden to smoke on the streets (Holladay, 1936).
More importantly, free blacks, like slaves, were forbidden to assemble unless white
persons were also present (Lawerence, 1953). Free blacks who appeared to be “habitually
idle” could be arrested and hired out to the highest bidder for a period up to a year. Non
enslaved blacks were considered to be a nuisance by the white community, and petitions
were sent to the legislature asking that something be done to rid the community of them
(Holladay).
There was a contemporary difference of opinion as to whether the black
population of the cities enjoyed a greater resistance to yellow fever than whites.
Armstrong, writing of the Norfolk epidemic, states that he agrees with a remark that
blacks “cannot take the disease.” Dr. Williman (1856), a physician volunteer who came to
Norfolk from North Carolina to aid in the epidemic, reported that, at first, there had been
a “confident belief that the black population of Norfolk would pass through the
approaching disorder with comparative immunity.” However, he states that blacks were
“stricken almost at the same moment with the white inhabitants.” He attributes the
apparent susceptibility of the black population to the presence of an “aggravated disease”
being present in white patients. His main concern with the incidence of the disease among
blacks was that the knowledge that they might get the disease “proceeded so far as often
to impair the service due from servant to master.”
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James Holladay, a Portsmouth councilman, reported that the disease spared no one
of any age, sex, or color (Report of the Philadelphia Relief Committee. 1856, p. 88).
Forrest (1856, p. 103) states that by mid-September, several hundred “colored people”
were down with the fever, and many had died or were dying. Dr. Schoolfield, of the
Portsmouth Sanitary Committee, believed that blacks got the disease later in the course of
the epidemic and that their disease was milder in form. He estimated that two thirds of the
black population suffered from yellow fever (with mulattos being more susceptible) with
black mortality at 5-8 percent (Report of the Philadelphia Relief Committee. 1856, p.
114). Savitt, reviewing the figures in the Report of the Portsmouth Relief Association,
has estimated that just 9.4% of all the dead in Portsmouth were African-American (Savitt,
1981/2002, p. 245).
Buxton (p. 17) restates the belief that yellow fever “is not a hard disease on
colored people.” Still, immune or not, the black population in Portsmouth was brought
low by the fever. Holladay, 1936) states that the “Negroes [sfc] in both towns were
thoroughly demoralized though they seemed to be practically immune from the fever. No
amount of money, no appeal of any kind could induce them to nurse the sick, or indeed
render assistance of any kind.” She also complained that “darkies” refused to drive the
wagons to move orphans from the Naval Hospital to the Academy.
Vache (1962, p. 52) claims that 2,000 black residents of Portsmouth remained in
the town during the epidemic. He then states that 1080 white citizens are known to have
died from the fever. Figures from the Portsmouth Transcript suggest that the actual
figure for blacks remaining in Portsmouth may have been closer to 3,000 (“Progress of the
Fever, 1855, August 20), although Dr. Schoolfield also estimates the number of blacks
remaining in the town as slightly less than 2,000 (Report of the Portsmouth Relief
Association. 1856, p. 142). The Naval Hospital kept rather careful statistics concerning
admissions and deaths. However, only 18 blacks were admitted to the hospital during this
time.64 O f these, 2 died-a death rate of 11 percent. The death rate for the whites

64 It should be noted that while hospitals were a rare institution at the time, there were
hospitals in the Commonwealth that admitted blacks. There is also ample documentation of
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admitted to the hospital was 36 percent (Holcomb, 1930, p. 264). However, comparisons
are difficult to draw because of the small number of blacks admitted.65
Forrest (1856, p. 205) suggests that considerably more whites than blacks died in Norfolk.
He states that two out of three white persons who remained in the city perished, but only
one out of three perished if the white and black populations are counted together. The
Portsmouth Relief Association lists 100 black deaths (Report of the Portsmouth Relief
Association. 1856).66 If 2000 blacks remained in the town, this means a mortality rate of
only five percent. This number is at odds with the estimate of eight percent black
mortality contained elsewhere in the body of the Report (p. 136), but both figures place
black mortality as considerably less than that of whites. It would seem that, although
blacks clearly suffered from the disease, they were not as apt to die as whites.67 Carrigan

exploitation of black patients as research subjects in these facilities (Byrd and Clayton, 2000 pp.
265-6, 280).
65 The extent of the medical and nursing services delivered to the black population during
the epidemic is not clear. We know that black volunteers came to the area, but, since the white
population generally believed that it was the place of blacks to serve whites, it seems unlikely that
the black volunteers would be assigned to care for the black population. Primary sources (written
by whites) seem always to identify blacks by race, so the specific absence of references to race
when writing about victim services (e.g., visits to homes) implies that the services were rendered
to whites. In more settled times, the quality of health care for blacks was varied with slaves
considerably more likely to receive a higher standard of care than free blacks. A master with a
significant investment in a slave (or a sense of responsibility) could ensure that a sick slave
received good care, including care in a hospital for black patients or in a segregated wing for
black patients. (It should be recalled that hospitals for blacks or for whites were rare in America
in the mid-19th century. Sick people were generally cared for at home.) Free blacks were adrift
in a society that cared little about them and suffered the highest mortality rates of any urban group
(Wade, pp. 135-141, 269). Since most slave owners left Portsmouth during the epidemic
apparently leaving most o f their slaves behind, their influence in ensuring good care for their
slaves was probably diminished.
66 Deaths o f enslaved blacks were listed by name o f their owner, e.g., “Todd, Merit’s
Henry”. Free blacks were listed by their own names (often a single first name) followed by the
letters “f n” designating their status.
67 Although black losses were relatively low, The Report of the Portsmouth Relief
Association (p. 182) lists the death of slaves as a prime economic loss of the epidemic.
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(1988, p. 63) confirms this notion “ ...blacks were not immune to yellow fever, but they
usually presented mild symptoms, and relatively few died of the disease.” In a later work,
Carrigan (1994) speculates that yellow fever may have been kept at bay in early 19th
century New Orleans due to the large number of immune blacks and Creoles in the city at
that time. When significant numbers of European immigrants swelled the city’s
population, yellow fever became a continual problem. Bogger (1997, p. 125) suggests
that blacks in Norfolk suffered fewer fatalities from the fever due to indirect [italics mine]
exposure in Africa. However many Portsmouth blacks died, few were buried by the Relief
Association. The Association paid for over 700 burials. Probably seven of these were for
black residents (Report of the Portsmouth Relief Association. 1856, pp. 194-9).
A number of blacks entered the epidemic area to care for the sick. Blanton (1933,
p. 263) notes that colored nurses were brought in from Charleston, New Orleans, and
elsewhere. The conditions under which the black nurses were coming were uncertain,
although Bogger (1997, p. 126) states that 19 nurses came to the area from Charleston as
volunteers. One, Snow Brown of Charleston, came “with his master’s written
permission.” Another was a “free colored man.” (Daniel Ravenel, September 22,1855
cited in the Report of the Portsmouth Relief Association. 1856, p. 319).
Blacks trying to leave the epidemic area were treated differently from whites. One town,
Welden, NC, demonstrated this kind of discrimination. Whites entering Weldon from the
epidemic area were to be heavily fined ($ 100/day). Slave owners were to be fined $50/day
for any slaves they knowingly allowed into Welden. Free blacks entering Welden from the
epidemic area were to either pay the fine or receive 39 lashes. But the language in which
these directives were couched left no doubt as to the fate of blacks entering the town.
“...if any poor negro [sic], likely to have the fever in his blood, shall enter our town of
Welden...we’ll strip to the skin and lay the lash, and then turn the fugitive out into the
swamps to die” (Armstrong).
At least one black inhabitant of the town benefitted from the epidemic—Bob Butt,
a slave who served as the town gravedigger. “This humble negro [s/c], in his line,
performed duty beyond all price. From mom till night, he labored at his spade, and
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frequently made the grave-yard his resting-place. Under his direction and
superintendence, all who died of the fever were decently committed to their mother
Earth,” ( Report of the Portsmouth Relief Association. 1856, p. 15). Not only was he
paid nearly $1400 for his efforts, when the epidemic was over, Portsmouth citizens raised
the money to buy the gravedigger’s freedom. He spent the remainder of his life as the
“much respected” sexton of Trinity church (Report of the Portsmouth Relief Association.
1856; Holladay as cited in Vache, 1962, p. 53).
Savitt (1981/2002) has argued that the presumed African-American resistance to
yellow fever increased the demand for their services and elevated their status. However,
with the exception of the experience of Bob Butt, any elevation in African-American
status in Portsmouth appears to have been temporary. Like whites, African-Americans
came into the area to serve, but their contribution was unremarked. Indeed, most
comments concerning black behavior by white writers of the period have to do with the
refusal of some blacks to tend the sick or the dead. There seems to be a clear expectation
that blacks should be willing to perform these jobs, but not a concomitant expectation that
whites should also, nor is attention paid to whites who may also have refused to help, let
alone to those, including those in positions of leadership, who abandoned the town.68

Managing the Epidemic in Portsmouth
A number of commentators have described and analyzed the urban response to
epidemics. The paradigmatic reference for civic experience in time of plague is certainly
that of Thucycides’ description of the plague of Athens. His picture of a community
overwhelmed and falling into a chaotic, lawless state serves the archetype for later
narratives. Crushing fear, hopelessness, disruption of social customs and religious

68 Actually, blacks in Portsmouth fared better than those in Philadelphia in 1793. In that
city, free blacks were the very first to respond to the mayor’s desperate call for help. Despite the
fact that they spent the entire epidemic toiling to tend the sick and bury the dead, the only notice
of their help seemed to be unproven accusations that some of them had stolen items from the
homes of the ill (M. Carey. A short account of the malignant fever, lately prevalent in Philadelphia
cited in Griffith, 1997, pp. 54-5).
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practices, futility of prevailing medical treatments are the repeated universal experiences in
times of plague and are seen again and again in experiences with yellow fever. Matthew
Carey’s (Carey’s A short account of the malignant fever. Lately prevalent in Philadelphia
as cited in Griffith, 1997, pp. 49-51) well known account of the great 1793 yellow fever
epidemic in Philadelphia clearly mirrors the experience of the Athenians in its account of
fear, civic breakdown, social isolation and abandonment of religious rituals. Where
Thucydides notes the prevalence of lawless and immoral behavior by a population who no
longer feared their consequences, Carey provides chilling psychological imagery.

Indeed, at this awful crisis, so much did se lf appear to engross the whole attention
of many, that less concern was felt for the loss of a parent, a husband, a wife, or
any child, than, on other occasions, would have been caused by the death o f a
servant, or even a favourite lap-dog.

However, he, like Thucydides, also notes the courageous behavior of individuals who
“risked and sometimes sacrificed their lives to tend to those in need, even strangers.”
Carey also documents the inadequacy of the government to manage the epidemic
and the raising of a volunteer organization to cope with the illness in Philadelphia. This
dependence on volunteer associations in lieu of government is a hallmark of the American
yellow fever experience and raises a number of issues as to the appropriate role of
government in civic life. In our present system, a city dweller might expect to look to
his/her city, county, state or national government for assistance in time of need. In the
historical American experience of yellow fever, cities were by and large, on their own.
Philadelphia, during the 1793 experience, was the nation’s capital. The only federal
response, however, was indecision as to whether the government should return to the city
at the end of the summer if the epidemic was still in progress. The notion that the nation
or even the state was obligated to relieve the suffering of the citizens of the city was not
even imagined.
Rosenberg (1992, pp. 281-2) has described the classical civic response to epidemics.
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Recognition that an epidemic exists is slow. Commercial interests are reluctant to face the
threat of a disruption of trade. Municipal authorities do not wish to face an epidemic’s
effect “on budgets, on public order, on accustomed ways of doing things.” Physicians
typically suppress their first suspicions. This slow curve of recognition is juxtaposed
against the typically steep biological curve of the onset of epidemic disease ensuring that
any civic response will probably be too little too late. However, there have been periods
when city governments responded rather quickly to the threat of epidemic. Magistrates in
certain Italian city-states more than five centuries before the Portsmouth experience were
experienced in coping with epidemics by establishing quarantines, organizing burials and
food deliveries and passing regulations for behavior in times of plague although other
cities in northern Europe and Muslim locales demonstrated lesser abilities in organizing
anti-epidemic measures (McNeill, pp. 186-9).69 A number of European cities developed
sophisticated anti-epidemic systems in response to the bubonic plague that devastated the
continent in the late medieval and early modem periods. In fact, they laid down the public
health principles, e.g., quarantine and isolation of victims, that still governed public policy
when the epidemic under study occurred.70 For these cities, however, responses to plague
strengthened and extended the power of the state, and city magistrates, although sending
their families away, usually remained at their posts (Slack, 1991).
In the short term, this was not true of the Portsmouth experience. The
government ceased to exist as Common Councilmen fled. However, some Italian
Renaissance cities passed through an interim stage of convening ad hoc committees in

69 The fatalistic attitude demonstrated by Muslim areas in the face of epidemic reflected
their belief that such events were sent by God as a mercy. For Christians, plagues were seen as a
punishment for sin and an opportunity to act to root out sin (and the sinful) from the community
(Slack, p. 116).
70 The practice o f isolation was developed as a means to contain the spread o f leprosy in
Europe from the 12th to the 14th centuries. Quarantines per se were a response to the bubonic
plague of the 14th century. Quarantine was the practice originated in Venice of isolating vessels
incoming from plague areas. Ships suspected of carrying infection were prevented from
offloading passengers, crew, or cargo for 30 and later for 40 days - thus the term quarantenaria,
later anglicized to “quarantine” (Duffy, 1990, p. 7).
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time of epidemic to bear responsibility for caring for the sick and destitute and burying the
dead. In time, these committees became standing boards of health (Hays, 2000, p. 132).
This scenario was largely followed by the town of Portsmouth. In the years immediately
following the epidemic, the government did extend its authority and its police powers in an
attempt to prevent another epidemic. These changes indeed accompanied a general
increase in municipal authority and professionalism in administration that led to the town’s
incorporation as a city.
There is also the issue of the degree of private involvement. In Philadelphia, as
later in Portsmouth, the city was virtually run by volunteers during the epidemic. But in
the Baltimore epidemic of 1800, the municipal government made vigorous efforts to
address the needs of the population with volunteers restricted to a role assisting in locating
those who required public assistance (Stickle 1979). Portsmouth clearly followed the
Philadelphia model.
As noted earlier, the Common Council’s response to the epidemic was to appoint a
Sanitary Committee to manage it. This Committee posted a notice on the 24th of July.

For the purpose of allaying the general alarm, the Sanitary committee appointed by
a special meeting of the Common Council held on the twentieth inst. have
determined to report daily the state of the prevailing epidemic.

They request all the physicians to make up a report of their cases to sunset of each
day, and have it at the Dispensary, No. 77 High Street, directed to the Sanitary
Committee.

From the returns of three physicians, there are under treatment at sunset on the
23rd, eighteen cases. Up to the present time there have been eight deaths only.
The disease is principally confined to Gosport, there being only a few cases in
other parts of town, and they originated in Gosport (Report of the Portsmouth
Relief Association, p. 124).
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Other than dismissing the number of deaths, the notice reassures the public that the disease
is confined to Gosport. Also of interest is the directive requiring case reports from
physicians - a fledgling bureaucratic requirement.
As government failed, a voluntary association assumed quasi-official functions.
The Portsmouth Relief Association consisted of seven men, nearly all of whom held
“official relations to the municipal affairs of the town.” It was this body that “undertook
the management of matters” (Report of the Portsmouth Relief Association. 1856, p. 9).
The Association established methods for obtaining and distributing supplies, for caring for
the sick, burying the dead, and for the long-term care of children who had lost their
parents during the epidemic. The town was districted into wards with committees
appointed to each ward to seek out “the sick and the destitute” (Report of the Portsmouth
Relief Association, p. 13). The scenes that greeted these committees could be horrific and
frustrating. Chisholm (cited in Emmerson, 1944, p. 224) describes a scene in which a
woman, left at home when her dying husband was taken to the hospital, was found dead of
the fever herself during a later visit.
A physician was assigned to each district (“From Portsmouth”, 1855, August 31).
To supply food and clothing, the Association rented stores, distributed the goods it
received to them, and employed people as storekeepers. The organization also supplied
“dietetics and cordials” on physicians’ requisitions. With some difficulty, the Association
procured wagons and drivers to convey patients to the Naval Hospital. With all hotels
being closed, the Association also found it necessary to secure quarters for the many
volunteers who came to help. Most importantly, the Association comprised a unitary
organization that could utilize the $85,000 in contributions to procure and distribute food
and medicines, to support volunteers, and provide, as best as possible, for the needs of a
sick, isolated population. Ten thousand dollars alone was spent to bury more than 700
bodies (Report of the Portsmouth Relief Association. 1856, pp. 13, 69,194-9).
Orphans were a particular problem. Holladay (1936) reports that there were
nearly 400 children who had lost at least one parent during the epidemic. Orphans were at
first housed at the Naval Hospital. Then the Association opened a temporary orphanage
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staffed by the Sisters of Charity in one of the town schools. As the situation worsened,
both the cities of Richmond and Baltimore offered to care for the orphans. They were, in
the end, sent to Richmond (Report of the Portsmouth Relief Association. 1856, p. 14).
The role of the churches in Portsmouth during the epidemic is not clear. Certainly
Father Devlin, the only Roman Catholic priest in the town, stayed, cooperated with the
Relief Committee, and performed heroically in ministering to his congregation. There
were reports on both sides of the water that some Protestant ministers had deserted their
churches and fled the area, but that was not true of all. A Norfolk minister noted that
seven of the ten ministers in that city had remained and that the others had good reasons
for leaving (Armstrong).
Portsmouth (and Norfolk) clearly could not muster the resources to cope with the
epidemic alone. With all normal government and commerce shut down, relief from
outside the city became a literal lifeline. One of the first groups to respond was the Sisters
of Charity. The Sisters, founded in America in 1707, had a reputation for coming into
epidemic areas when other nurses were fleeing (Nelson, 2001, pp. 35, 40). They had first
come to Norfolk in 1836 (Ledger Dispatch May 12, 1956). Through a connection with
St. Patrick’s church in Norfolk, the Sisters sent nurses to both cities (Forrest, 1856, p.
169). Three came from the mother house in Emmitsburg, Maryland to serve in the Naval
Hospital (Holcomb, 1930, p. 266; Nelson, p. 41).71 Other cities, many of them all too
familiar with the visitations of yellow fever, generously responded to requests for
assistance. Baltimore, Richmond, New York and, most notably, Philadelphia, sent
provisions and money to the voluntary associations of both cities to carry out their relief
activities (Forrest, 1856, pp, 176-83). Many cities also sent personnel to care for yellow
fever victims. In all, 87 physicians and more than 150 nurses came from other locales
(mainly along the eastern seaboard) to serve during the epidemic (Blanton, 1933, p. 236).
Cities all along the eastern seaboard sent money and goods. But cities were not alone in
their response. Hundreds of individuals sent money and provisions to help the

71 Others from the order came from Baltimore to serve in Norfolk. Their service led to the
founding of the Hospital of St. Vincent de Paul in that city the following year (Nelson, p. 41).
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beleaguered towns. “Ladies” sent clothes for the children. A man in Nansemond County
sent five lambs “to be slaughtered and distributed among the needy of Portsmouth.” An
anonymous donor who had given a “small contribution to Norfolk” also sent a “small
amount” to Portsmouth (Report of the Portsmouth Relief Association. 1856, pp. 21425).72 Shipyard workers in other cities contributed to their “brother mechanics and
others” (Report of the Portsmouth Relief Association. 1856, p. 226). Churches and
lodges sent money. Collections were made by university students and among children for
the orphans of the town. Medical, homeopathic and botanic physicians and a number of
nurses offered their services. The Tuscarora tribe contributed $25 to be divided between
Norfolk and Portsmouth. The Catholic College grounds in Richmond were offered for
care of the sick from both cities. Purveyors of patent medicines offered their tonics
without charge or for a voluntary contribution (Report of the Portsmouth Relief
Association. 1856, pp. 227-343).
Physicians, nurses and others traveled into the epidemic area to assist although
there is some disagreement as to their number and mortality rates. Forrest (1856, pp. 2503) lists no fewer than 107 physicians who came to the two cities during the epidemic. Of
these, he states, 24 served principally in Portsmouth where they were said to suffer a
mortality rate of 20 percent. (Twenty four percent of the physicians who served in
Norfolk also died.) Holladay (1936) reports that 28 volunteer physicians served in
Portsmouth with eight deaths among them. The Report of the Portsmouth Relief
Association (1856, p. 206) lists 27 volunteer physicians who worked in Portsmouth with
seven deaths.
The best documented effort to assist the two cities was that of Philadelphia. That
city, no stranger to yellow fever, called a town meeting August 16th “to adopt measures
for the relief of the Poor of Norfolk, Portsmouth and Gosport, Virginia, now suffering
under the ravages of the Yellow Fever...” (Report of the Philadelphia Relief Committee.
1856, p. 6). At that meeting, 50 citizens were formed into block committees for the

72 The practice of earmarking part of a single donation for Portsmouth and part for
Norfolk was not uncommon.
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purpose of raising relief funds. These funds were to be remitted daily to the relief
committees in Portsmouth and Norfolk. Notices were published in the Philadelphia
newspapers noting that it was the poor who remained in the two cities. In fact, the cities
were described as “poor” as well as “unused to the fever.” There was an appeal to civic
pride-to the “philanthropy that ever distinguishes this community” as well as to the fact
that a nearby city, Baltimore, was active in supplying provisions to Portsmouth and
Norfolk. In a week, more than $30,000 was collected. By mid-October, that sum had
risen to $46,000-the largest sum ever to be raised in Philadelphia for such a cause.
(Additional funds, approximately $20,000, came from other Pennsylvania cities.) But
Philadelphia did not supply only money. Thirty Philadelphia physicians, nurses and
druggists went to Portsmouth to assist in the epidemic. (Approximately an equal number
served in Norfolk.) It was reported that eight of them died there. (Seven volunteers were
thought to have died in Norfolk (Report of the Philadelphia Relief Committee. 1856, pp.
10-3,16-7,22). Included in the Portsmouth volunteers who survived was Miss Lucy
Patterson, an eighteen-year-old recent convert to Roman Catholicism. Although the
Committee initially refused her permission to travel to the epidemic area, she persisted and
went, claiming she had the right to go “because she intends to devote her life to religion
and charity.” Thomas Webster, the head of the committee was moved to write to three
priests to “remonstrate with her against going,’ then to the mayor of Portsmouth to
“watch over her.” In the end, Mr. Webster capitulated. Through her priest, he provided
her with passes and funds for incidental expenses (Report of the Philadelphia Relief
Committee. 1856, pp. 96-8).
Although many cities, not surprisingly, attempted to close their borders to refugees
from the epidemic, Northampton, Matthews and Accomac counties welcomed visitors
from the epidemic area (Report o f the Portsmouth Relief Association. 1856, p. 132).
Petersburg took steps to establish a quarantine as early as August 2nd. At the same time,
Richmond sent two physicians to Norfolk with an eye to “protecting this city [Richmond]
against contagious diseases which might be brought here by infected persons (“Yellow
Fever in Norfolk and Gosport,” 1855, August 3). Nearby Hampton required that persons
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desiring to enter that town were to produce certificates to the effect that they were not
residents of the epidemic area (“Yellow Fever in Norfolk and Portsmouth,” 1855, August
9). The city of Baltimore, although it contributed generously to relief efforts, early on
took very severe measures to ensure that no infected persons reached that port. When the
disease became epidemic in Portsmouth, a physician was despatched from Baltimore to
inspect every ship about to leave the port of Norfolk for Baltimore. A committee of
Portsmouth citizens was employed to identify other Portsmouth residents so that the
doctor could refuse them passage. Some Norfolk residents easily bypassed such
precautions by taking a morning boat to the welcoming Eastern Shore counties, then
boarding a boat departing for Baltimore from there (Armstrong).
Other locales sent fleeing Portsmouth residents back to their homes. A ship loaded
with 200 escaping passengers was refused admission to both Old Point Comfort and
Fortress Monroe, and was obliged to turn back (“The Infected Ports,” 1855, August 8).
In fact, the ship was met at Old Point Comfort by armed sentinels who precluded its
landing at bayonet point (Report of the Portsmouth Relief Association. 1856, p. 131).
Richmond passed an ordinance instituting a quarantine against vessels arriving from
Norfolk and Portsmouth on August 9th (“City Council,” 1855, August 10) which was
lifted during the third week in August (“The Quarantine,” 1855, August 27). In fact,
Norfolk and Portsmouth both had quarantines, one against the other (“The Quarantine,”
1855, August 27). By the 14th of August, it was reported that a citizen could leave
Portsmouth only with “the greatest difficulty” (“Yellow Fever at Norfolk and
Portsmouth,” 1855, August 14).
The combination of flight and quarantine established the population for which the
Association was responsible. Their numbers are noted elsewhere in this paper. In the end,
the Association became responsible for almost all aspects of civic life. All outside
contributions passed through Association hands. All supplies, to sustain life, to care for
the sick and to bury the dead came from the Association. Other organizations-schools,
churches, clubs, and, above all, the government, disappeared. The Association served as
not only an organization, but the organization that maintained the fabric of the town in its
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most desperate season.

Aftermath in Portsmouth
On the sixth of November, the Common Council resumed their sessions. (The last
meeting had been August 7th.) They were most interested in returning to business as
usual. They quickly attended to the filling of vacancies left by the epidemic and, indeed,
life did go on as evidenced by the gradually increasing attention to mundane matters. But
the catastrophe haunted them for years following. At first, it was a matter of calling for a
public meeting (later changed to a motion of thanks) as a manifestation of “gratitude of
the people towards the noble and generous action of our numerous friends in relation to
the late epidemic” (Minutes of the Portsmouth Common Council. 11/12/55). They also
resolved to wear the “ususal badge of mourning “for 30 days as a symbol of respect for
two dead Council members. (The two had stayed to help. The Council had 13 members.
Had all remained in the town, they would doubtless have been mourning additional
members.) Money was voted for the police who had been “deprived of their ususal fees”
during the epidemic (Minutes of the Portsmouth Common Council. 11/12/55, 12/4/55).73
Some time in early December, a special meeting was held in Dr. Schoolfield’s
office to deal with the question of the orphans of the epidemic. Most of them were still
being sheltered in Richmond. It was resolved to send a committee to travel to Richmond
to make further arrangements for them there until “provision could be made for them at
home.” By mid-month, the committee had completed their report on the 45 children with
a careful listing of names (many were siblings), ages (10 months to 15 years) and
dispositions. Most had been taken in by relatives and several were being adopted. In
January, they offered a more detailed report and decided the expenses for their trip
($55.75) should be paid by funds from the Portsmouth Relief Association. It was at this
meeting that the leading spirit of the Association, Dr. Schoolfield, resigned from the

73 The role of the police during the epidemic is not clear. The appropriation of funds for
their services implies that at least some of them stayed. In normal times, a mainstay of police fees
was for the killing and burial of dogs. Presumably, the dogs were safe while the epidemic raged.
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Council and announced his departure from Portsmouth. He received a tribute in the
minutes for “his conspicuous and noble sacrifices and services during the dark and
desolating period of the late pestilence” (Minutes of the Portsmouth Common Council,
1/1/56).
After that, attention returned to the report on the budget. Thanks to the monies
and the actions of the Portsmouth Relief Association and the presence of the Naval
Hospital, the town government escaped not only having to govern during the epidemic,
but also having to pay for it. The budget report for 1855 made no mention at all of the
epidemic. Indeed, the only direct municipal expenses for the epidemic were the $1500
later voted to pay for medals of honor struck to honor the physicians of the Naval
Hospital. The Council itself noted that the report was “good” and indeed the interest on
the town debt had lessened to forty percent of revenues. There were, of course, less
obvious costs associated with the pestilence. Substantial sums were appropriated in the
following years for public health measures designed to avoid another outbreak of yellow
fever.
The first of these, after a committee report on “cleansing the streets and lots of the town”
was the appointment of a Town Inspector

with full powers to investigate the condition of any and every lot, cellar, outhouse,
alley, wharf, dock or street; to receive complaints and remove, abate, or cause to
be removed or abated, any nuisance complained of; to prohibit the creation of Hog
Pens within the limits of the town; to cause the beef and fish markets to be kept
constantly cleaned, and to do all other acts necessary to the perfect cleansing of
the Town; to enforce such penalties and carry out such orders as he may receive
from the Town Council or the Board of Health (Minutes of the Portsmouth
Common Council. 1/11/56).74

74 This is the first mention of a Board of Health. Such a board did not yet exist in
Portsmouth and was not, in fact, created until later.
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The town was to be divided into districts with a warden in each to register
complaints. One or more garbage carts were to be used to remove “all filth, offal or other
matter” in front of any house by order of the Inspector” (Minutes of the Portsmouth
Common Council. 1/11/56). At a later meeting, an ordinance was presented to make the
position full time, paying $50 per month. The Inspector was given the authority to use
force and to bill property owners for street obstructions. Early in the year, a committee
was appointed to audit the records of the Portsmouth Relief Association (at the request of
the Association treasurer, a member of the Common Council). In March the audit was
completed with the committee reporting that the Association had collected $85,320.63
and spent $80,270.02 leaving a balance of $5050.61. The extra funds were dedicated to
care for the orphans of the epidemic. Those who had sheltered them were to be paid and
the Relief Association was instructed to erect and endow an orphan asylum.
In February, the motion of thanks to those who had assisted was passed in a more
detailed form. It included mention of the “benevolent people of Maine, New Hampshire,
Massachusetts, Rode island [«c], Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania,
Delaware, the District of Columbia, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina,
Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, Florida, Texas, Kentucky, Indiana, Wisconsin
and to “benevolent and zealous men who composed the several relief committees within
their borders-to all the churches, to their Humane Associations, Societies and fraternities,
and public works and work shops.” The Council also thanked the railroads and
steamboats that had conveyed the doctors and nurses free of charge. Specific vessels, the
Saranac, the Michigan, the Hetzel and the Savannah were also thanked. There was
specific mention of doctors, nurses and ministers of the gospel and four men, one each
from Philadelphia, Baltimore, Richmond and Petersburg for sending provisions. They
mentioned the “noble” women, the Sisters of Mercy and the Sisters of Charity, and
thanked the cities of New York, Baltimore, Philadelphia and Richmond for their support
of orphans. Nor were federal officials, the Secretary of the Navy, and the Chief of the
Board of Medicine and Surgery for the Naval Hospital and the Commander of the Naval
Station, his officers and his men, forgotten.
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For most, expressions of gratitude would have to suffice. The striking of six gold
medals at a cost to the town o f $1500 (approximately ten percent of the town’s
discretionary income) for the physicians at the Naval Hospital was ordered, and the
Council approved the design of the Portsmouth Relief Association for a monument for the
graves o f the doctors and nurses who came into the town and died during the epidemic.
There is no record of the monument having been built and in January, 1859, the remains of
a number of Philadelphians who had died in the epidemic in both Portsmouth and Norfolk
were disinterred and, with great ceremony, were placed aboard a steamer to be returned to
their native city (The Southern Argus. 1859).
As the weather warmed, the fears of the Council members that summer would
bring another disaster became apparent. The first hint that public health would become a
medical responsibility came during an April meeting when a report of physicians was
received on the “most filthy condition” in the market house. The report had not been
initiated by the physicians, nor by the Council, but prepared rather at the request of the
Town Inspector. The report, signed by three local physicians, noted that building used for
the sale o f meat was in “comparatively good condition”, that it should be sprinkled with
lime and kept open. The Fish Market, M l of decomposing fish, was another matter. It
was to be closed, the walls were to be removed for ventilation and the market was to be
used for sales only. A group of buildings known as Talbot’s Row and surrounding lots
were found to be in a “condition highly favourable for the production of a most malignant
form o f disease, moisture abundant requiring only the heat of a summer sun, to generate a
most virulent malaria.” The physicians recommended a liberal use of lime on the lots to
“cover up entirely all offensive matter.” The attached cellars, “excessively wet and filthy”,
were to be drained (Minutes o f the Portsmouth Common Council, 4/28/56).
The report went on to recommend that all citizens renovate their cellars and sinks,
draining, filling in and liming them as “we are now on the eve of warm weather, when
unless the above sanitary regulations are observed, effluvia prejudicial to the health of the
Town, will be engendered, which may, possibly, occasion another alarming panic in our
midst.” Heat, moisture and decomposition were named as “the three great causes of
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disease” and warnings were given concerning animal and vegetable decomposition during
the summer.
The mayor, stating that he was required to bring to the Council’s attention
“anything affecting the public welfare,” reported at the next meeting that they had been
taught a lesson and recommended grading and filling various sites to prevent “the slow
and deleterious process of evaporation.” His recommendation to increase the duties of the
Town Inspector and give him more power was referred to committee. A stable in Gosport
was declared to be a “nuisance” and was to be removed.75 The Council reviewed a
petition from citizens living near the Market House that the House be left open for
ventilation. And it was determined that the President of the Council should apply to the
Norfolk County Court for permission for the town of Portsmouth to establish its own
quarantine grounds. Not surprisingly, this request later caused a jurisdictional problem
with the Norfolk Board of Health which operated its own quarantine grounds. The
problem was finally referred to the State’s Attorney. The motivation for a Portsmouth
quarantine ground is not clear. It can be speculated that the Council had gained
information concerning an investigative report to be published the following year that
damned the captain o f the Ben Franklin for lying to the Norfolk quarantine officer.
According to letters sent by the ship’s engineer to a committee of physicians, the
ship was exposed to a particularly virulent epidemic in St. Thomas during a lengthy
layover and three cases and two deaths from yellow fever occurred during the voyage.
This was confirmed by a passenger on the ship who had spent a number of years in the
West Indies and knew the disease well. Moreover, a member of the crew lay dying from
yellow fever at the Norfolk marine hospital even as the Ben Franklin first lay at anchor in
the quarantine grounds. There were apparently two other cases of yellow fever in the

75 Livestock seemed to be common in Gosport. Later in the year, the Council granted a
request from the Methodist Episcopal Church in Gosport to erect a fence to keep out cattle. But
other areas of the town had problems with animals also. In August, 1857, the Council ordered
that hogs and goats belonging to persons residing in Norfolk County, but not in Portsmouth, were
to be rounded up and sold within five days if not claimed by their owners. Later that same year,
there was a report o f “hogs running at large.”
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ship’s crew before that of the boiler repairman and additional cases after the ship was sent
back to the quarantine grounds. Additionally, there was a report of two men who boarded
the ship in quarantine, stayed overnight and sickened and died of yellow fever. (This was
reported by Dr. Schoolfield.) While that may have been the case, the fact that both these
victims were black raises suspicions. Given the low mortality rate of the disease in
African-Americans, it seems unlikely that both would die of the disease ('Report on the
Origin of the Yellow Fever in Norfolk during the Summer of 18551. Certainly any leak of
this kind of information would dampen faith in the Norfolk quarantine procedures.
As the year wore on, the Council continued acting to prevent another epidemic.
The walls of the Market House were indeed removed (from April to October). Most
important, in July (Minutes of the Portsmouth Common Council, 7/1/56), a Board of
Health was finally established.76 The Board was to consist of Portsmouth citizens (in
practice, white males) and was to meet every week from March to November and every
two weeks the remainder of the year. In a short-lived ordinance (stricken at the end of
July) that was certain to occasion competition with the Town Inspector, the Board was to
“inspect all parts of the town” every week and report nuisances to the mayor. They were
given authority to enter houses and enclosures, inspect and order abatement o f various
problems. Fines were to be levied against offenders. A physician was to be elected
annually as Health Officer “to provide against the introduction and spreading of infectious
and pestilential diseases as hereinafter directed.” The Health Officer was

required to visit all vessels coming from any place, from which the Board of Health

76 In this action, the Council was following an established tradition. Boards of Health
were commonly established after epidemics in American cities. The very first such board was
established by the city of Philadelphia after its 1793 experience (Tobey, 1930, pp. 74, 77). In the
south, the Boards of Health were civic rather than state-based. Their activities, even their
existences, waxed and waned with the occurrence of urban epidemics (Humphreys, 1992, p. 47).
The great yellow fever epidemic o f 1878 occasioned the formation of a National Board of Health
(Tobey, 1930, pp. 74,77). The Report of the Portsmouth Relief Association (pp. 184-5) also
recommended the creation o f a Board of Health although the authors also predicted that there
was very little possibility of the return of the pestilence.
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shall deem it possible that a contagious or pestilential disease might be introduced,
and to detain the same when necessary, and the Quarantine Ground for the town of
Portsmouth, which shall be with the assent of the County Court of Norfolk...

Ships having on board any person with contagious disease, any person who died on the
voyage of contagious disease, or coming from a sickly port or place without clean bills of
health were to come to the Quarantine Grounds and fly the traditional oblong yellow
quarantine flag. Goods or infected persons from these ships were not to be off-loaded
without the Health Officer’s approval. Persons leaving vessels illegally were to be
detained by force. Vessel captains were required to pay $2.00 (later raised to $5.00) for
the inspection.
Penalties consisted of a schedule of fines - for the masters of vessels, for pilots
who failed to conduct vessels to the Quarantine Grounds, for persons boarding the
affected ships without permission. Ships arriving having damaged cargo and arriving
between May and November, and any ships thought to be infected were to be “purified”.77
By August, the Council realized the problems occasioned by investing the Town
Inspector and the Board of Health with identical duties and power. The office of
Inspector was essentially folded into the Board of Health with both the Inspector and the
Health Officer becoming executive officers of that body. Over the long term, this solution
proved wanting. In December of the following year, the entire Board resigned over a
dispute with the Inspector. The Board won, and the ordinance was re-written stating that
the Town Inspector was required to obey all orders from the Board. That was not enough
for the Board members who resigned again. The Council refused to accept their
resignations. The matter was finally settled by giving the Board the authority to hire and
fire the Town Inspector and to have him serve on a month-to-month basis.

77 The process of purification, though apparently clear to members of the Council, are not
so clear to us. Generally, such measures included ventilation, general cleaning, removal of
decomposing matter, removal and/or cleaning of bedding and clothing, and the laying down of
lime.
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By September, 1856, the Council, no doubt much relieved that they had so far seen no
yellow fever, but still wary, instituted a requirement for the town burying grounds to
report deaths weekly to the Health Officer. Information on disease, age, sex, color and
location o f grave was required. In November, more health measures were taken. Bids
were to be taken from private contractors for garbage removal. The Board of Health
proposed that all docks should be dredged and a cart was given to the Town Inspector to
be used during the winter.
After a number of meetings cancelled due to lack of a quorum, the Council once
more turned its attention to health measures in February. The Board of Health declared
the need for a pesthouse and proposed that the Health Officer should be salaried. In
March, it was agreed that the Health Officer should receive $300 per year (including
retroactive pay) and should be responsible for care in the pesthouse. The pesthouse
which was leased by the town came under the authority of the Board of Health rather than
the Health Officer when the latter resigned the following month. As to the pesthouse
itself, a fee schedule was established. Patients were to pay $1.00 per day for medical
attendance and $4.00 per week for medicines, nursing and food. Blacks could be admitted
to the pesthouse with masters paying the fees for slaves and free blacks allowed to work
their debt off either in the pesthouse itself or “upon the streets of the town” or “elsewhere
in public work” (Minutes of the Portsmouth Common Council, 3/4/57).
Health concerns continued with the passage of the seasons. The Board o f Health
began to interact with the long-standing Committee on the Streets with regard to the
streets’ conditions. Some responsibilities that might previously have been the
Committee’s responsibility were now assumed by the Board. In July, the Board was
authorized to “procure a trainload o f dirt” and place it at the disposal of the Town
Inspector and to “collect the amount of purchase money from sale of the same.” Filling
low places with dirt was considered a sanitary measure. One of these was apparently what
the Board called the “ravine” of Effingham Street (Minutes of the Portsmouth Common
Council, 9/1/57).
The following year, the Board took quick action concerning an apparently short131
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lived smallpox threat. A single case was reported. The house in which the victim lived
and the area in which the house was situated were quickly isolated, and a special
committee was appointed to address the threat of an epidemic that never materialized.
Although we have emphasized the health- related activities of the Council, other
town business continued apace. Railroad issues continued to appear on the agenda. The
new gas lighting was found to be insufficient. More fire wardens were appointed and
rewards were posted for arsonists. The public cemetery was improved. Bids were
accepted to build a new Market House and later, plans were made for a new firehouse.
Problems in policing the town continued also. More power was given to the Mayor in
regard to policing and reports o f delinquent officers became his responsibility. In 1857,
the police force stood at a captain and six watchmen. In September of that year, it was
clear that problems with the police had not ended. A volunteer militia was contracted for
$3000 to be the town guard (along with two daytime police officers). The militia
apparently found police duty unaccommodating and broke the contract in about a month.
And the police problems continued. The mayor reported that members of the night watch
were found sleeping or at home when they were supposed to be on duty. They were
disciplined with fines and reprimands. A hint of the coming storm came during the
summer o f 1857 when the Council gave permission (and funding of $250) to the Virginia
Volunteers for a military encampment. The Volunteers’ petition spoke of being

prepared to defend our rights...from foreign and domestic foe...to keep in awe and
subjection our slaves who might (in the absence of such military force) be induced
by a secret and insidious enemy to become insubordinate and to violate the laws of
the Commonwealth (Minutes of the Portsmouth Common Council. 6/22/57).

The encampment was viewed by the Council as a tourist attraction.
The record of the Portsmouth Common Council in the years following the
epidemic demonstrates a growing professionalization in governing. There is significant
growth in committee work. The Council developed a routine procedure of having
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sponsors announce ordinances they planned to introduce in advance giving Council
members the opportunity to reflect before voting. The practice may also indicate less
social communication between members, but it also allowed for greater transparency in
municipal affairs. Public safety measures in terms of fire protection were increased and
special attention was paid to police problems. The Council may not have been able to
successfully address their difficulties with the police, but they were willing to grapple with
the issue and implement creative solutions. The Council still occasionally failed to meet
due to lack o f a quorum, but, for the first time, fines were voted for members who failed
to show up.
Duffy (1992) points out that the experiences of American cities with epidemics
eventually convinced their citizens that the public health could not be left to volunteer
groups. Cities needed to assume the responsibility for the development and
implementation o f quarantine and sanitation measures to prevent epidemics. The public
health measures taken by the Portsmouth authorities serve as an example. The assumption
o f new public health responsibilities by the Common Council and the untangling of the
authority needed to implement them provided special lessons in governance. Public health
measures as intrusive as using wardens to report nuisances are usually resisted by the
commercial interests of a municipality until a disaster occurs. Here, that had clearly
happened, but, if there were protests, they did not find their way into the Council minutes.
However, the Council had to work out the tricky questions of medical authority and police
power common to public health endeavors as well as address the usual public policy
dilemmas involved in realizing a necessity for action in the face of imperfect information.
Their measures to prevent a recurrence of the calamity did not distinguish among
competing theories of contagion, miasma, local or foreign origin. Like most municipalities
of the time, Portsmouth employed a “shotgun” approach, hygienic measures for streets
and buildings, quarantines to bar infection, and a pesthouse to limit it. Still, even with its
increased attention to expertise, the town did not collect sufficient revenues to support
additional activities such as the Board of Health and higher salaries for public officials.
Banks were approached several times for substantial loans during the period. With
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solvency still an issue only a year and a half after the epidemic, the Council requested that
the mayor convene a town meeting to petition the Legislature to incorporate as a city.
The process went speedily. Three months later, the Legislature approved the town’s
issuance o f bonds to replace the town scrip, and only a month after that, elections for new
officers under incorporation were held. Incorporation did not proceed without a few
bumps. Four Council meetings that month were not held due to lack of a quorum.
But o f greatest interest to us is the seamless interaction with the Portsmouth Relief
Association. The Association had arisen out of a failure of government, but once the crisis
was over, the Association seemed to dissolve itself into the returning municipal
administration. The Council took it upon itself to audit die Association records and to
appropriate to itself the $5000 balance. Although it was the intention of the Association
that the funds were to be spent on the orphans of the epidemic, it was seen as the
Council's decision that that be done.

Contemporary Perspectives on the Epidemiology of Yellow Fever
Those experiencing an epidemic usually seek to find an explanation of the event in
terms that offer the possibility of control. Why do some survive and some not? We
explain epidemics in terms of unprotected populations, vectors and epizootic reservoirs.
Nineteenth century survivors explained the epidemic in terms of volition, responsibility and
susceptibility. Bad, i.e. immoral behavior (e.g., intemperance) caused illness. Exposure to
bad air caused illness. Alternatively, exposure to sick people caused illness. Incorrect
living (e.g., dwelling in overcrowded, dirty tenements) caused illness. Being an outsider
(e.g., not a southerner) caused illness. (The framework for the previous discussion may be
found in Rosenberg, 1992, pp. 283-4.) Like many in our time, 19th century observers of
epidemics tended to personalize disease. Disease “invaded”, “attacked”, “claimed victims”
(Carrington, 1994 p. 9). The survivors of the Portsmouth yellow fever epidemic also
spent considerable time in analyzing the possible causes of the pestilence. Their arguments
revolved around the question of whether the steamer, Ben Franklin, had brought the fever
or not. Forrest (1856, pp. 7-8, 35) argued strongly that, since both cities “had been
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remarkably healthful for many years,” the disease must have been imported. He notes that
the first case announced was that of the boiler-maker employed on the ship, and that the
first twenty or thirty cases occurred within “a stone’s throw of the vessel.” He also argues
that the cities are “far beyond the latitude in which the fever is produced to any great
extent...” To say that the fever originated in Norfolk or Portsmouth would be to imply
that the cities were “unhealthy”- a position that Forrest clearly holds to be untrue.
In their report, The Philadelphia Relief Committee (1856, pp. 3-4) also pointed out
that the Portsmouth and Norfolk areas “have not been recently noted for any peculiar
unhealthiness” and that there had been no yellow fever epidemics in the area since 1821
(Report o f the Philadelphia Relief Committee. 1856, pp. 24-5). In this judgment, the
Report’s authors reflected the standards of the day - standards that accepted high rates of
infant and young adult mortality as common. According to the 1850 Mortality Schedule
for the town of Portsmouth (Tables 1 and 2), 33 white deaths and 13 black deaths had
occurred in Portsmouth from June, 1849 to June, 1850 (the latest year prior to the
epidemic for which these statistics are available). Most deaths were the result of
infectious disease. Nine white deaths and one black death were due to consumption.
Infant deaths (death at one year of age or less) were common, occurring in 11 out of 33
white deaths and 5 of 13 black deaths - most commonly from infant colic. The average
age for death for whites was 22 years and for blacks 34 years. Even while taking the
probability of significant error into account, these figures suggest a population that was
not ready to assume an additional disease burden.
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TABLE 1
PORTSMOUTH, VIRGINIA 1850 MORTALITY SCHEDULE
NUMBER OF DEATHS

AGE AT DEATH

WHITE

BLACK

1 year or less

11

5

2 years

2

3 years

1

4 years

1

7 years

1

11 years

1

17 years

1

19 years

1

20 years

1

25 years

1

30 years
33 years

1

37 years

1

38 years

1

46 years

1

48 years

1

49 years

1

50 years

1

60 years

1

65 years

1

70 years

1
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80 years

2

81 years

1

87 years

1

? years

1

TOTAL

32

13

MEAN AGE AT DEATH

22.4 years

34.4 years
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TABLE 2
PORTSMOUTH, VIRGINIA 1850 MORTALITY SCHEDULE
CAUSES OF DEATH

WHITE

BLACK

Abscess

1

1

Cholera

2

Chronic Gastritis

1

Congestive Fever

1

CAUSE OF DEATH

Consumption

1

Croup

1

Diarrhea

1

1

Disease of the Heart
Dropsy

1

Infant Colic

1

Inflammation of Brain

1

Fever

1

Mania Potes

1

Marasmus

1

Pneumonia

1

Old Age

2

Sulfin Gangrene

1

Typhoid Fever

1

Unknown

3

4

TOTAL

33

13
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In 21st century terms, the regular occurrence of so many deaths from infectious
disease might imply that epidemic conditions were already present in Portsmouth even
before the appearance of yellow fever. We hold AIDS to be an epidemic even though
AIDS deaths (in America) have had nowhere near the impact demonstrated by 19th century
infectious diseases considered non-epidemic at the time. Epidemics, to a great extent, are
a matter of perception. The residents of 19th century New Orleans, often called the
“necropolis of the south”, accepted an extremely high degree of mortality (in fact, the
highest mortality rate in the country even in non-epidemic times) as normal. The city’s
newspapers simply ignored the existence of disease until it became so overwhelming that
their reportage was redundant (Carrington, 1994, pp. 33-4,49).
Although there appear to be some discrepancies in the figures, the report to the
Portsmouth Common Council (the town’s elected governing body) in April, 1855 also
demonstrated a pattern o f high rates of deaths at a young age. Twenty three people were
buried in Potter’s Field. At the burying ground, 36 adults and 27 children were interred.
The ages of death for the burial ground are found in Table 3.
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TABLE 3
BURIAL GROUND INTERMENTS IN PORTSMOUTH, VIRGINIA 1855

AGE AT DEATH

NUMBER INTERRED

<1 year

18

1-20 years

10

20-40 years

3

40-50 years

6

50-74 years

17

TOTAL

54

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

The Committee also traced the onset of the epidemic to the Ben Franklin.
However, they note that Dr. Schoolfield (a member of the Common Council and later of
the Portsmouth Relief Association) had treated a case of yellow fever in Portsmouth on
June 24th, nine days before the boiler repairman was diagnosed. The authors go on to a
discussion of the local conditions thought to be necessary for the development of the
“migratory” fever. Following the sanitarian principles popular at the time, the Committee
described predisposing conditions as including “putrid masses of animal and vegetable
filth,” open sewers and damp cellars. High temperatures were also noted as a contributing
factor (Report o f the Philadelphia Relief Committee. 1856, pp. 24-5).
Although a resident of the area at the time, Schoolfield set forth his very strong
opinion that yellow fever was, in fact, a local disease, not brought in by outsiders at all.
He ascribed the origin o f the disease in Portsmouth to:

•

“the immense amount of vegetable matter [at the Page and Allen wharf],
acted upon by water and extreme heat,”

•

the filthy condition of Fish Row which made the residents “peculiarly
susceptible to the influence of the malaria,”

•

heavy rains in April and May followed by drought,

•

calm to light southerly winds,

•

a long period of “continuously low tides,” and

•

extreme heat in July and August.

The heat, the drought, and the low tides were of particular importance since the “effluvia”
that caused the disease was “exhaled” from mud (Report of the Portsmouth Relief
Association. 1856, p. 118). In the light of how important the influences of heat and water
were considered to be, it is surprising that Dr. Schoolfield made no mention o f the
marshes that cut up the back section of the town (Report on the Origin of the Yellow
Fever in Norfolk during the Summer of 18551. However, Schoolfield is not slow to
emphasize that the “filthy and disgusting” conditions of the overcrowded Irish
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neighborhood in Gosport (Fish Row, Leigh’s Row) were well calculated to feed a
pestilence if not to breed one. Citizens of Norfolk also blamed residents of Fish/Leigh’s
Row for bringing the epidemic to their city by fleeing to their kinsman’s neighborhood of
Barry’s Row in that city (Armstrong). The Committee of Physicians who reported on the
epidemic in Norfolk, though blaming the Ben Franklin for the sickness, strongly advised
that in the case o f another epidemic, the city should

remove all persons sick of yellow fever as far as possible from a crowded city
population, and especially from that of the laboring Irish, who now abound in
Norfolk (Report on the Origin of the Yellow Fever in Norfolk during the Summer
o f 1855.1857).

Although he disagreed with Schoolfield concerning the presence of unusual
climatic conditions, Armstrong (a contemporary Norfolk clergyman) also analyzed the
possible causes o f the epidemic in terms of weather, giving special attention to wind
conditions. He identified the points o f origin for the epidemic (for both Norfolk and
Portsmouth) as the Page and Allen Shipyard, the case diagnosed by Dr. Schoolfield June
24th and Barry’s Row, the Irish section of Norfolk, noting that joining these points yielded
an equilateral triangle. Then, he declared that the summer’s prevailing winds had followed
a course that bisected the triangle south to north. Armstrong leaves it to the reader’s
imagination as to the import of the wind direction. However, he comes down strongly on
the side o f yellow fever being of local origin, citing the case of an infected ship that had
moored in the harbor in 1854 without sparking an epidemic as well as the fact that those
fleeing from the epidemic area did not occasion epidemics in their destinations. Perhaps
most striking in his analysis is his agreement with a remark by William Fergusson, a
Scottish physician with 20 years experience in the West Indies, that yellow fever is “a
concomitant of the old slave trade.”
Holcomb (1930, p. 269) states that, although there was at first an inclination in
both cities to connect the disease with the visit of the Ben Franklin, “afterward and little
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by little, the conviction grew that there was some other cause.” However, his only
evidence for this statement lies in the work of Dr. Schoolfield - a work contemporary with
the epidemic itself. Holcomb (p. 272), writing with foil knowledge of the role of the
mosquito as vector is of the opinion that “the Ben Franklin had all to do with it.”
Certainly the visit of the ship must be regarded with a high index of suspicion.
A number of physicians also raised the possibility of the presence of yellow fever in
the Portsmouth area earlier than July 8th. Williman (1856) maintained that a crewman (or
possibly a passenger) from the ship had been admitted to the Marine Hospital in Norfolk
for treatment for yellow fever June 21st. Dr. Schoolfield, a member o f the Common
Council, attended a case o f yellow fever about one mile from Portsmouth as early as June
24th. Holcomb reports this case as being within sight of the Ben Franklin’s anchorage and
Armstrong reports the patient as having been bedridden for months and therefore unlikely
to have been infected away from her home. A certain Dr. Trugien was called to see three
cases o f yellow fever near the Page and Allen’s wharf on June 30th. One of the persons
who nursed these cases was, herself, diagnosed with yellow fever only a week later
(Report o f the Portsmouth Relief Association. 1856, pp. 120,122-3). Williman (p. 170)
reported that between the first and the tenth of July, inhabitants of Lee’s Row (or Leigh’s
Row), a tenement inhabited by Irish immigrants and located just opposite the Page and
Allen Shipyard in Gosport, became ill. From here, he states, “in various radiating lines,
the progress of the epidemic can be traced...” Schoolfield also reported the presence of
the disease on Leigh’s Row at the same time that the boiler repairman was ill (Report of
the Portsmouth Relief Association, p. 123), and Holcomb (p. 257) reports the deaths of
two men who boarded the Ben Franklin to deliver wood. Duffy (1966 p. 11) suggests
that in New Orleans, physicians identifying an early case of yellow fever were liable to be
denounced for “needlessly arousing public apprehension.” Perhaps this kind of fear kept
local physicians from reporting the earlier cases and the boiler repairman constituted a
threshold beyond which they were unwilling to keep silent. It is also possible that the
naval physicians were called to examine this particular case to lend credibility to the
diagnosis. These physicians had had experience with the disease which can be difficult to
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diagnose in its early stages (www.sho.int/inf-fs/en/factlOOhtml~). Additionally, military
physicians had little to fear from any possible wrath o f the Common Council. There may
be another factor at work here - that of “otherness.” It was believed at the time that
southerners were inured to yellow fever - that “outsiders” were the population at risk..
The June 24th case was a woman who had recently moved to Virginia from New Jersey
(Report of the Portsmouth Relief Association, pp. 120-1). The Gosport cases occurred
among Irish immigrants. The boiler repairman, however, was southern. He came from
Richmond.
With regard to yellow fever, configuration, contagion and predisposition were all
thought to play a part by the physicians of the time - although there was considerable
disagreement as to the relative importance of each. Moreover, the theories tended to
become intertwined in their application. The belief that “outsiders” were more likely to
contract the disease mirrored the susceptibility point of view. But Dr. Schoolfield’s
thoughts concerning the capacity o f outsiders (the Irish) to enhance contagion by their
environmental conditions and the environmental conditions themselves to cause the
epidemic demonstrate the contemporary difficulties in sorting out etiologies. In any case,
by mid-century, there was some understanding that yellow fever seemed to be
transportable, particularly by ships arriving from infected areas (Rosenberg, 1992). In
their report on the yellow fever epidemic in Norfolk, a Committee o f Physicians came
down firmly on the side of those who believed the disease had arrived at the port aboard
the Ben Franklin. Indeed, they specifically addressed the case that Dr. Schoolfield had
attended June 24th. While agreeing with his diagnosis, the Committee denied that the
malaria (bad air) arising from the marshes near her home could have been responsible.
They noted that the quarantine grounds where the infected ship had anchored were only a
mile from the house and that malaria blown from the ship had caused the infection - a
plausible theory considering that a case of the disease had occurred in the same house in
1854 when another infected ship, the Chimere, had lain at anchor at the same location.
Like Dr. Schoolfield, they noted the presence of the disease in Gosport in late June, but
unlike him, they ascribed those cases to their proximity (about 100 yards) to the
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quarantined ship (Report on the Origin of the Yellow Fever in Norfolk during the Summer
of 1855.1857). Armstrong (1856), an educated layman, demonstrates a number of
common medical beliefs of the time in his memoir of the epidemic in Norfolk. These
included the notion that the cause was a type of poison (and therefore not contagious),
that there could be a “scattering” of cases not leading to an epidemic, that the disease was
transportable (a “traveling epidemic”), that the fever could be of a “mild and manageable”
or “malignant” type, that Norfolk was clean and therefore healthy, that deaths could be
caused by “imprudent” behavior. Not incidentally, he also points out the difficulties
encountered by the first Norfolk physician to encounter the disease - the accusations that,
on the one hand, he was not prompt enough in reporting the disease, and on the other
hand, the implication that his diagnoses of the fever were imagined.
Portsmouth’s initial response to the epidemic followed a classic pattern described
by Rosenberg (1992, pp. 280-287). First, the town was slow to recognize first that there
was yellow fever present, then slow to acknowledge that an outbreak had become an
epidemic. Although there was a degree of fear, there was no panic while the cases were
confined to the Gosport area. Gosport was a discrete area connected to the town by a
bridge. Moreover, Gosport residents were unlike the population of Portsmouth proper.
Whether one subscribed to theories of contagion or miasma, isolating Gosport would
seem to eliminate the threat to the more comfortable citizens of Portsmouth.
Additionally, the fact that much of the population of Gosport (particularly the Irish)
belonged to marginalized groups lessened concern about their fate. Mass flight did not
begin until cases were clearly originating in Portsmouth itself. However, as the epidemic
escalated, public responses to its progression based on contemporary theories of epidemic
diseases were challenged and proved ineffectual.

Discussion
The Portsmouth yellow fever experience brings together many threads of
antebellum life. Portsmouth was a town in a marginal economic condition located in a
state in the same situation. At this distance in time, we can clearly recognize the racism,
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sexism, and ethno-centrism that characterized its population’s relationships. Town
government might be generously characterized as semi-professional. The town leaders
addressed the crisis in terms o f their own experience using the best science of the time.
The experience demonstrated a failure of government (unrecognized at the time) and the
success o f a hastily assembled ad hoc group. In the epidemic’s aftermath, the Common
Council’s efforts to prevent another outbreak contributed to a growing professionalization
o f government.
Changes in attitudes are more difficult to assess than ordinances passed by the
post-epidemic Common council; however, there is evidence to suggest that some attitudes
toward Irish immigrants may have softened in the wake of the crisis. Portsmouth residents
might have selected a number of factors to blame for the yellow fever visitation - the Ben
Franklin’s captain, the doctors who could do so little for them, the Council members who
fled the city. But the circumstance they came closest to blaming was the presence of the
Irish. In this, they were not unlike other Americans of the time. Irish immigrants, fleeing
from starvation in their homeland in great numbers, by mid-century had become objects of
derision and intolerance in their new land. Their desperate poverty set them apart and
their religion fed anti-papist bigotry. The extent of prejudice against the Irish in
Portsmouth is not clear, but across the water in Norfolk, the Know- Nothing party was a
political power (although the mayor was Catholic), and anti-Irish sentiment resulted in the
burning o f Irish homes and businesses when the epidemic began there (Gaidmore).
The heroic actions of the Catholic clergy and especially of the Sisters of Charity in both
Portsmouth and Norfolk may have mitigated the anti-papist sentiment fueling the prejudice
against the Irish. The Know-Nothing senator Robert M.T. Hunter was quoted in the
Washington Sentinel after the epidemic.

But, fellow citizens, I went a little too far, when I said it was proposed to
proscribe Catholics from all offices in this country. There are some offices which
sons and daughters o f the Church are still considered competent to discharge, I
mean the offices of Christian charity, of ministration o f the sick. The Sisters of
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Charity may enter yon pest-house, from whose dread portals the bravest and
strongest man quails and shrinks; she may breathe there the breath of pestilence
which walks abroad, in that mansion of misery, in order to minister to disease
where it is most loathsome, and to relieve suffering where it is most helpless
(Hunter, Editorial, Washington Sentinel. August 9,1855 cited in Nelson p. 41)

Even with this change in sentiment, it seems hardly likely that Senator Hunter would have
supported Catholic political ambitions, but he did at least credit a brave and selfless act.
With the cataclysm of the Civil War descending on the town so soon after the
yellow fever experience, it is not feasible to judge any long term effects of the epidemic.
We do know that the middle years of the 19th century marked the high point o f yellow
fever in the American south (Carrigan, 1994, p. 79). For the yellow fever capital, New
Orleans, the occupation of the Civil War, which might have been expected to bring a flood
o f new victims, was actually a healthy experience. General Benjamin F. Butler, the first
general of the occupying forces, cleaned up the streets and instituted a rigorous
quarantine. Although some of the city’s citizens prayed for yellow fever to return to
ravage their conquerors, the army’s public health measures held and few cases of the fever
were reported (Carrigan, 1994, pp. 82-9). Hie epidemic of 1878 which traveled up the
Mississippi was so devastating as to cause the federal government to create a short-lived
National Board of Health. Hie last American epidemic of yellow fever occurred in 1905
(Carrigan, 1994).
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CONCLUSIONS
The Application of Systems Theory to the Portsmouth Epidemic Experience
The framework for this paper is systems theory as elaborated by Anderson and
Carter. The basis of systems theory is the notion of parts and the whole and the
interrelatedness of both. Anderson and Carter examine the theory as it relates to: cultures,
communities, organizations, groups, families, and the person. The system is dynamic. At
any time, each element of the system is interacting with other elements as well as with the
whole system and external systems.
As noted above, our intent was to utilize systems theory as a framework for the
examination of the events of the epidemic, realizing that the strengths of the theory (its
comprehensive sweep, its promise of an organizational and explanatory model) must be
tempered with an understanding that theories may constrain reality as much as explain it.
That said, our initial research question asked whether systems theory as elucidated by
Carter and Anderson could help us to understand the events of the epidemic.
A system is comprised of a number of elements: communities, organizations,
groups, families and the person. As the research progressed, two major findings became
evident. First, the system that was the town of Portsmouth altered as the stress of the
epidemic changed its dynamics. The government disappeared. Families fled. Individuals
were unable to care for themselves. Institutions such as churches fragmented. Borders
closed. Commerce ceased. Second, as other system elements were diminished by the
crisis, an organization (the Portsmouth Relief Association) arose, dominated the system
and, in the end, preserved it. This focused the attention o f the writer on the nature and
activities of the Association.
Barton (1970, p. 38) has noted that social systems can be expected to maintain
themselves in times o f moderate change and stress. Indeed, the capacity to cope with
stress would seem to be essential to any long-lived system. However, the speed o f onset
and the duration of the stress agent greatly affects the capacity of the system to respond
successfully. Changes that occur without warning are more likely to create loss and vitiate
the capacity to respond than those that give warning and allow time to prepare. Stresses
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that are recurring or prolonged may allow the system to adapt, but may also drain its
resources over time. A sudden, brief impact may have long-lasting effects, but recovery
can proceed without additional crises (Barton, p. 40). Clearly, for Portsmouth, its
experience with epidemic yellow fever was sudden and brief. Coming without warning, it
did indeed destroy the existing system’s capacity to respond. Families fled. Commerce
ceased. Most important, the Portsmouth Common Council, the organization that might
have been expected to mount a response, dissolved. In this, the Portsmouth system
differed considerably from a city such as New Orleans where yellow fever was an
expected epidemic experience and the government regularly contracted out for needed
services.
Barton (p. 125) argues that when a disaster is sudden and occurs on a large scale,
an emergency social system has to be formed. Like any other system, it must be organized
to produce outputs. Seen from this perspective, it should then be expected that the
organizational element in Anderson and Carter’s description of a social system would
become the dominant component in the system during the epidemic. And, indeed, that is
what happened.
As described above, visitors to Portsmouth described a situation o f social
disintegration and lack of energy {entropy) during the epidemic. Anderson and Carter (p.
9) have described energy as the “capacity for action” or the “power to effect change.”
Operationally, energy consists o f exchanges of both information and resources both
internal and external to the system. During the epidemic, the Portsmouth Relief
Association became the focus of the exchange of both information and resources (e.g.,
receiving communications from the outside, receiving donations, maintaining stores for
distribution o f goods), thus becoming the most effective force (perhaps the only effective
force) for the maintenance o f synergy (interaction among system components) in the
system. Did the Association manage to maintain the town in a “steady state” as described
by Anderson and Carter? It could be argued that indeed it did. During the epidemic, the
system did not in fact collapse although it certainly did not function as usual. Cultural
norms were, for the most part, maintained. Marginalized groups remained marginalized.
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White males continued to control the town. Although commerce as usual collapsed,
necessary goods were delivered and distributed. Insofar as possible, certain social
institutions did continue to function although in a distorted fashion. At least some clergy
continued to see to their congregations. Thanks at least in part to the hardworking town
gravedigger, bodies were buried in a reasonably timely manner if not in the customary
fashion. Enabled by generous subsidies from the Relief Association, the Naval Hospital
expanded its normal functions and assumed substantial responsibility for caring for some
o f the civilian population. More telling is the fact that the system quickly returned to its
previous state once the emergency was over. The Common Council resumed its
functions. Families returned. Commerce resumed. Social classes and norms remained
unchanged.
The establishment of extreme physical system boundaries are a distinctive feature
in epidemics. Nearby and even distant locales established quarantines in an attempt to
contain the epidemic and the population thought to be carrying it in the circumscribed area
o f Portsmouth itself. Nonetheless, most of the population managed to flee. Traffic of all
kinds that normally crossed the boundary into the town also became constricted.
Desperately needed food and supplies slowed to a trickle. A limited number of volunteers
became the town’s only visitors. The Relief Association had little control over those who
left, but became the conduit for managing incoming people and goods. The Association
dealt both with other organizations (e.g., the Howard Association in Norfolk, the
Philadelphia Relief Committee) and with individuals who wished to contribute. However,
in terms of dealing with internal groups, the Association’s activities appear to have been
more personal (e.g., working with Father Devlin rather than the Catholic Church, personal
hiring of drivers).
The Portsmouth Relief Association and the government of the town of Portsmouth
meet the definition of an organization, i.e., they were goal-directed. Anderson and
Carter’s description of systems theory allows us to see how organizations function within
an intact system. It, therefore, contributes to our understanding of the nature of the town
o f Portsmouth and the nature of the government, particularly the organization of the
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Common Council, at the start of the epidemic. What we see during the epidemic is a
major insult to the system, a fall in energy level, and an increase in entropy. Using sources
to supplement Anderson and Carter’s description allows us to understand that an
organization such as the Relief Association might be expected to be the element of the
system that could dominate the system to address its new and overwhelming needs. With
the end of the epidemic, the organization that had dominated the town disappeared, and
the system re-knitted itself with the government resuming its place as an element in the
system.
The theory gives us a workable analytic framework to examine the main events of
the epidemic. For instance, it allows us to look specifically for such phenomena as energy
exchange, boundary definition, system identity and autonomy. Carter and Anderson
define a border as occurring when the intensity o f energy one side is greater than the
intensity o f energy on the other side. This is somewhat confusing, but their meaning
becomes clearer when they note that, if boundaries were completely open, there would be
no way to distinguish between systems and that a completely closed system would cease
to exist. One of the most striking examples of the change in boundaries during the
epidemic came with the establishment of quarantines. This is a particular threat to any
port city. Port cities live on the constant traffic between themselves and the outer world.
The closing o f this particular boundary will indeed cause the system to cease to exist.
That may well have happened to Portsmouth except for the extraordinary efforts of the
Portsmouth Relief Association within the town and the many outside organizations,
communities and individuals that came to the town’s assistance. As documented in their
Report, members of the Association were in daily communication with those who were
supplying them with provisions and personnel. Although port traffic ceased, arrangements
were made to allow the steamship Coffee to carry in supplies. The boundary between
Portsmouth and the outside world changed, but it did not cease to exist. The preservation
o f the permeability of the boundary helped to ensure the survival o f the town.
The town’s identity and autonomy was preserved largely by the activities of the
Portsmouth Relief Association. In addition to their accomplishments in ensuring survival,
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the Association preserved the social structure and culture of the community. The
Portsmouth Common Council was able to resume its duties in a community where it was
still accepted as the legitimate authority. The only social dislocation it needed to address
was the filling of vacant positions. The town after the epidemic remained essentially the
same as before the sickness.
Even as a 19th century organization, the Relief Association exhibited a number of
modem characteristics that enabled it to deal with a chaotic situation. Its lack of
hierarchy, its common understanding of the environment, its apparent absence o f rules and
structure enabled it to meet the crises of each new day with efficiency and dispatch. But
even as it demonstrated its modernity, it should be noted that the Association was very
much an antebellum organization in its expectations. Its members represented the
dominant group in the society. They expected that those who could afford to flee would
do so. They expected that women should be a protected class and were therefore
astonished by the actions of the Sisters of Charity who responded to their calls for
assistance. They expected that the poorest in the society would have had something to do
with the origin o f the epidemic, and they expected that those they had enslaved would be
eager to tend to those who had enslaved them.
A hallmark of organizations is their identifiable outputs. The detailed budget in the
Association’s report allows us to identify how the organization allocated its resources. It
is considerably more difficult to assess the impact of the organization’s work. On the face
o f it, it is difficult to see how the town would have survived the epidemic with its social
institutions intact if the Association or a similar organization had not come forth to
provide leadership and management. However, this conclusion, no matter how reasonable
it appears, cannot be evaluated. What is more apparent from the town records in the
period following the epidemic is how little attention the government paid to the work of
the A ssociation. Beyond auditing the accounts, the Common Council seem ed to have

little interest in how the crisis was managed. Although the Council took measures to
prevent another epidemic (e.g., the establishment of a Board o f Health), no thought seems
to have been given to the management of another crisis if it did occur. Fortunately, it did
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not. The Portsmouth epidemic was a unique event in the histoiy of the town.

Background o f Organizations
The prominence o f the Portsmouth Relief Association in the town during the
epidemic demands a closer look at organizations and their place during similar
phenomena. Organizations are o f ancient provenance. They were employed by the
Pharaohs to build pyramids and by the emperors of China to construct irrigation systems.
The organization of the Roman Catholic Church saw Europe through the difficulties o f the
medieval age (Etzioni, 1964, pp. 1-2). Anderson and Carter state that an organization is
“a social system whose purpose is the achievement of specific, explicit goals.” In this
aspect, the nature o f the Portsmouth Relief Association as an organization is undeniable.
The goal was survival of their town under the worst of circumstances. To fully
comprehend the achievement of the Association in meeting this goal, we might reflect on
what might have happened had this organization not come together.
Again, Thucydides provides the classic description of the social consequences of
the dissolution of control during time of the plague.

For the catastrophe was so overwhelming that men, not knowing what would
happen next to them, became indifferent to every rule of religion or law... Athens
owed to the plague the beginnings of a state o f unprecedented lawlessness. Seeing
how quick and abrupt were the changes of fortune which came to the rich who
suddenly died and to those who had previously been penniless but now inherited
their wealth, people now began openly to venture on acts of self-indulgence which
before then they used to keep dark. Thus they resolved to spend their money
quickly and to spend it on pleasure, since money and life alike seemed equally
ephemeral. As for what is called honour, no one showed himself willing to abide
by its laws, so doubtful was it whether one would survive to enjoy the name for it.
It was generally agreed that what was both honourable and valuable was the
pleasure o f the moment and everything that might conceivably contribute to that
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pleasure. No fear o f god or law of man had a restraining influence. As for the
gods, it seemed to be the same thing whether one worshiped them or not, when
one saw the good and the bad dying indiscriminately. As for offences against
human law, no one expected to live long enough to be brought to trial and
punished: instead everyone felt that already a far heavier sentence had been passed
on him and was hanging over him, and that before the time for its execution
arrived it was only natural to get some pleasure out of life.

We cannot know what might have occurred in the absence of the Relief Association or a
like organization. But we do know that Portsmouth did not descend into the same state of
civil collapse as the Athenians.

Activities of the Portsmouth Relief Association
On the 5th o f February, 1856, the Portsmouth Relief Association presented it report
to the Portsmouth Common Council and requested that the Council audit its accounts.
From a 21st century perspective, this seems a surprising event. Many on the Council had
deserted the town. Seven men who had remained had taken it upon themselves to form a
de facto government, maintain order, care for the sick, and bury the dead. Now the
Association, which had seamlessly ceded authority back to the Council at the end of the
epidemic requested that body to review and approve its works.
The Association began its report with expressions of gratitude to “the citizens of
every section o f our country” who had contributed money, goods, and services to “a dying
community” (Report of the Portsmouth Relief Association, p 10). Thanks were expressly
given to a number of men by name - the head of the Seaboard and Roanoke Railroad
Company, men who had headed relief efforts from other cities, and physicians at the Naval
Hospital, suggesting that personal, rather than institutional relationships were thought to
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be the drivers of organization and action.78 A notable exception is the formal language use
when describing actions o f the federal government. However, its agents, namely the
physicians at the Naval Hospital were personally known and warmly regarded.
Unfortunately, the Report does not recount how or even when the Association was
formed. The writers describe how the epidemic had seized upon the community when
totally unprepared for it. The whole population was seized by panic. There was no place
prepared for the reception o f the indigent sick; and from want of knowledge of the
character of the disease, it was next to impossible to procure competent nurses.79 All
merchantile pursuits and mechanical operations having been brought to a close-the wages
o f labor having been stopped, and the stores having been closed, the Association at the
very threshold found its hands full (pp. 12-3).
The Report states that the “first need” was “supplied by the consent of the
Government to the use of the Naval Hospital; and the Association at once proceeded to
afford all the relief in their power to alleviate the suffering caused by the want of food and
nursing” (Report o f the Portsmouth Relief Association, p. 13). We know that the
Common Council met on the 2nd of August, noted that the use of the Naval Hospital had
been obtained and added members to the Sanitary Committee. (Unlike the first three
appointments, the new members were not members of the Council.) Their last meeting
was August 7th when they voted additional funds for the use of the Sanitary Committee.
Mass flight started from the town the first week in August when it was recognized that the

78 It is notable that the men o f the Association directed their gratitude only to other men.
The attitude o f the Relief Association members toward women is well-expressed in their remarks
concerning the work of the Sisters of Charity. They were praised for their “womanly sympathy”
and their “entire immolation of self on the altar of charity” (Report of the Portsmouth Relief
Association, p. 71). Indeed, the documents of the time (and even of somewhat later times) rarely
mention women as individuals. For example, in 1890, a long-time Portsmouth resident, compiled
a list o f people in the neighborhoods he knew as a child. With the notable exception of a rare
female shopkeeper (both black and white), women were described only by whom they married
(Foreman, 1911).
79 The term “indigent sick” expresses the mid-19th century belief that middle class patients
should be cared for at home. Hospitals were for poor people.
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epidemic was not confined to Gosport. By the middle of the month, it was reported that
only one Council member (possibly Dr. Schoolfield) remained in the town. However, the
Sanitary Committee was likely gone by then. One member of the Committee died during
the epidemic, although we do not know when. The other members are found neither on
the roster of the Relief Association nor on the list o f the dead. The Portsmouth Transcript
reported that on September 25th, the Common Council was without a quorum, but “those
o f them who remain, cooperated with by a few citizens, have undertaken the management
o f affairs.” However, it is unlikely that nearly six weeks passed with no organized relief.
The wording of the Association’s Report, “..the first need was supplied by the consent of
the Government to the use of the Naval Hospital; and the Association at once [italics
mine] proceeded to afford all the relief in their power to alleviate the suffering caused by
the want of food and nursing.” implies that the Association was founded close to the
opening o f the Naval Hospital to civilian patients and when food shortages were seen.
The quarantines that would have prevented food from arriving were established early in
August. The mass flight that occurred at that same time would have impaired the food
distribution system. Food became scarcer as the month progressed. By the end of
August, near famine conditions prevailed. It is reasonable to speculate that the
Association took control of the situation sometime near the middle of the month.
In any case, when the Association did begin its work, its first action was to district
the town into wards and to appoint a committee for each ward. It was the duty of the
committees to “seek out the sick and destitute.”

A central office was opened, at which daily sessions were held. For the supply of
provisions, articles of diet and clothing, stores were rented and store-keepers
placed in them. As fast as goods arrived they were sent to the stores to be issued
to those in need, on the orders of the Ward Committees, or o f the members of the
Association. Dietetics and cordials were gratuitously supplied on all the
physician’s requisitions” (Report of the Portsmouth Relief Association, p. 13).
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In these short sentences, we see the bones of the organization - a core group with
decentralized authority and maintenance of societal norms (such as keeping normal sites of
commerce and respecting prescriptive authority) to attain its basic goal of survival. It was
not enough for the Association to create an organization, it was necessary to continually
recreate it. All four o f the shopkeepers at the Provision Store fell ill and three died. All
the remaining town apothecaries also fell ill. The Association replaced them with
volunteers from abroad. All of these also became ill and four died.
The Association took responsibility for all functions, both commercial and official,
that would enable the town to function at the most basic level. Transportation, for
example, proved to be a major problem, especially transport to the Naval Hospital for the
sick. There was also the matter o f housing for the incoming volunteers. First, they were
accommodated at a private residence-later at a hotel. Needs changed as the epidemic
progressed. The Association opened an orphanage, placed it under the superintendence of
the Sisters o f Charity, then sent the children to Richmond when the Sisters caring for them
became victims of the epidemic themselves. One of the Association’s most pressing
responsibilities was procuring nursing services. In this the Association’s Report came
down firmly on the side of the disease’s being miasma-based. Indeed, the Association
attributed its difficulties in finding nurses to the fact that the people of the town, not being
experienced in yellow fever visitations, were ignorant of its non-contagious nature. “It
was hard to persuade them that there was no more danger in nursing the sick, than there
was in breathing the atmosphere in the streets” (Report of the Portsmouth Relief
Association, p. 15). Their efforts in burying the dead were eased by the heroic actions of
Bob Butt.
Amazingly, the Association was apologetic for the amount of funds they had
expended. They complained o f extortionate payments being demanded by nurses and
drivers. The Report stated that “the Association endeavored to get along with as little
expenditure of money as possible” (Report of the Portsmouth Relief Association, p. 15).
It is not clear why the members of the Association felt so constrained. For Common
Council members, used to dealing with severe budget constraints, the attention to
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economy was ingrained. That this habit obtained even during a catastrophic situation
suggests that the Association felt that they were custodians of public funds and therefore
responsible to the town for their wise use.

“...when the amount expended is contemplated, and the circumstances by which
they were surrounded taken into consideration, it is not probable that another
organization could have done with less. Emergencies which could not have been
perceived were constantly arising, which had to be met at once. Personal help was
continually in demand, and this was only to be had at exorbitant rates. These, and
other causes o f a similar nature, went far to increase the expenses beyond what
they would have been in ordinary times (Report of the Portsmouth Relief
Association, p. 15).

How was the money spent? Holt Wilson, treasurer of the organization, kept
detailed records o f each contribution and expenditure. Indeed 50 full pages o f the Report
are dedicated to the accounts. Although most expenditures were undertaken directly by
the treasurer, two other members of the Association also spent funds directly. The
contributed funds were spent for a dazzling array of goods and services - transportation,
nursing, grave digging, catering, druggists, laundry, office supplies, unloading
steamboats, clerking in the stores, groceries, day labor, clothing for physicians and nurses,
lumber, direct relief for widows and children, replacement of furniture and bedding
removed from houses, ice, wood, coffins, and even orders of cigars for the doctors and
nurses. Some of the entries reflect the Association’s notion of itself as a temporary
replacement for the government of the town. For instance, although the Common Council
had promised to pay for services rendered by the Naval Hospital, they never did so.
However, the Association made numerous payments to the Hospital over the course of the
epidemic. Both the Association and the Common Council clearly believed that the
Council’s promise had been fulfilled by the Association. The Association also paid for
some o f the expenses incurred for the trip made on behalf of the Council to Washington to
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request the use of the Hospital-even though the Association was not even in existence at
the time of the trip. The Association also cooperated with their counterpart, the Howard
Association in Norfolk. Many contributions came to both cities with the request to share
with the other. Both organizations honored these requests to share funds, although in all
other aspects of management, the two organizations operated alone. It is interesting to
note that, although the Common Council resumed its meetings immediately after the
epidemic, the Association continued to disburse funds until the end of the year.

In fact,

during this time, the budget o f the Association shows monies being given to the Council
for the care of orphans. This delay allowed the municipal government to avoid virtually all
economic responsibility for the disaster.
As noted above, one o f the most telling examples of how both the Association and
the Common Council saw the Association asade facto replacement for the town
government is shown in its dealings with the Naval Hospital. According to the terms of
the agreement entered into by the Hospital and the Common Council,

the town was to reimburse all expenditures rendered necessary for the care and
support of the sick citizens who might be sent to the hospital; and also to make
good all damage done to the furniture, bedding, &c. [57'c] by reason of its use by
them; and the Commodore was further instructed to require, as a preliminary to
the occupation o f the Hospital, a guarantee from the corporation to this effect.
Accordingly, a resolution was adopted, pledging the faith of the town to the terms
agreed on by the committee, and a copy of the resolution, authenticated by the
signatures of the President and Clerk of the Board, with the corporate seal
annexed, was delivered to Commodore McKeever on the same day, and on the
next day, August 1st, that noble institution was thrown open for the reception of
the citizens of Portsmouth, sick with yellow fever (Report of the Portsmouth
Relief Association, p. 157).

The pledge of the “faith of the town” was actually kept by the Association which paid the
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Hospital over $3000, mostly in personnel expenses. The Council “paid” the Hospital only
by having medals struck commending its medical officers.

Goals. Organizations, and The Portsmouth Relief Association
How did the Portsmouth Relief Association meet needs usually addressed by
other components in the society? What enabled the Association to function in a system
deformed by the universal experience of a life-threatening disease? To answer these
questions, we will utilize a number of theories having to do with the nature of
organizations. These theories allow us to examine the circumstances of the workings of
the Association within the system. After this more detailed analysis, we will again look at
the work o f the Association as explained by Anderson and Carter.
The yellow fever epidemic in Portsmouth was a phenomenon of impressive
complexity. We have examined how social, political, economic historic and biological
forces converged to create a “deathstorm.” The government of the town abandoned it
leaving a vacuum of authority. A hurriedly formed private group became, in essence, the
town government, then returned the reins of authority to the elected officials who returned
when it was safe to do so. Here, we wish to examine the nature of the group that assumed
responsibility for shepherding the town through the catastrophe.
Organizations are distinguished most by one characteristic-goal attainment.
Indeed, Parsons states that this is the defining quality of an organization. Organizations are
social units (or human groupings) deliberately constructed and reconstructed to seek
specific goals (Structure and Process in Modem Societies cited in Etzioni, 1964, p. 3).
Corporations, armies and hospitals are examples of organizations while ethnic groups and
families are not. Organizations may be viewed as closed systems. Seen in terms of formal
structure, an organization may be labeled a rational system. It may be labeled a natural
system if seen in terms of its informal structure.80 In the case of the Relief Association,

80 Organizations are part o f a larger system, but they may also be viewed as systems in
themselves. As such, the individuals within them function within both the formal structure of the
organization (the interrelated pattern of jobs that comprise the organization) and the
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formal structure seemed to be at a minimum. Although we know that one member served
as treasurer, we also know that responsibility for resource allocation was not his alone.
The list o f the Association members does not state that any o f them held a particular office
within the Association. Although the Mayor is listed first, there is no evidence that he
served as the leader (assuming there was a leader) of the group (Report of the Portsmouth
Relief Association). Indeed, that position may have been held by Dr. Schoolfield given his
assumed knowledge o f medical issues. When viewed as a closed system, the Association
demonstrates the characteristics of a natural system-a network of cooperative
relationships among peers dedicated to a specific goal. In their work comparing social and
formal organizations, Blau and Scott (2001) suggest the underpinning of these kinds of
cooperative relationships. They argue that three characteristics constitute the core of
social organizations. First, the members of the organization share common values.
Second, they share common social expectations, i.e., there is a standard of acceptable
behavior. Lastly, there are differential role expectations associated with various social
positions. As peers, it could be expected that the members of the Association shared
values and recognized similar societal norms. As men with experience in governance, it
might be expected that they might assume a leadership role during a crisis. But, more
importantly, the presence of the characteristics of a strong cooperative organization may
have obviated the need for a formal, hierarchical structure.
Organizations may also be viewed as sets of interdependent activities (open
systems). Organizations may therefore be viewed not simply as entities, but also as
processes (Scott, 2003, pp. 26-33). The Association was extraordinarily interactive both
within the town and abroad. Indeed, since it was virtually the only viable town institution,
it bore well-nigh the entire interaction burden. The Association’s report documents not
only the organizations interactions within the town-arranging nursing, burials, distribution
of supplies, home visits, but also its extraordinary record of communication with the

organization’s informal structure (the set of demands and expectancies the individual encounters
within the group ((Scott, 2001)).
161

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

outside world. The Association received all letters and contributions sent to the town and
coordinated volunteer activities with the cities sending volunteers and kept outside donor
groups appraised o f the status of the epidemic.
As Parsons has noted, the goals of an organization allow identifiable outputs. The
document presented to the Council allows us to identify the outputs of the Association.
Resource allocation, maintenance of order, control of commerce, aid for the sick, care of
orphans, food and drug distribution, and burial of the dead were the outputs of the
Association in its role as a quasi-government.
Scott (p. 11) notes that the dedication to specific goals defines a set of problems
common to organizations. These include: defining objectives, inducing participants to
render services, controlling, coordinating services, garnering resources, selecting and
training participants and achieving a working accommodation with neighbors-all issues
addressed by the Portsmouth Relief Association in supplying services to the town and
coordinating donations with the Howard Association in Norfolk.
According to Etzioni (1964, pp. 5-19), goals serve a number of purposes. They
orient the organization in time by looking toward the future. They not only legitimize the
activities o f the organization, but the very organization itself. Goals also provide a means
of accountability-they are met or they are not. Goals may also evolve or become
perverted (e.g., an organization that directs funds to luxurious quarters rather than to the
tasks at hand). There may also be unstated goals, e.g., a charitable organization that
supports the poor may also exert a form of social control. And goals may be larger than
stated. A manufacturer may have a goal of processing x units per week, while the true
goal is to make profits. Goals may also be displaced. The survival of the organization
may become the organization’s most important goal. This becomes especially problematic
when the organization’s original goal has been met-as in the case under study. The
organization becomes a “machine without a purpose” which must either find a new goal or
cease to exist. (Etzioni, p. 13) In the Portsmouth situation, the machine ceased to exist.

Organizational Characteristics of the Portsmouth Relief Association
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It should be noted that the definition of organizations can be somewhat fluid
depending on the perspective of the social theorist offering the definition. At the most
basic level Popenoe (1968, pp. 80-82), offers a review of some basic distinctions between
organized groups and such totally disorganized groups as crowds and mobs.81 Perhaps the
best way to understand organizations is to describe an unorganized population.

...the rights, duties, possessions, functions, roles, social status and position of its
members are undetermined and undefined either in broad outline or meticulous
detail; so are its categories of the lawful, recommended, and prohibited forms of
conduct and relationship; so are its official law and government, structure of social
differentiation and stratification, economic order, and so on. Consequently, all
remains uncrystallized. The whole system of social relationships and values is
confused and vague. Members do not know who is ruler and who is to be ruled;
what are the rights and duties of each; what is the proper form of social
relationship between them; what actions and conduct are recommended; lawful and
prohibited for each party (Sorokin, P.A. Society. Culture, and Personality: Their
Structure and Dynamics as cited in Popenoe, p. 81).

Probably the key element that kept Portsmouth from falling into the states of
disorganization described by both Thucydides and Sorokin was the public acceptance of
the Association as a substitute government, i.e., the recognition granted to the authority of
the Association. Where did this authority originate? Handy (1976, pp. 114-21) has
offered six sources for the power of an organization:

•

physical power

•

resource power

81 Note too that the very language of the discipline is fluid. While Anderson and Carter
define organizations and groups as different entities, Popenoe refers to “organized groups.”
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•

position power

•

expert power

•

personal power and

•

negative power

Physical power is the police power of an organization. The physical power of a
government permits them the use of direct coercion in law enforcement. Resource power
refers to the ability o f an organization to control available resources, e.g., the ability o f a
union to withhold labor. Position power refers to legitimized power — the authority of a
government official, for example, comes from the legitimate authority of the government
itself. Expert power comes as the result of special expertise. Sometimes the possession of
even a limited amount of special knowledge will confer power if others in the group lack
any knowledge. Personal power is often called charisma. It may be enhanced by other
kinds o f power, e.g., the holding o f high office. Negative power is the capacity to disrupt
or stop events. Persons in lowly positions, e.g., a clerk who can mislay mail, often can
possess considerable negative power.
The Portsmouth Relief Association possessed a number of the above sources of
authority. The extent o f the policing functions of the Portsmouth Relief Association is
unknown. Some cities during time of epidemic suffer a breakdown of authority leading to
increases in criminal acts. Thucydides’ description of the experience of Athens certainly
points to a vacuum of authority and a rise in uncivil behavior. Contemporary accounts of
the Portsmouth experience do not tell of a similar situation. Indeed, the picture seems to
be that of a community so dispirited as to suffer a lack of enough energy to perpetrate
criminal acts. The budget of the Relief Association includes the expenditure of about
$400 for wardens, presumably appointments made with an eye to maintaining order. But
there is no record of the activities of these men. We do know that the Council assumed
responsibility for the police by voting funds to reimburse them for fees lost during the
epidemic. Given the continual struggle of the Association to find persons willing to
transport and nurse patients, we can reasonably speculate that, although the Association
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may have been able to maintain civic order, it did not possess the forces necessary to
coerce the unwilling (whether slave or free) to perform these functions.
Clearly the most powerful force exerted by the Association was its control of
resources - namely the munificent contributions that poured into the area from almost
every part of the country. Letters accompanying contributions were customarily addressed
to the Mayor, a member of the Association, or to Holt Wilson, its treasurer. Absolute
control o f the purse meant that all resources-food, medicines, nursing services, transport,
housing, burial needs, orphan support-were meted out by the Association. Funds appear
to have been spent as the need arose and authorized by any member o f the Association
who knew o f a need. Most needs were documented, e.g., “to Robert G. Scott, keeper of
store to pay of [sic] laborers and hands”, but others were more general, e.g., a payout of
$400 to “J.N. Schoolfield’s order, for cash to self, to pay off sundry bills” (Report of the
Portsmouth Relief Association, p. 41). In their absolute power over the purse, the
Association not only replaced the financial functions o f the municipal government, but also
those of the commercial sector of the town.
As stated above, position power refers to legitimized power. Clearly, with the
dissolution o f the Common Council, the Relief Association moved into a legitimate power
vacuum. However, in their persons, some brought remnants of legitimate power to their
task. The mayor was a member of the Relief Association as were four members of the
1855 Common Council. (A fifth man had served on the Common Council in 1854.)
Therefore six of the seven members of the Association had been entrusted by the voters of
Portsmouth with legitimate power and may have been seen by them as a quasi
continuation of legitimate authority. Legitimacy may also have been conferred on the
Association by its membership-white males. Weber (1953/1980) suggests that beliefs in
the social order and its prerogatives legitimate authority. The Association manifested the
prevailing social order in Portsmouth. It is important to note, however, that the
Association possessed no legal authority at all. In this, they acted in the same way as the
volunteer association that took over management of the city of Philadelphia in 1793

165

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

(Duffy, 1990, p. 39).82 Most contemporary and later observers may assume that the
expert power on the Association rested with Dr. Schoolfield. Certainly, it was the
Common Council’s first thought as they formed the Sanitary Committee around his
leadership. However, it has been long realized by public health practitioners that the
possession of clinical knowledge necessary to treat individual patients does not qualify its
owner to address the health needs of populations. Indeed, the debate as to what
constitutes the basis of public health practice continues even now (Lundgren, 2001).
However, it is clear that political and management skills are of prime necessity in meeting
epidemic threats. The mayor and past and present Council members were able to transfer
these skills acquired in more serene times to the yellow fever crisis.
There is no way to evaluate the personal power based on charisma that may have
been possessed by the members of the Relief Association. Some, most notably the mayor,
had been successful in the political realm and might therefore be expected to demonstrate
the leadership qualities necessary to win and hold office. In fact, leaders may gain their
legitimacy by means of elections. They may also arise because of special circumstances
(Structure and Process in Modem Societies cited in Etzioni 1964, pp. 1-3). But, whatever
their histories or however they gained legitimacy, there can be little doubt that the men of
the Portsmouth Relief Association demonstrated extraordinary determination and
leadership in seeing their town through its greatest crisis.83

82 In at least one instance, volunteer action went beyond services during an epidemic.
When New York City refused to respond to the Philadelphia situation by taking steps to prevent
yellow fever from striking there, a New York volunteer group hired physicians and inspectors to
inspect ships and wharves. Later, the City entered into a form of public-private partnership by
establishing a committee to work with the volunteer group and investing the joint group with full
powers “to do everything which may become necessary” (Minutes of the New York City Health
Committee cited in Duffy, 1990, p. 40).
83 Miller (1985, pp. 191-2) notes that conflicting loyalties is an issue commonly faced by
organizations in times of disaster, i.e., those who may be dealing with the disaster may have family
responsibilities as well. We do not know how the men of the Association dealt with their family
responsibilities during this time, however, it was not uncommon for men in both cities to send or
take their families to safety and then to either stay or return to assist with the epidemic.
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As far as negative power, any organization as singularly powerful as the Relief
Association was in its time can cause things not to happen as well as to happen. Events
that might have happened, but didn’t, are rarely documented. For instance, we know well
what monies were spent by the Association and how they were spent, but we do not know
how many (if any) may have applied for funds and not received them. Perhaps the most
intriguing non-event occasioned by the Association was its dissolution and ceding of its
considerable authority to the Common Council on the return of its members to the town.
The Association still had considerable funds and certainly the good will of the community
and could doubtless have continued as a powerful player in town affairs, but did not. Not
only were its funds turned over to the Council, but the Council was also requested to bless
the Association’s management of the contributions it had received.
Anderson and Carter (pp. 119-20) note that organizations generate power and,
since they must ensure compliance to achieve goals, must apply some kind of control.
Parsons (pp. 42-4) believes that the generation of power in an organization depends on
four factors:

•

the institutionalization of a value system which legitimizes its goals and
functions,

•

the regulation o f its procurement and decision-making processes through
universalistic rules,

•

command of support of the people on whose cooperation it depends, and

•

command o f necessary facilities, i.e., financial resources.

The Portsmouth Relief Association was able to meet all o f Parsons’ specifications. By
acting as a substitute for a legitimate government, it clothed itself in the extant value
system of the town. Its members, experienced in the rules of procurement and decision
making common to governance, brought their knowledge to the process of ensuring
survival in a time of crisis. Their position as past leaders commanded the support of the
population and their total control over resources ensured the dependance of the
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population on the Association.
Etzioni (1968, pp. 97-101) suggests that organizations have systematic
differences in their means of enforcing compliance. First, he notes that, unlike families or
groups o f friends, organizations are “artificial”. Because of this artificiality, organizations
are more reliant on formal controls to ensure group conformity. Etzioni argues that
power is applied in different ways depending on the nature of the organization, from
physical coercion (as in a prison) to utilitarian (or remunerative) incentives (in a factory)
to normative allegiance (to a church). Although organizations may utilize more than one
category o f compliance measures, a mix of approaches tend to cancel each other out.
Although the author provides lists of different kinds of organizations utilizing either
coercive, utilitarian or normative methods of enforcing compliance, governments, as such,
are not specifically categorized, although some government functions such as running
prisons are listed as coercive. Governments, however, clearly possess the necessary
power to function as coercive organizations.
Etzioni lists voluntary organizations as normative in their methods of gaining
compliance. However, the goals of an organization bring their own legitimacy (Etzioni,
1964). In another work, Etzioni (1968, pp. 59-61) classifies the means of control
employed by an organization into three categories: physical, material or symbolic.
Physical controls are punitive; Etzioni offers whips and locks as examples. Material
controls (utilitarian power) consist of goods and services and, at base, money. Symbols
include prestige and esteem (normative symbols) and love and acceptance (social
symbols). Normative symbols may be used by higher ranks to control those of lower rank.
Etzioni also ranks these forms o f power in terms of their alienation of those under control
with coercive power being the most alienating, and symbolic power the least alienating,
“...the application of symbolic means o f control tends to convince people, that of material
means tend to build up their self-oriented interests in conforming, and the use of physical
means tends to force them to comply” (Etzioni, 1968, p. 60).
The model of an organization is partially dependent on the type of controls it
applies. Etzioni examines prisons as coercive organizations and notes the duality of a
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formal hierarchy (wardens, guards) and an informal hierarchy among the prisoners.
Control in normative organizations depends more on the personal qualities of the people
within them than the more formal controls seen in coercive organizations. Individuals,
often those o f high status in the community, use their personal influence to exert power.
This kind o f organizational power is seen often in religious organizations. Utilitarian
organizations are characterized by a flatter power structure with officials, formal and
informal leaders sharing control-a structure sometimes found in factories (Etzioni, 1968),
but also common in voluntary associations (Scott, 2003, p. 13). The evidence suggests
that the Portsmouth Relief Association employed at least a few police officers. However,
the Association’s frequent complaints as to the difficulties encountered in enlisting willing
or unwilling individuals to aid in such activities as nursing and patient transportation
implies that the Association possessed little coercive power. What power the Association
possessed probably lay in the personality and stature of its members, its control over
resources and the absence of any other source of authority.
Organizations that serve in time of disaster may spring from a number o f sources
Dyne (Organized Behavior in Disasters. 1970 cited by Miller, 1985). These sources are
summarized in Table 3. Established organizations may simply expand their functions or
they may extend their range of services to meet the emergency. For example a fire
department may be called upon to put out a single fire or a number of fires, a small brush
fire or an inferno. In any case, the department is providing essentially the same service.
Other organizations may add extra services in time of emergency. A utility company
serving a community after a hurricane will expand its repair crews to meet the need for
reconnecting service. Some existing organizations will take on unfamiliar tasks during an
emergency. A construction company may turn its attention to dealing with collapsed
buildings rather than erecting them. Members of the ironworkers union in New York City
were among the first to arrive at the Twin Trade Towers on 9/11 to deal with the disaster.
Lastly, organizations may emerge and disappear during a disaster to address a variety of
problems. A neighborhood may organize for clean-up after a storm. Clearly the
Portsmouth Relief Association was an “Emergent Organization” according to Dyne.
169

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Although many of its members were familiar with municipal services, the Association’s
responsibilities were far broader as well as more novel than those performed by the town
government. Supply and distribution of food and drugs, nursing services, and
transportation were activities not usually undertaken by the Common Council. However,
such activities as budget management and maintenance of social order were familiar.
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TABLE 4
ORGANIZATIONAL RESPONSES TO DISASTER

Type o f

Disaster-related Task

Disaster-related

Organiza

Performance

Structural Alterations

Type I:

Performance of many

Few structural changes;

Police, Fire

Established

familiar tasks; demand for

changes that occur are

departments,

organiza

service is greatly increased

largely the result of

National

increased demand for

Guard

Examples

tion

tions

organization’s services;
tasks carried out by
existing personnel
Type II:

Performance of familiar

Major structural changes

Red Cross,

Expanding

tasks: prepared to carry

due to disaster-related

utility

organiza

out disaster-related tasks

tasks and integration with

companies

tions

other groups and
volunteer or auxiliary
personnel

Type III:

Performance of largely

Major structural changes

Local

Extending

unfamiliar disaster-related

due to disaster-related

construction

organiza

tasks

tasks

company,

tions

student
organizations
help salvage
library
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Type IV:

Performance of unfamiliar

Emergent structure;

Neighbor

Emergent

disaster-related tasks;

shifting and temporary

hood rescue

organiza

emergent definition of

membership

and cleanup

tions

tasks to be carried out

crews

From Dyne, R.R. Organized
Behavior in Disasters cited by Miller,
D.L. (1985)
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The Portsmouth Relief Association as a Mid-19th Century Organization
Was the Portsmouth experience typical of 19th century epidemic situations? As we
have seen, in the absence o f a functioning municipal government, a volunteer organization
assumed responsibility for management of the town of Portsmouth during the epidemic.
Whatever we may think of the actions o f the Portsmouth government, public-private
partnerships in time of epidemic were not unknown at the time. A similar sort o f private,
volunteer performance of all public functions was clearly exemplified in the classic
Philadelphia experience a half a century earlier and was also found in the Norfolk
experience. In some cases, most notably in New Orleans where epidemic disease was
almost constant, the government found it expedient to directly support charitable
organizations to care for victims while they regularly fled to more salubrious locales.
In some ways, the rather muddled relationship between public and private efforts
to care for the sick reflected the organizational relations of the time. For most o f the
population, caring for the sick was considered a domestic responsibility. Hospitals, our
dominant health care institution, were uncommon, existing only to care for those who
could not be tended at home - mainly travelers and the destitute. Some were public, but
private charitable organizations, too, took on themselves responsibility for the sick. In
mid-century in Sacramento, both the Odd Fellows and the Free-Masons nursed the sick,
and provided coffins for the dead (Roth, 1997). Certainly the most conspicuous example
of a private organization taking responsibility for the care of the sick in time of epidemic
was that of the Howard Association of New Orleans. Formed to address the yellow fever
epidemic o f 1837, year after year, the Association tended to the victims of the city’s
pathogen-friendly climate (Carrigan, 1994, p. 45). This was no small responsibility. In the
great yellow fever epidemic o f 1853, the Association managed a budget of $200,000.
When the Charity Hospital and four temporary infirmaries established by the city proved
inadequate, the Association opened an additional four hospitals.

Association members divided the city among themselves, as they had done in the
past, and took responsibility for locating destitute yellow fever patients and calling
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on them daily; arranging for home medical and nursing care; paying for medicines,
ice, groceries, and bedding; and, when necessary, transporting patients to hospitals
and orphans to asylums, and arranging for burial o f the dead (Carrigan, 1994, p.
68 ).

The Association was also given supervisory authority over the two municipal orphanages
(Carrigan, 1994). But the Association was only one of the organizations in New Orleans
that provided services in time of epidemic. With the municipal government paying little
attention to the poor, a variety of mutual assistance societies, labor unions, religious
associations and others served as a safety net in epidemic times (Carrigan, 1994, p. 69,
344-353).
The variation in methods adopted by 19th century American cities in dealing with
epidemic crises may be in part a reflection of confusion as to where responsibility for
population health rested. Health in terms of care for the sick was transitioning from a
matter o f philanthropy to one of professional responsibility. The responsibility for public
health. measures was also undergoing transition in the period under study. The lack of
clarity concerning the obligations of legitimate governments was also undergoing change a transition reflected in the variation in responses to the threat of epidemics. The
Baltimore yellow fever epidemic mentioned earlier seems to have been addressed by the
city government. New Orleans and New York entered into private-public partnership
arrangements. Charleston too, with five yellow fever epidemics in the last decade of the
18th century, also relied for a time on a physician volunteer committee to identify cases of
yellow fever. However, the city entered the 19th century with paid city inspectors (Duffy,
1992). Portsmouth followed the earlier Philadelphia model with the mayor remaining in
the city and a group o f volunteers serving as a de facto government. In some instances,
states provided some assistance. In New York, the state legislature paid considerable
attention to the problems o f epidemic presented by the port of New York. In the 1798
epidemic in New York City, the state provided most of the funds needed for relief;
however, the state legislature required the City to have paid inspectors and a system for
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routine quarantines. The state o f Massachusetts too also granted cities authority to deal
with epidemics. In an earlier time (1795) in Baltimore, before the city received a charter,
the state of Maryland appointed physicians to inspect ships. However, when the city
received a charter two years later, the state shifted responsibility to the municipal
authorities. There were no state boards of health at the time (Duffy, 1992) and no federal
interest until the massive yellow fever epidemic of 1878 forced the formation of a (short
lived) national board o f health. What is most telling in the Portsmouth experience in terms
o f other government authorities is that the government and the Relief Association both
looked to and received assistance from federal rather than state authorities. In a short
time, these same citizens would be waging war against the government that had helped
them in the name of the government that had abandoned them.

The Portsmouth Relief Association as a 21st Century Organization
Can the Portsmouth Relief Association serve as a model for 21st century crisisrelief organizations? The recognition of the need for organizations to accomplish work is
age-old. During the Exodus from Egypt, Jethro, the father-in-law of Moses, directed him
to delegate authority over the tribes of Israel in hierarchical lines. Socrates also directed
his attention to the art of management of organizations. However, it was not until the
approximate time of the epidemic that scientific attention was turned to the nature and
management of organizations. For at least a century, writings concerning organizations
focused on such principles as authority, hierarchy, specialization, rules, order and
discipline (Shafritz, J.M. and Ott, J.S., 2001, pp. 8-78). This perspective mirrored the
rational system description noted above. It was believed that organizations needed to be
highly structured. This need for structure, however, led to a certain inflexibility, a
characteristic that caused the disruption of the government during the Portsmouth
epidemic.
By the mid-twentieth century, organizational theorists turned their attention to the
more human aspects of organization, i.e., a natural systems perspective. In doing so, they
began to question whether organizations’ structures and functions actually matched
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(Shafritz, J.M. and Ott, J.S., pp. 88-135). Cyert and March described organizations as
coalitions of people with varied interests. Instead o f following strict rules, the members of
the organization continually made bargains with others on the basis of their own interests.
Also during this time, basic assumptions made be earlier writers were questioned. Simon
noted that accepted administrative principles such as efficiency and hierarchy were, in fact,
often in conflict. Specialization might lead to non-recognition of factors important to the
problems at hand.
Daft (1998, p. 14) describes the need for 21st century organizations to operate
under conditions of randomness and uncertainty. He looks to future organizations to
order themselves in such a way that they possess the flexibility to move, even to move
drastically, to meet ever-changing circumstances. In a curious way, the Relief Association
is an exemplar of this post-modern paradigm. The Portsmouth municipal government,
with its classically ordered structure and rules, broke apart in the face of the epidemic. All
o f its members did not leave the area. The mayor and a few Council members remained.
However, the government could not function as such because its structure required the
convening o f regular meetings, the presence o f a quorum and the passing of ordinances as
its means of operation. The Portsmouth Relief Association had no such restrictions. In
fact, it seemed to operate with few, if any, rules. Its whole purpose was to address the
constantly shifting needs o f the population as the epidemic progressed. To accomplish the
goal, authority was apparently spread throughout the organization. Evidence suggests
that all or most members of the Association possessed the authority to make decisions as
to funds appropriation as the occasion demanded. Although Holt Wilson served as
treasurer, it is not clear that there were other officers. Letters accompanying donations
were commonly addressed to the mayor or to Holt Wilson as treasurer, but not to other
members as officers. There were some donations addressed to Dr. Schoolfield as chair of
the Sanitary Committee, but that was the municipal organization that preceded the
Association. With its small size, lack of specialization and absence of conventional
organizational restraints, the Association could “turn on a dime” to address social
conditions that had progressed from orderly to chaotic in a matter of days.
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Conner (1998) argues that contemporary organizations must be re-thought to meet
conditions of increasingly rapid change-even of chaos, i.e., exactly the conditions faced by
the Portsmouth Relief Association. To meet these exigencies, organizations must
demonstrate four characteristics: nimbleness, resilience, human due diligence and, above
all, execution.
Nimbleness is the ability of an organization to succeed in an unpredictable, erratic
environment by implementing important changes. The term means more than flexibility.
Conner (p. 40) argues that it includes “speed, grace, dexterity, and resourcefulness.” In a
competitive environment, nimbleness provides an edge over rival organizations. During
the epidemic, nimbleness enabled the Relief Association to first organize itself and then to
organize relief efforts in a constantly shifting milieu. Nimbleness enabled the Association
both to utilize existing institutions (e.g., working with the clergy who remained in the
town) and to address totally new problems (e.g., finding housing for volunteers). It
allowed the members of the Association to awake to new conditions every day, to find
new resources (e.g., volunteers, money, medicines) to meet the changed situation, and to
ensure that the identified resources were appropriately utilized.
Resilience is the ability to absorb large amounts of disruptive change without a
significant drop in productivity* Resilience may be seen in leadership, in culture and in
context. Resilient leadership is predisposed to seize opportunities both within and outside
the organization. It is focused, but also flexible in considering a variety o f information on
which to base decisions. Resilient leaders are able to structure the information they
receive and are proactive in resolving new problems. The Portsmouth Relief Association
demonstrated all these traits. Change was upon them with each new day, even with each
new hour. They were able to utilize existing opportunities in the town (e.g., using an
existing hospital) and to create opportunities outside the town (e.g., maintaining
relationships with groups in other cities who were sending resources). The Association’s
focus was forced upon them with the single mission of survival in an overwhelming crisis,
but the members evidenced flexibility in their response to information, e.g., their shifting
attention to such matters as nursing, burials and care of orphans as the need arose. They
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showed an ability to structure their response as well as the ability to be proactive by
districting the town and sending out volunteers to assess and address the situation in each
district.
Human due diligence has to do with gathering of information, planning and
engaging in actions directed to the effects of rapid change on the human capital of an
organization. The human capital within the Relief Association’s own ranks was small in
number, but large in leadership ability. The members of the Association knew the town
intimately and were accustomed to leadership positions. The Association’s main human
capital concerns were the people who remained in the town who might be able to assist in
relief efforts and the large corps of volunteers who arrived from other locales. Both were
subject to conditions of rapid change. Those who were well and capable of work on one
day might be moribund or even deceased the next. Arriving volunteers had to be
accommodated and assigned to appropriate tasks. Epidemic conditions forced the Relief
Association to adapt to workforce conditions that were shifting daily, even hourly.
The impressive record of the Association’s ability to execute the activities needed
to address the issues raised by the epidemic is best found in the detailed budget the
Association presented to the Common Council after the crisis. The largest expense
actually occurred after the disease had abated. That was the $25,000 endowment for the
newly established orphanage. During the epidemic, the main expenditure was for coffins
and burials ($8000) with general relief efforts costing about two thirds of that figure.
Payments to physicians, nurses and to the Naval Hospital were $3000 - $4000 each. The
aggregate figures, however, give only a hazy vision of the Association’s ability to execute,
The long list of detailed expenditures contained in the Association’s Report testify to the
organization’s ability to address diverse needs as they arose. A sample of expenditures is
found in Appendix Two. With its flat organization, lack of structure and specialization,
and its ability to succeed in a chaotic environment, the Portsmouth Relief Association
departed from its 19th century roots and leapt 150 years into the future.

Discussion
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This work started with the observation that we were looking at a small epidemic,
and that we would be examining the events of the epidemic in the framework of systems
theory. Entering into the year 1855, the town of Portsmouth was a functioning system
with a number of entities (e.g., government, families, churches, commercial enterprises)
interacting with each other and with the outside world. The system sustained and was
sustained by an antebellum culture based on white male dominance. As the crisis matured,
the system became stressed and deformed. The fleeing of families and individuals, the
collapse of government and commerce created a vacuum of leadership and institutions at a
time when the town needed both.
But, although the system changed, it did not fracture. In the absence of the usual
sources o f authority, a volunteer organization formed not only to address the epidemic
itself, but also to, as far as possible, maintain the town. The organization dominated the
town during the summer and fall of 1855. In fact, with the shrinking or absence of other
entities that might balance its importance and its control of virtually all aspects of life (and
death), the Portsmouth Relief Association might fairly be characterized as a totalitarian
organization. Still, it can also be argued that the Association carried on “business as
usual.” The town’s cultural basic social arrangements did not change. White men were
still expected to lead the town. Black men and women were expected to serve the white
population. The port and commercial establishments closed, but the Association made
arrangements for supplies to arrive by steamer and opened its own stores. Many church
members and apparently some ministers fled, but the remainder worked with the
Association to succor the ill. Ritual funeral arrangements were abandoned, but the town
managed to bury its dead in a timely fashion. Interactions with the outside varied from
usual practices, but the Association maintained a robust correspondence with the outside
world. Other than scenes of desperation at departing ships, there is little evidence of civil
disorder.
Once it became evident that the Portsmouth Relief Association became the
dominant element of the system, the focus of the work shifted to the Association as an
organization. The Association clearly functioned as an organization with goals and
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measurable outputs. But, oddly, in its flat structure, its diffusion of authority, and its
ability to respond to new situations as quickly as they arose, the Association prefigured
organizational theoretical thought one hundred years in the future.
The epidemic may have been small scale, but the response to it revealed a number
of common antebellum social arrangements, and also typifies the American response to
disaster relief as well as to the threat of specific diseases. Even today, the American
approach to both is a mix of private and public responses. Both the American Red Cross
and the Federal Emergency Management Agency are expected to address disasters. The
National Institutes o f Health and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention are
expected to deal with disease in the United States, but so are the American Heart
Association and the American Cancer Society. In the Portsmouth experience, the
municipal government was absent, thus providing the opportunity for a volunteer
organization to seize the reins of government. The federal government did respond
positively to the town’s request for the use of the Naval Hospital to care for the civilian
population, but their official role seems to have been limited. Indeed much of the monies
required to use the Hospital for this purpose came from contributions that were disbursed
by the Relief Association.
Is there a place for organizations like the Relief Association in 21st century
municipal crises? This paper is a case study and therefore suggestive rather than
generalizable. However, the Portsmouth experience argues that bureaucracies with their
stepwise methodologies and prescribed modes of operation will fail in the face of chaos.
Even if the Portsmouth Common Council had remained intact, it is difficult to understand
how their process o f lengthy meetings, referrals to issues to committees, and the passing
of ordinances could have addressed the conditions of the epidemic. Modem municipal
governments have even more complex, entrenched governing processes. What then can
governments do to prepare for times of crisis? The nature of the yellow fever epidemic is
similar to many catastrophic conditions in that its effects were unanticipated and
perpetually mutating. The Portsmouth Relief Association demonstrated that a small, flat
group empowered to cut across customary lines of authority was able to address the
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catastrophe in a way that a “normal” government could not. Cities may not be able to
anticipate disasters, but they could consider planning for the immediate formation of such
a group should it become necessary.
Probably the last American epidemic to occasion the mortality and morbidity seen
in a runaway yellow fever epidemic was experienced in the influenza epidemic of 1918.84
Although a relatively modem public health structure (e.g., boards of health) existed in the
U.S. at the time, the means to address the epidemic collapsed in city after city (Iezzoni,
1999). With regard to HIV/AIDS, slow-moving though it was, private organizations were
required to goad the public health response. With our knowledge of and means to destroy
the vector of yellow fever, the chance of repeating the Portsmouth experience of that
disease is probably small. But the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention is looking
to prevent a possible pandemic of avian influenza (bird flu). Avian influenza affects a
number o f bird species with others serving as reservoirs. The agent of infection has been
identified as the H5N1 vims. The vims has demonstrated an ability to move not only from
birds to humans, but also from humans to humans. The current mortality rate is 70
percent. There is no proven cure and no vaccine (Key Facts about Avian Influenza and
Avian Influenza A Vims, 2005). Any sustained outbreak of this disease could prove a
severe test o f the public health system.
Today, the Virginia Department of Health is the agency which most directly
addresses itself to the prevention and management of infectious disease in the state. The
Department provides limited information concerning mosquito-bome diseases on its
website (www.vdh.state.va.usl. The most detailed information pertains to West Nile
vims. There is nothing on the site regarding avian influenza. As for yellow fever, the
Department advises vaccination for those who are traveling to “countries where the
disease occurs.”

84 HIV/AIDS is an epidemic in slow motion. Influenza, like yellow fever, kills quickly.
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APPENDIX 1
Nineteenth Century American Epidemics

1803

New York

Yellow Fever

1820-03

Nationwide

“Fever”

1831-2

Nationwide

Asiatic Cholera

1832

New York City and other major

Cholera

cities
1833

Columbus, Ohio

Cholera

1834

New York City

Cholera

1837

Philadelphia

Typhus

1841

Nationwide (especially severe in the

Yellow Fever

south)
1847

New Orleans

Yellow Fever

1847-8

Worldwide

Influenza

1848-9

North America

Cholera

1849

New York

Cholera

1850

Nationwide

Yellow Fever

1850-1

North America

Influenza

1851

Illinois, Missouri, the Great Plains

Cholera

1852

New Orleans and Nationwide

Yellow Fever

1855

Nationwide (many parts)

Yellow Fever

1857-9

Worldwide

Influenza

1860-61

Pennsylvania

Smallpox

1865-73

Philadelphia, New York, Boston,

Smallpox

New Orleans

205

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

1865-73

Baltimore, Memphis, Washington,

Cholera

DC
Philadelphia, New York, Boston,

Smallpox, Typhus,

New Orleans, Baltimore, Memphis,

Typhoid, Scarlet Fever,

Washington, DC

Yellow Fever

1873-5

North America and Europe

Influenza

1878

New Orleans

Yellow Fever

1885

Plymouth, PA

Typhoid

1886

Jacksonville, FL

Yellow Fever

1865-73

Newsletter Genealogical Society of Santa Cruz County (Sept-Oct, 1997). “Epidemics in
US 1628-1918". www.bihughes.org/epidemic.html.10/20/Q3

South Bend Genealogical Society (April, 1996). “Epidemics in U.S. - 1657-1918.
www.geocities.com/Heartlnad/Plains/9467/epidemic.htm. 10/20/03
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APPENDIX TWO

SELECTED EXPENDITURES OF THE PORTSMOUTH RELIEF
ASSOCIATION (1855)

August 27:

Wm. Porter for digging graves

$7.00

August 28:

Purchase of horse from Wm. Outten

$40.00

August 31:

Jacob I. Day, conveying sick to Hospital
and Pest House

$54.00

September 3:

Jackson Carr, nurse at Hospital

$43.59

September 3:

caterer, James Webb, support of physicians
N. Street
$25.00

September 3:

Francis Reilly, nurse

$33.00

September 4:

James Lanider, to purchase clothing,& c.,
for children destitute on his hands

$5.00

Isaac, hack hire, carrying Julius Ward to
Hospital

$1.00

September 6:

Pasquali Vassette, apothecary

$21

September 7:

Frederick Walker, servant at Hospital

$46.50

September 7:

Hannah Wheeler, cook at Hospital

$46.50

September 7:

Jane Baines, washer at Hospital

$31.00

September 7:

B.D. Clark, freight on 195 tons ice

$243.75

September 8:

Roscoe Wilson, services in provision store

$5.00

September 11:

John Wilkins, bread for Academy

11.52

September 11:

R. West, for unloading steamer

$ 1.00

September 14:

F. Montserral, cigars for Hospital

$9.60

September 5:

207

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

September 15:

Com for provision store

$82.40

September 17:

J.H. Cherry, hire of laborers on steamer

$25.00

September 17:

Lewis Stanwood, laborer at Hospital

$ 10.50

September 22:

James K. Haynes, services as clerk

$45.00

September 24:

J.S. & R.B. Levy, stationery

$59.28

September 29:

Jacob, messenger at Hospital

$ 16.00

October 3:

Charles Fuller, waiter at Hospital

$35.00

October 8:

Dr. Thomas of Cincinnati, Ohio, &c.

$300

October 8:

Dr. Bryant and Dr. Aspull

$300

October 11:

Rent, servants &c., Crawford House

$600

October 13:

R. Porter, clothing for physicians and nurses $24

October 15:

Relief to a widow and children

October 16:

D. Peete’s bill for lumber, &c.,
for pest house and fence, &c.

$ 10

$361.92

October 16:

R.G. Scott, hands, &c., at store

$24.50

October 22:

Wm. A. Smith’s bill, bacon

$44.19

October 23:

Bill of Hatton & Cooke for 2500
prescriptions

$225

W.H. Wilson for injuries and damage to
his house and furniture by yellow fever
patients, mattresses, bedding, carpets,
blankets, &c. taken by association and
replaced

$511

Mashall Hutchison’s receipt for cash, in
order to convey Wm. Smith, lunatic, to
Brooklyn

$75

October31:

November 3:
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C.W. Murdaugh, services rendered in
going to and returning from Washington
city, to procure use of the Hospital from
the General Government

$25

Anderson, slave, use of horse and feeding
same

$9

November 14:

Miss Barrett, for caps for orphans

$2.50

November 14:

Norfolk Howard Association, for Norfolk
orphans (half of contribution from
Lancaster, Pennsylvania)

$1.50

J.G. Hodsden’s bill for coffins, raised top,
plate, Box and hearse, $13 each, flat tops
and plain $10, mattresses, &c. as per bill

$303.25

November 28:

Bob Butt, grave digger

$1289.60

December 3:

Hospital, whitewashing rooms occupied
By sick citizens

$27.75

John Nash, Esq., trustee, for 10 lots in
square No. 3, 2 lots in square No. 2,
4 lots in square No. 5, 5 lots in square
No. 10, one-half square No. 14, and 2
Lots adjoining, on the west of the Ravine,
As burial ground for the dead who died
By the yellow fever in 1855, all being
lots in Oak Grove Cemetery

$480

J.M.. Freeman & Son for watch stolen
from Sister of Charity while at hospital

$35

J.N. Schoolfield’s bill for furnishing list
O f dead

$50

December 21:

H. Stokes, for burying 598 persons

$6767.89

December 22:

Expenses of Committee fo Common
Council of Portsmouth in relation to
Orphans

$42

November 13:

November 13:

November 20:

December 4:

December 5:

December 10:
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December 28:

December 29

This amount appropriated to the Humane
Society of Portsmouth to purchase wood
for the poor
Moses P. Young, shoes for orphans

$2000
$9.25

Report of the Portsmouth Relief
Association
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